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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Com I liiis jurisdiction piirsiiiiiil lit I H.ili < IMII \nn *j 59-1 NiN and Ulah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
t 
Techsystems, Inc. ("ATK") is subject to tb<* privilege tax assessed under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-4-101 for tax year 2000, where (11 \ is. possessed and beneficially used real 
property ovviu-d In Ik I Inili'il Sink's • . -^ .• . ,_t 
motors for private companies pursuant to a Facilities Use Contract that allowed ATK to 
use the NIROP Property o n r u - free non interference basis, and where (2) no other 
piv, ate company useu ,• ,v .. OJP Property for any purpose and no other entity had a 
us uscinnhm 'ROP IVopnlv'1 
[Issue preserved: R. 1082-1084] 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts review summary judgment determinations 
courts determine oiiij ,vliethci the ..MA ern<!-!» law and 
whether it correctly held that there were no disputed issues >i * nitenai tau N ••Hake 
Conul\ \ tlolluhw Hunt ( ii V U\ 'UIIIWI ' l32«>XMI|ah 'Hill fi|iiolin^ 
Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, ^ 6, 96 P.3d 950 and Kouris v, Utah Highway 
Patrol, 2003 UT 19, f 5, 70 P.3d 72). 
1 
ISSUE II: Did the District Court correctly determine that ATK did not have 
standing to raise the Supremacy Clause challenge based on federal government immunity 
from taxation? 
[Issue preserved: R. 1085] 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts review summary judgment determinations 
for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's legal conclusions; appellate 
courts determine only whether the district court erred in applying the governing law and 
whether it correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Salt Lake 
County v. Holliday Water Co., — P.3d — , 2010 WL 2332985 Utah, 2010 (quoting 
Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, f^ 6, 96 P.3d 950 and Kouris v. Utah Highway 
Patrol 2003 UT 19, Tf 5, 70 P.3d 72). 
ISSUE III: Did ATK preserve its issue and argument on appeal that it was 
economically impacted and thus had standing in its own right to assert a violation of the 
Supremacy Clause under the Doctrine of Pre-emption? 
[Issue not preserved] 
Standard of Review: If an issue is not preserved, appellate court will not address 
its merits "absent plain error or exceptional circumstances." Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. 
Ivers, 218 P.3d 583(Utah 2009) quoting State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, % 21, 167 P.3d 
1046. "Exceptional circumstances . . . is used infrequently and usually requires 'rare 
procedural anomalies."9 Hill v. Estate of Alfred, 2009 UT 28, f 25, 216 P.3d 929 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 1993)). 
2 
ISSUE IV: Did the District Court correctly rule that Utah's privilege tax does not 
violate the Supremacy Clause by taxing the full value of property that is possessed and 
beneficially used for profit by ATK but owned by the U.S. Navy, where ATK's 
possession of the property was exclusive, its beneficial use of the property was the value 
of the property and there was no tax assessed against the Navy? 
[Issue preserved: R. 1085-1087] 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts review summary judgment determinations 
for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's legal conclusions; appellate 
courts determine only whether the district court erred in applying the governing law and 
whether it correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Salt Lake 
County v. Holliday Water Co., — P.3d —, 2010 WL 2332985 Utah, 2010 (quoting 
Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, H 6, 96 P.3d 950 and Kouris v. Utah Highway 
Patrol 2003 UT 19, % 5, 70 P.3d 72). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101. Tax basis — Exceptions — Assessment and 
collection. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (l)(b) and (c), a tax is imposed on the 
possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person of any real or personal property 
which for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that property is used in connection with 
a business conducted for profit. 
(2) The tax imposed under this chapter is the same amount that the ad valorem 
property tax would be if the possessor or user were the owner of the property. The 
amount of any payments which are made in lieu of taxes is credited against the tax 
imposed on the beneficial use of property owned by the federal government. 
#** 
(3) A tax is not imposed under this chapter on the following: 
3 
* * * 
(e) the use or possession of any lease, permit, or easement unless the lease, 
permit, or easement entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the 
premises to which the lease, permit, or easement relates. Every lessee, permittee, 
or other holder of a right to remove or extract the mineral covered by the holder's 
lease, right, permit, or easement except from brines of the Great Salt Lake, is 
considered to be in possession of the premises, notwithstanding the fact that other 
parties may have a similar right to remove or extract another mineral from the 
same lands or estates; 
(4) A tax imposed under this chapter is assessed to the possessors or users of the 
property on the same forms, and collected and distributed at the same time and in the 
same manner, as taxes assessed owners, possessors, or other claimants of property which 
is subject to ad valorem property taxation. The tax is not a lien against the property, and 
no tax-exempt property may be attached, encumbered, sold, or otherwise affected for the 
collection of the tax. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Proceedings, 
This is an appeal by ATK from a District Court Decision and Order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the County, the Utah State Tax Commission and Granite 
School District and upholding the County's privilege tax assessment against ATK for its 
beneficial use for profit of exempt property owned by the United States Navy. R. 1087, 
1089-1090. Addendum A. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below, 
Pursuant to his statutory duties, the Salt Lake County Assessor issued property tax 
assessments to ATK for its ownership and use of real and personal property located in 
Salt Lake County for tax year 2000. R. 191-259. Addendum B. In addition to property 
tax, the Assessor assessed a privilege tax on ATK's possession and beneficial use of 
exempt property owned by the United States Navy known as the Navy Industrial Reserve 
4 
Ordnance Plant ("NIROP"). Id. ATK appealed the 2000 assessments to the Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization ("Board") where the Board, and later the Utah State Tax 
Commission, sustained the assessments. Id. ATK appealed to the District Court and the 
matter was assigned to a Tax Judge. Over the course of time, the parties reached a 
settlement on all property tax valuation issues, but reserved the right to challenge the 
2000 privilege tax assessment of ATK's possession and beneficial use of NIROP (the 
"NIROP Issue"). R. 119-128. Ultimately the NIROP Issue was transferred to the 
Honorable Jon M. Memmott, Second Judicial District Judge sitting as a Tax Judge for the 
Third Judicial District. R. 1079-1087. 
The County, with the support of Granite School District, and the Utah State Tax 
Commission filed Motions for Summary Judgment citing interpretive Utah case law and 
urging the District Court to rule that ATK was subject to and not exempt from Utah's 
Privilege Tax on its possession and beneficial use of the NIROP property. R. 75-108. 
ATK filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that it was exempt from the 
privilege tax because it did not maintain exclusive possession of the NIROP property in 
as much as the Navy maintained a presence on the property to inspect the work 
performed under its government contracts by ATK. R. 747-764. Additionally, ATK 
asserted that when the beneficial user of exempt property does not have full, unfettered 
use of property, a privilege tax on the full value of the exempt property is a tax on the 
federal government's retained interest in that property. Id. ATK then argued that such a 
tax on the government's property interest is a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution. Id. 
5 
C. Disposition by the District Court 
The District Court adopted the factual assertions of the parties contained in their 
respective memoranda and concluded there were no material facts in dispute. R. 1081. 
Applying Utah law to the undisputed facts, the District Court further concluded that 
"ATK was in exclusive possession of the NIROP property as of 1 January 2000, as 
contemplated in Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-10l(3)(e) through its permitted possession and 
use of the premises under its Facilities Use, Capital Maintenance and Production 
Contracts and subcontracts, even though the land-owner, the Navy, retained traditional 
levels of management and control in the NIROP Property. No one else other than the 
land owner (i.e., the Navy), had any possession, use, management, or control of the 
NIROP Property during 2000." R. 1090. 
As to ATK's Supremacy Clause argument, the District Court further ordered that 
the tax imposed under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 does not violate the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. The Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution creates rights for the federal government, not for private individuals. Id. 
Under Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), this Court established a three-part test 
to determine when a party may assert the constitutional rights of a third party: "First, the 
presence of some substantial relationship between the claimaint and the third parties; 
second, the impossibility of the rightholders asserting their own constitutional rights; and 
third, the need to avoid a dilution of third parties9 constitutional rights that would result 
were the assertion of jus tertii not permitted.' R. 1091. The Court found that ATK could 
not establish the second and third requirements under the Shelledy test and therefore did 
6 
not have standing to raise the Supremacy Clause claim. Id. The Court further ruled that 
even if ATK had standing to assert its Supremacy Clause argument, which it did not, the 
privilege tax assessed against ATK was constitutional. Id. ATK had "exclusive 
possession" of the NIROP Property. Id. Since ATK's possession was exclusive, its 
beneficial use of the NIROP Property was the value of the NIROP Property and no tax 
was assessed against the Navy. Id. 
D. Statement of Facts, 
1. ATK is a leading supplier of aerospace and defense products to the U.S. 
Government, America's Allies, and major prime contracts. The Aerospace Division 
accounts for 40 percent or $436 million of all Fiscal Year 2000 sales. R. 76, 1081. 
2. ATK's primary financial goal is to create maximum shareholder value 
through profitable growth and the effective use of cash and other resources. R. 77,1081. 
3. ATK's U.S. Government business is performed under both cost-plus 
contracts and fixed-price contracts. Cost-plus contracts are either cost-plus-fixed-fee, 
cost-plus-incentive-fee, or cost-plus-award fee contracts. Fixed price contracts are either 
firm fixed-price, fixed-price incentive, or fixed-price-level-of-effort contracts. ATK 
obtains military contracts through either competitive bidding or sole-sourced 
procurement. R. 78, 1081. 
4. ATK's aerospace division utilizes property located in Magna, Salt Lake 
County, Utah known as Bacchus Works. Bacchus Works consists of three plants: Plant 
One, Bacchus West, and NIROP. R. 79, 1081. 
7 
5. As of March 31, 2000, ATK occupied manufacturing assembly, warehouse, 
test, research, development and office properties in Magna, Utah having a total floor 
space of approximately 2,324,000 square feet. These properties were either owned, 
leased or occupied under facilities use contracts with the U.S. Government, including 
518,000 square feet occupied rent-free under a facilities contract that requires ATK to 
pay for all utilities, services, and maintenance costs. R. 79, 1081. 
6. For 2000, the parties agreed that the value of ATK's Bacchus Works 
property in Salt Lake County, including exempt NIROP property possessed or 
beneficially used by ATK, on which the privilege tax was assessed, was $238,032,387. 
R. 79-80, 1081. 
7. NIROP property at ATK's Bacchus Works plant is comprised of six (6) 
parcels that constitute approximately 528.48 acres of land and 181 improvements owned 
by the U. S. Navy. Alliant uses 165 improvements at NIROP in connection with its 
business to fulfill and perform its government contracts. The uses and features of the 
structures within NIROP are similar to those of ATK's Plant One. R. 80, 1081. 
8. Of the 181 improvements located at NIROP, 15 no longer contribute value, 
six contribute less than $1,000 value each, and 16 contribute less than $5,000 value each. 
Consequently 144 of the improvements contribute 99.7% of the value for NIROP. R. 80, 
1081. 
9. ATK utilizes NIROP to fulfill its contracts with Lockheed Martin and 
McDonnell Douglas. NIROP is used in the manufacture of rocket motors for the Navy's 
Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) programs and other programs such as the U.S. Army Space 
8 
& Missile Defense Command in relation to the STARS and the Delta GEM-40 for 
McDonnell Douglas (Boeing). The missile rocket motors produced at NIROP have 
included the Trident II (commonly called D-5); Trident 1 (commonly called C-4), the 
Poseidon (commonly called C-3), and Polaris (commonly called C-4). R. 80-81,1081. 
10. Under ATK's cost-plus contract with Lockheed Martin for the Titan IV 
("Titan IV Contract")? ATK was required to "furnish all necessary supplies and services 
required to perform the efforts associated with the Final Assemble Capability for T-IV 
SRMU for FY 00," in accordance with various contract provisions for a Target Price of 
approximately $19 million, with a Target Cost of $17 million and a Target Profit of $2 
million. The total contract value had an estimated price of $380,869,476, and included an 
Award Fee for ATK's performance of over $6.8 million with a Mission Success Launch 
Incentive of over $16 million. In the performance of this Contract, ATK was authorized 
"to use throughout the period of performance of this Contract, on a rent-free non-
interference basis, any of the Government Property (Government Furnished Property, 
Government Furnished Flight Hardware, Government Furnished Facilities, Government 
Furnished Technical Data, Special Tooling, Special Test Equipment and [ATK] Acquired 
Property) provided under, or for which a right to use has been previously granted for" 
under specified prime contracts and subcontracts. Technical direction to ATK under this 
Contract could only be given by Lockheed Martin, who retained the right of inspection. 
ATK had a duty to manage the subcontract effectively and efficiently. R. 81-82,1081. 
11. Similar provisions are included under ATK's cost-plus contract with 
Lockheed Martin for the Trident II (D-5) ("Trident II Contract"). For example, the 
9 
contract called for a Target Price of nearly $61.8 million, including a Target Cost of over 
$56.4 million and a Target Fee to ATK of $5.4 million. The contract included provisions 
for use of government-owned facilities, special tooling and special test equipment and 
allowed source inspections by Lockheed Martin. R. 82, 1081. 
12. ATK's contract with McDonnell Douglas Corporation relates to the 
production of Ground-Ignited Graphite Epoxy Motors (GEM) and production of Air-
Ignited Motors Equipped with Lengthened Nozzles (GEM-LN) for the Delta II program 
("GEM Contract"). This fixed price contract had a total value of $486 million. ATK was 
the exclusive supplier to Boeing. Cross utilization requests were required for NIROP 
facilities. Performance was predicated upon the utilization of Government owned 
production equipment and facilities on a rent-free, non-interference basis. R. 82, 1081. 
13. ATK has employees who work routinely at NIROP in connection with its 
for-profit business. R. 82, 1081. 
14. NIROP is identified separately from surrounding properties by a chain link 
fence that identifies the NIROP property, warns trespassers to keep out and excludes the 
public. Only authorized personnel are allowed access to NIROP. R. 83, 1081. 
15. The Navy's administrative offices are in ATK's administration building at 
Plant One. When a guest enters ATK's facilities, such guests must sign in and receive a 
badge. ATK controls who enters its NIROP facility. Pursuant to the facilities use 
contract between ATK and the United States, there would be no reason for the Navy to 
block access to ATK personnel to NIROP. R. 83,1081. 
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16. The Navy Strategic Systems Program maintains an office at ATK's Plant 
One for the purpose of providing technical assistance under Navy supply and facilities 
contracts. R. 83, 1081. 
17. ATK's possession and beneficial use of NIROP is pursuant to a "Facilities 
Use Contract" ("Contract") with the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs ("SSP"). ATK 
is granted access to, and use of, NIROP to fulfill contracts and subcontracts that ATK has 
with the Navy. ATK agrees to "use, maintain, account for, and dispose of [NIROP 
facilities] in accordance with the terms and conditions of this facilities use contract." 
ATK's Facilities Use Contract is exclusive, i.e., no other business has a facilities use 
contract with the U.S. Government that grants access to and use of NIROP. R. 83, 1081. 
18. ATK must give first priority of use of NIROP to work on behalf of SSP 
programs. Cross-utilization requests are common. R. 84, 1081. 
19. ATK and not the Government is to provide all maintenance, repair, 
rehabilitation, or replacement of the several facilities accountable under the Facilities Use 
Contract. To that end, ATK entered into a Capital Maintenance Contract with the U.S. 
Government for the NIROP facilities. The estimated cost of maintenance under this 
contract to ATK for 2000 was $1,090,000. ATK, however, received no fee under this 
maintenance contract. The work called for by the Capital Maintenance Contract pertains 
to capital maintenance of NIROP facilities, "which are required by ATK to perform 
essential work on the Trident missile program." R. 84,1081. 
20. The Facilities Use Contract, initially signed in 1996, was to continue for a 
period of approximately 5 years. This Contract and all other contracts referenced herein, 
11 
including contracts with Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 
incorporate Federal Acquisition Regulation Clauses ("FAR Clauses") and DOD FAR 
Supplement Clauses by reference together with other miscellaneous provisions. R.84, 
1081. 
21. Under FAR 52.245-9(b), "The Contractor may use the Government 
property without charge in the performance of - (1) Contracts with the Government that 
specifically authorize such use without charge; (2) Subcontracts of any tier under 
Government prime contracts if the Contracting Officer having cognizance of the prime 
contract - (i) Approves a subcontract specifically authorizing such use; or (ii) Otherwise 
authorizes such use in writing; and (3) Other work, if the Contracting Officer specifically 
authorizes in writing use without charge for such work." R. 84-85, 1081. 
23. The unauthorized use of Government property can subject a person to fines, 
imprisonment, or both, under 18 U.S.C. 641. R. 85, 1081. 
24. ATK's use of NIROP is further qualified by FAR Subpart 45.1 which 
prescribes policies and procedures for providing Government property to contractors, 
contractors' management and use of Government property, and reporting, redistributing, 
and disposing of contractor inventory. With four exceptions that do not apply herein, it 
does not apply to property under any statutory leasing authority. R. 85, 1081. 
25. During late 1996 and early 1997, the Navy requested that the Facilities Use 
Contract be amended to have all buildings on NIROP which contain high energy 
propellant (D5) sited using a 1.25 TNT equivalency. Effective March of 1997, ATK 
agreed to site the NIROP facilities to the 1.25 TNT equivalence criteria to process 
12 
Trident propellant. Explosive limits were reduced thus impacting the rest houses 
(magazines). Siting the facilities to a TNT equivalence was unique to and necessary for 
ATK's business operations and use of the NIROP facilities. R. 85, 1081. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ATK challenges the County's privilege tax assessment on its possession and 
beneficial use for profit of tax-exempt property owned by the United States Navy 
("NIROP").1 The District Court rejected all claims by ATK. 
First, ATK claims it is exempt under section 59-4-101 (3)(e) because it does not 
have "exclusive possession" of NIROP since, it argues, the Navy retains "possession and 
control" over the property. However, ATK both misstates its relationship with NIROP 
and the Navy and it misinterprets section 59-4-101(3)(e). 
ATK is an independent contractor that holds an exclusive Facilities Use Contract 
with the government. It is permitted to use the Navy property practically as it chooses on 
a rent-free non-interference basis and no other private company is authorized to use the 
Navy property for any purpose. Under its Facilities Use Contract, ATK agrees to use, 
maintain, account for, and dispose of the facilities as specified in the Agreement. 
ATK misinterprets section 59-4-101(3)(e) which, under the plain language of the 
statute and interpretive case law, only applies to third parties and not to the exempt 
property owner, i.e., the Navy. ATK's reliance on Keller v. SouthwoodNorth Medical 
Pavilion, Inc. is misplaced. Keller construed Utah's forcible retainer statute, not Utah's 
1
 ATK is a leading commercial supplier of aerospace and defense products to the U.S. 
Government, America's Allies, and major prime contracts. 
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Privilege Tax Act - two contrasting statutes. Moreover, ATK's business relationship 
with the Navy is by permit, not by lease as discussed in Keller. Attempting to apply 
Keller to this appeal leads to a meaningless and inoperable interpretation of section 
59-4-101(3)(e) apparently conceded by ATK. ATK's flawed interpretation of section 
59-4-101(3)(e) violates the well-establish principle that tax exemptions are to be strictly 
construed and all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of taxation. ATK bears the 
burden of establishing an exemption from Utah's privilege taix. 
The County asserts that the Utah Supreme Court rulings in Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation is determinative. This Court should find that ATK is subject to the privilege 
tax. 
Second, ATK claims that the privilege tax assessment is unconstitutional and 
violates the Supremacy Clause. However, under the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in 
Shelledy, ATK, which is not an agency or instrumentality of the United States 
Government, does not have standing to bring a Supremacy Clause challenge. Failing 
under the Shelledy test, ATK raises for the first time on appeal an issue and argument that 
it has suffered an economic impact that entitles it to standing to assert that the privilege 
tax violates the Supremacy Clause under the Doctrine of Pre-emption. Issues and 
argument raised for the first time on appeal may not be considered. 
Finally, even if the Court were to consider ATK's standing argument, which it 
should not, the County's privilege tax assessment does not violate of the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States' Constitution because the United States Supreme Court and 
Utah's Supreme Court have previously upheld the assessment of a tax based on the 
14 
possession and beneficial use by an independent contractor of federally owned property. 
This Court should reject ATK's challenges and affirm the ruling of the District Court. 
15 
ARGUMENT 
I. ATK IS SUBJECT TO UTAH'S PRIVILEGE TAX FOR ITS POSSESSION 
AND BENEFICIAL USE OF THE NIROP PROPERTY - EXEMPT 
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY USED IN CONNECTION WITH ITS 
BUSINESS CONDUCTED FOR PROFIT. 
The Honorable Jon M. Memmott, Tax Judge sitting for the Third District Court, 
ruled that ATK was subject to Utah's privilege tax since "ATK was in exclusive 
possession of the NIROP property as of 1 January 2000, as contemplated in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-4-101(3 )(e) through its permitted possession and use of the premises under its 
Facilities Use, Capital Maintenance and Production Contracts and subcontracts, even 
though the land-owner, the Navy, retained traditional levels of management and control 
in the NIROP Property. No one else other than the land owner (i.e.9 the Navy), had any 
possession, use, management, or control of the NIROP Property during 2000."2 The 
District Court's ruling is consistent with the plain language of the privilege tax statute. 
Moreover it is supported by interpretive Utah case law, including Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964); ABCO Enterprises v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 211 P.3d 382 (Utah 2009); and Interwest Aviation v. County Board of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987). This Court should affirm 
the District Court's ruling. 
A. The Privilege Tax closes any gaps in the Tax Laws. 
Utah's Privilege Tax Act was enacted in 1959 to close any gaps in the tax laws by 
imposing a tax on any property possessed or used in connection with a business for profit 
2R. 1090 
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which was otherwise exempt from taxation.3 It closely resembles the Michigan statute of 
similar purpose, which was held constitutional in a series of U. S. Supreme Court cases.4 
These cases are grounded on the proposition that a private contractor's right to use 
property in a business conducted for profit may be made subject to a nondiscriminatory 
tax based on its value, even though title to the property may be in the United States; and 
that the burden of the tax may ultimately fall on it.5 Overlapping taxation does not occur 
when government-owned property is held and used by private person for private use and 
profit; in such situation, property is used as if it were private property, and the policy 
favoring taxation exists.6 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the constitutionality and application 
of Utah's Privilege Tax Statute. In ABCO Enterprises v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
ABCO Enterprises (ABCO) occupied and used for several years two parcels of property 
owned by Ogden City. Because of Ogden City's ownership, the properties were exempt 
from property tax under the Utah Constitution. The Weber County Board of 
o 
Equalization assessed a privilege tax to ABCO pursuant to Utah's Privilege Tax Act. 
Because ABCO used the properties to conduct a for-profit business it was required to pay 
3
 Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 at 393 (Utah 1964). 
4
 Id. at 394. See, United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States v. 
Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of 
America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958). See Note, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 Harv.Law 
Rev. 77,157-161 (1958). 
5
 Id. 
6
 Interwest Aviation v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 
at 1225 (Utah 1987). 
7
 ABCO Enterprises v. Utah State Tax Commission, 211 P.3d 382 at 384 (2009). 
8
 Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 et seq. 
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a privilege tax in the same amount as the property taxes that would have been owed by an 
owner of nonexempt property. Weber County's Board of Equalization and the Utah State 
Tax Commission both ruled that the Weber County Assessor properly assessed the 
privilege tax.9 
ABCO challenged the assessment claiming that assessing a privilege tax on a 
leasehold interest at the same amount that a fee simple interest would be assessed, 
violated the uniform operation of laws provision of article I, section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.10 Justice Durham writing for the Court however ruled "[t]he 
privilege tax . . . does not violate the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah 
Constitution or the Equal Protection Clause."11 In its three-pronged analysis, the 
Supreme Court declared first, that the classification created by the privilege tax was 
reasonable, and where ABCO voluntarily joined the classification, the privilege tax 
created no competitive disadvantage, and equalized the tax burden.12 Second, that the 
legislative purpose of the privilege tax was legitimate in that it closed any gaps in the tax 
law; and third, that the classification was rationally related to its legitimate purpose where 
no unreasonable burden existed and the privilege tax effectively closed any gaps through 
i *\ 
equalized revenue generation. 
9211P.3dat384. 
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. at 390. 
12
 Id 
13
 Id. 
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B. ATK's possession and beneficial use of the NIROP Property meets the 
statutory threshold for application of privilege tax under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-4-101(l)(a). 
In Interwest Aviation v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County,u the 
Utah Supreme Court established a pattern of analysis for applying Utah's Privilege tax 
statute stating "[t]o fall within the ambit of the exemption provided by § 59-13-73,15 three 
statutory criteria must be satisfied. First, the property in question must be of the type that 
ordinarily is exempt from taxation. Second, the property must be used by a private 
individual, association, or corporation in connection with a for-profit business. Third, the 
business entity must be a concessionaire at one of the listed public facilities." The first 
two criteria establish prima facie application of the privilege tax. The third criteria 
examines whether an exemption applies. In Interwest, the Supreme Court's third analysis 
reviewed the unrelated concessionaire's exemption.16 Here, the County will address 
ATK's "exclusive use" exemption claim under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e). 
In applying the Interwest analysis, ATK is clearly subject to the statutory 
threshold for application of the privilege tax. First, there is no dispute that NIROP 
consists of real property and improvements owned by the federal government. Federally 
owned property is exempt under Utah law and thus the NIROP property is exempt.17 
14
 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987). 
15
 Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-73 was the forerunner to Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 et seq. 
16
 Id 
17
 Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1101(3 )(a). See also, Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. 
Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 at 393 (Utah 1964) (the state cannot impose a tax upon the United 
States or its agencies, citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)). 
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Second, the property is used by a private corporation in connection with a for-
profit business. There is also no dispute that ATK is a for-profit corporation 
manufacturing rocket motors for prime contractors with government contracts.18 ATK's 
stated primary financial goal is to create maximum shareholder value through profitable 
growth and the effective use of cash and other resources.19 ATK's business includes 
work under the Titan IV cost-plus Contract with prime contractor Lockheed Martin, the 
Trident II (D-5) cost-plus contract, and the fixed price contract for the production of 
GEM and GEM-LN for the Delta II program pursuant subcontracts with prime contractor 
McDonnell Douglas (Boeing).20 Between these first two criteria, ATK's use of NIROP 
pursuant to its Facilities Use and Capital Maintenance Contracts to perform its business 
operations under the Titan IV, Trident II and GEM Contracts result in ATK's possession 
and beneficial use of exempt property. Consequently all elements for imposing the 
privilege tax are met. 
Under nearly identical facts, the Utah Supreme Court in Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation v. Peterson ruled that plaintiff Thiokol Chemical Corporation at its Wasatch 
Division plant in Box Elder County was subject to the privilege tax for its research and 
development of the first stage of the Minute Man Missile under a cost-plus contract with 
Statement of Facts, ffl[ 1-3, 9-12. 
Id. ^2. 
Id. 1f 9-12. 
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the United States.21 The Thiokol Court sustained Box Elder County's 1961 privilege tax 
assessment on property which the contract recited title remained in the United States.22 
Additionally, ATK's use of NIROP as meeting the threshold application for 
privilege tax is consistent with the Parties Settlement Agreement. The Parties agreed that 
the sole issue before this Court would be whether NIROP was exempt from the privilege 
tax under Utah law. This Court should begin its analysis from the conclusion that 
ATK's profitable possession and beneficial use of NIROP meets the threshold application 
of the privilege tax. 
C. ATK misstates its relationship with the Government in its use of 
NIROP 
ATK tries to recast the government's relationship in such a way that it would 
appear the government controls ATK operations at NIROP.24 Such characterization is 
wholly inconsistent with the written contracts that define their relationship. 
Under express terms of the Facilities Use Contract: 
The parties hereto agree that the terms and conditions of this facilities use 
contract shall apply to those facilities provided to the Contractor by the 
Government (Strategic Systems Programs, Department of the Navy) for the 
Contractor's use in performance of contracts or subcontracts, or both, for 
the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) System. The Contractor agrees to use, 
maintain, account for, and dispose of the such facilities in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of the facilities use contract. 
21
 Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 at 393 (Utah 1964). 
22
 M a t 395. 
23
 R. 127. 
24 ATK Opening Brief p. 10, ffl[ 16-18 and p. 28. 
25
 R. 647; Addendum C. 
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Thus, the government and ATK both agree that the NIROP facilities are provided to 
ATK by the government, and that ATK - not the government - will use, maintain, 
account for, and dispose of the NIROP facilities. ATK is an independent contractor and 
not an agent of the government.26 Under the contract caption "Cognizant Contract 
Programmatic and Technical Authority (Feb 1993)," the SSP is designated as the "on-
site representative of the Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP) with delegated 
authorities on programmatic and technical requirements on the FBMWS/SWS." In 
other words, the SSP serves as an inspector or observer providing guidance for 
programmatic and technical requirements for the FBM. The Government provides no 
maintenance, repair, rehabilitation or replacement of the severable facilities accountable 
under the contract.29 ATK provides the capital maintenance of the facilities required by 
ATK to perform essential work on the Trident missile.30 Under ATK's Titan IV contract 
with Lockheed Martin, ATK is authorized to use its Government Property on a rent-free 
non-interference basis. Similarly, performance under ATK's GEM Contract with 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation is predicated upon the utilization of Government 
owned production equipment and facilities on a rent-free, non-interference basis.32 
As a practical matter, it seems counter intuitive that the government would direct 
and control ATK operations at NIROP. As a publicly traded corporation, ATK is the 
27
 R. 648. 
28
 Id 
29
 R. 650. 
30
 R. 825. 
31
 Statement of Facts, f 10. 
32Mat1J12. 
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leading supplier of aerospace and defense products to the U.S. Government and a global 
leader in the development and production of large solid propulsion rocket motors for 
space and strategic applications and a provider of space launch services.33 ATK's 
Aerospace segment designs, develops, and manufactures solid rocket propulsion systems 
for space and strategic applications and composite structures for military and commercial 
aircraft, space launch vehicles, government and commercial satellites, and spacecraft.34 
ATK has the expertise. ATK has the experience. ATK has the manpower. ATK holds 
the contracts to build rocket motors. ATK owns the primary manufacturing facilities for 
the Trident rocket motor production. ATK uses NIROP in a support role to its privately 
owned property. 
The relationship between ATK and the SSP is virtually identical to that between 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation and the Government in Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. 
Peterson?5 In Thiokol, Plaintiff Thiokol Chemical Corporation ("Thiokol") had since 
1957 been engaged in the research and development of the first stage of the Minute Man 
Missile under a cost-plus contract with the United States.36 Thiokol was an independent 
contractor and not an agent of the U.S. Government because it could deal with the 
property "practically as it chooses" pursuant to its cost-plus contract. 
It ha[d] the right to inspect and reject any property found unsuitable to its 
uses. Upon acceptance it has the duty to maintain, but no liability for loss, 
damage or the using it up entirely. Thiokol is given the right to possession 
33
 Id. at 1| 1. 
34R.76. 
35
 Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964). 
36
 Thiokol Chemical Corporation was purchased by ATK and is now ATK Thiokol, Inc. 
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and to use it primarily in conjunction with the contract. This seems to 
imply that it could use the property for other purposes if it so desires.37 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court in Thiokol stated: 
The above conclusion [that the contract specified the end result and not the 
means to the end result] is not changed by the fact that under the contract 
the Government maintains a staff of about 60 people to supervise such 
things as security, safety measures, labor relations, accounting, 
procurement and the Company's organizational structure, including wages 
and salaries. These measures are quite understandable because of the 
desirability of safeguarding the interests of the Government in the 
expenditure of such large sums of Government money; and more 
importantly, because of the necessity for maximum security in this field 
vital to the national defense. But they are not inconsistent with the main 
purport of the contract which is directed toward requiring Thiokol to pursue 
its own course in accomplishing 'the end result,' rather than the 
Government having actual management and direction of the enterprise38 
So it is with ATK and the SSP. The Government maintains a small staff authorized only 
to administer the programmatic and technical requirements of the Fleet Ballistic Missile 
(FBM). ATK is under contract to manufacture rocket motors. The Court should rule that 
ATK is subject to Utah's privilege tax for its beneficial use and possession of NIROP. 
D. ATK's possession and beneficial use of the NIROP Property is not 
exempt from privilege tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(e). 
Exemptions from taxation are to be strictly construed and all ambiguities are 
to be resolved in favor of taxation. The burden of establishing the exemption lies 
37
 Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391, 394 (Utah 1964). 
38
 Id. 
Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 573 P.2d 337 
(Utah 1977) citing State v. Salt Lake County, 96 Utah 464, 85 P.2d 851 (1938), citing 
State ex rel. Richards v. Armstrong, 17 Utah 166, 53 P. 981 (1898) and Judge v. Spencer, 
15 Utah 242,48 P. 1097 (1897). Note that the rule should not be so narrowly applied as 
to defeat its purpose. Corporation of Episcopal Church in Utah v. Utah State Tax 
Com'n, 919 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). 
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with the entity claiming it. That burden here lies with ATK. 
1. ATK has misconstrued and misapplied Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-4-101(3)(e) 
In its opening brief, ATK invokes the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-4-101 (3)(e) and asserts that the District Court erred in finding that ATK had 
"exclusive possession" of the NIROP properties. ATK argues that the plain 
language of this privilege tax statute only permits the assessment of a privilege tax 
when the user of the exempt property has "exclusive possession" of that property.41 
ATK suggests that so long as the owner retains some degree of control of that 
property, the user does not have "exclusive possession" and, therefore, is not subject 
to the privilege tax.42 
The District Court rejected ATK's analysis and concluded that ATK did have 
exclusive possession of the NIROP Property pursuant to its Facilities Use Contract or 
permit to use the NIROP Property.43 In reaching this conclusion, the District Court 
applied well-established principles of statutory construction and determined that the 
Court was to strictly construe the exemption statute and resolve all ambiguities in favor 
of taxation. The Court further determined to "read the words of a statute literally unless 
Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 573 P.2d 337 
(Utah 1977) although that burden must not be permitted to frustrate the exemption's 
objectives. 
41
 ATK Opening Brief p. 13. 
42/d. a t l8 ,28. 
43
 R 1090. 
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such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable . . . [and] presume that the statute 
is valid and that the words and phrases used were chosen carefully and advisedly.44 
ATK cites Keller v. SouthwoodNorth Medical Plaza, Inc.,45 to argue that it did not 
have exclusive control because the Navy retained some amount of management and 
control of the NIROP Property. Rejecting ATK's reliance on Keller, the District Court 
concluded 
While this interpretation may be appropriate for forcible entry actions, such 
as in Keller, this interpretation would render the language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-4-101 non-sensical. By their very definition and operation, a 
lease, a permit, and an easement transfer less than the full bundle of rights 
held by the landowner. Additionally, the language of the statute 
contemplates that a person may have exclusive possession under a lease, a 
permit, or an easement. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3)(e). If, as ATK 
argues, the statute's use of exclusive possession excepted the retention of 
management and control by the landowner (i.e. the Navy), the privilege tax 
could only be assessed against a landowner in fee-simple. Such a reading is 
"unreasonably confused and inoperable," because the landowner in fee 
simple, the Navy, is exempt from property taxes under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-1101(3)(a). Gull Labs., Inc., 936 P.2d at 1084 (quotations omitted). 
Moreover, in this matter, much of the management and control exercised by 
the Navy on the NIROP Property was ancillary to ATK' s operations and, 
therefore, beneficial to ATK. Cf.Loyal Order of Moose v. County Bd. of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d 257, 261-63 (Utah 1982). For 
example, the Navy used their office at ATK's administration building in 
Plant One to provide technical assistance to ATK in their fulfillment of 
Navy contracts. Additionally, the fourteen (14) Navy personnel were on 
site to manage the NIROP Property and assist ATK in the fulfillment of 
Navy contracts. 
ATK's criticism of the District Court ruling and its reliance on Keller are misplaced. 
Gull Labs., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
959 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1998). 
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2. Keller was an unlawful detainer decision that provides little 
guidance and no analytical authority on the interpretation of 
Utah's Privilege Tax Act. 
In Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc.,46 Lessee Dr. Clyde B. 
Keller brought an action against Lessor Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc. and Dr. 
Robert L. Youngblood (collectively "Youngblood") for trespass, conversion, and 
interference with prospective business advantage, after Youngblood removed two signs 
owned by Keller from a business monument. Under the terms of his lease originally 
negotiated with a former lessor, Keller could place a sign on this monument to advertise 
his services. However the sign had to be in keeping with other signs as to size and 
location. Because Keller wanted a larger sign he renegotiated his lease. Youngblood, 
successor in interest to the original lessor, later told Keller his signs were 
"unprofessional" and that they should be removed. Keller did not remove the signs. 
Several months followed and Youngblood later removed the two signs without 
permission or notice to Keller. Keller relocated his practice atnd then sued. 
The lower court found Youngblood's removal of the signs violated the forcible 
entry statute and awarded Keller treble damages under the statute. Youngblood appealed 
claiming, among other things, that Keller's access to signage space did not constitute 
"real property" within the meaning of the forcible entry statute. 
Writing for the Supreme Court and in the context of Utah's forcible entry statute, 
Justice Zimmerman noted that a lease "conveys an interest in land and transfers 
949 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998). 
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possession.47 It must convey a definite space and must transfer exclusive possession of 
that space to the lessee.48 In contrast, a license in real property 'is the permission or 
authority to engage in a particular act or series of acts upon the land of another without 
possessing an interest therein.'"49 The Supreme Court concluded that Keller's lease 
agreement gave him a license, not a leasehold interest in the business monument, since 
Keller, like all other tenants, had permission to place a sign on the monument. Keller's 
lease did not transfer possession of any part of the monument to him, nor did it assign 
any definite space to him or give him exclusive possession of any space on the 
monument.50 Further, Youngblood retained management and control of the monument.51 
The Keller decision provides little guidance on the application of a privilege tax 
to ATK for its possession and beneficial use of the NIROP Property pursuant to its 
Facilities Use Contract for multiple reasons noted below. And as the District Court 
correctly noted, ATK's interpretation and application of Keller to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-4-101 will render the statute non-sensical, i.e., absurd or unreasonably confused or 
inoperable.52 
47
 Id. See also 49 Am. Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 21 (1995). 
48
 See id. 
49
 959 P.2d 102,107 (Utah 1998). 
50
 Id 
51
 Id. 
52
 Rowsell v. Labor Com % 186 P.3d 968 Utah App.,2008 ("[a]n equally well-settled 
caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language 
of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result" quoting Savage v. Utah Youth 
Vill, 2004 UT 102, f 18, 104 P.3d 1242). See also, Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 4 
(Utah 1996) ('each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are 
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable, quoting 
Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)). 
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First, the forcible retainer statute and Utah's Privilege Tax Act are contrasting 
statutes with absolutely no comparable analysis in creation, interpretation or application. 
Second, ATK's business relationship with the United States Navy as argued by 
ATK and as determined by the District Court is by permit, not by lease.53 ATK operates 
NIROP pursuant to an exclusive Facilities Use Contract which all parties admit is neither 
a lease nor an easement. Consequently, any "exclusive possession" analysis under 
Keller which pertains to a leasehold relationship, necessarily and admittedly, has no 
application here. 
Third, section 59-4-10l(3)(e) clearly contemplates that "exclusive possession" 
may apply across the board to any business relationship based on lease, permit or 
easement5* In other words, if one could never obtain "exclusive possession" of real 
property by permit, then reference by section 59-4-101 (3)(e) to permits is meaningless 
and inoperable in violation of the principle of statutory construction that each word is 
used advisedly and effect should be given to each term according to its ordinary 
meaning.55 ATK concedes this inoperable reading of section 59-4-101 (3)(e) when it 
boldly states "ATK relied on Keller to demonstrate that a lessee can have 'exclusive 
" R . 1083. 
54
 Section 59-4-101(3)(e) states that a privilege tax is not imposed on "the use or 
possession of any lease, permit, or easement unless the lease, permit, or easement entitles 
the lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the premises to which the lease, permit, 
or easement relates." 
55
 State v. Low, 192 P.3d 867 (Utah 2008) (Under rules of statutory construction, the 
Court looks first to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning and presumes 
that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its 
ordinary and accepted meaning). 
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possession' of property, but a permittee cannot." Moreover, ATK's argument under 
Keller - that management and control by the exempt property owner eviscerate 
exclusivity - suggests that one could never have "exclusive possession" in a license or 
permit since a licensor or permittor will always maintain some management and control 
of the premises to which the license or permit applies. 
3. Exclusive possession under § 59-4-101(3)(e) refers to exclusive 
possession as to third parties and not as to the exempt property 
owner. 
The County asserts that "exclusive possession" under section 59-4-101(3)(e) 
refers to third party exclusivity or exclusive possession as to third parties and not as 
to the exempt property owner. In every application of the privilege tax, the fee 
owner of the exempt property necessarily retains several key rights in its total 
"bundle of rights"57 and thus will always retain some quantum of control or 
management over the property, as for example the right of a landlord to re-enter and 
inspect his improvements in a landlord - tenant relationship, or the right of the 
government to issue multiple permits over grazing or mineral extraction on public 
lands. This point is highlighted in ABCO Enterprises v. Utah State Tax Commission 
which contrasted the leasehold interest of ABCO with the fee simple interests of the 
exempt property owner, Ogden City, thus recognizing the retained rights of an 
56
 ATK Opening Brief, p. 23. 
57
 See, The Appraisal of Real Estate, Twelfth Edition, pp. 68-69 ("[t]he bundle of rights 
concept compares real property ownership to a bundle of sticks. Each stick in the bundle 
represents a separate right or interest inherent in the ownership... The complete bundle 
includes the following: The right to sell an interest; The right to lease an interest and to 
occupy the property; The right to mortgage an interest; The right to give an interest away; 
and The right to do none or all of these things"). 
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exempt property owner over the lesser rights of its lessee. ABCO challenged Weber 
County's privilege tax assessment by asserting that a privilege tax on a leasehold 
interest - the interest held by ABCO - at the same amount as a fee simple interest -
the interest held by Ogden City - violated equal protection under federal law and the 
uniform operation of law provision under article I, section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. Indeed, ABCO's rights in Ogden City's property were but a fraction 
of the rights held by Ogden City in fee simple interest. A fee simple interest gave 
Ogden City rights to the property that ABCO as lessee did not have. Even so, 
ABCO's argument was rejected and the privilege tax sustained. The exclusive use 
exemption provision of section 59-4-101(3)(e) cannot include the exempt property 
owner without eviscerating the statute. 
This interpretation is further consistent with the plain clarifying language of 
the second sentence in section 59-4-101(3)(e), enacted in 1975, which provides that 
"[e]very lessee, permittee, or other holder of a right to remove or extract the mineral 
covered by the holder's lease, right, permit, or easement except from brines of the 
Great Salt Lake, is considered to be in possession of the premises, notwithstanding 
the fact that other parties may have a similar right to remove or extract another 
mineral from the same lands or estates."58 This legislative reference to "other 
Emphasis added. In 1975, the Utah Legislature clarified and narrowed the exclusive 
possession exemption by adding this second sentence that specifically addressed the 
exemption for lessees, permittees, or other holders of a right to remove or extract 
minerals-except from brines of the Great Salt Lake. For a further discussion on the 
legislative history of Utah's Privilege Tax Act, see R. 969-972. 
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parties" clarifies that "exclusive possession" applies to third parties and not to the 
exempt property owner, in this case, the Navy.59 
Utah case law also supports the County's argument of third party exclusivity. In 
the 1920 Utah Supreme Court decision Boley et al v. Butterfield,60 the high court 
considered whether an instrument upon which the action was brought conferred upon 
defendant an exclusive right to graze his sheep upon the land during the season covered 
by the lease.61 The court analyzed the issue by reviewing the controlling words of the 
instrument and concluded the lease was simply di permit to graze certain sheep upon the 
land. Then the court stated: 
As to whether or not the permit granted was exclusive or nonexclusive, the 
instrument is ambiguous. It is not self-explanatory, especially in view of 
the fact that different bands of sheep belonging to different owners may 
graze within the same territorial limits. The court cannot say as a matter of 
law that a grazing permit of certain lands means an exclusive permit. It 
clearly may mean a right in common with others, or it may mean an 
exclusive right, according to the conditions existing at the time and the 
circumstances attending the granting of the permit. 
When the legislature first enacted the Privilege Tax Act in 1959, this 1920 Supreme 
Court opinion formed part of the legal landscape considered by the legislature. Under 
59
 Duke v. Graham, 158 P.3d 540 Utah, 2007 ("[T]he plain language of a statute is to be 
read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the 
same statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters" State v. 
Schofield, 2002 UT 132, f 8, 63 P.3d 667). 
60
 Boley et al v. Butterfield, 194 P. 128 (Utah 1920). 
61
 194 P. at 130. 
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Boley, whether a permit was exclusive was determined relative to third party users and 
not the exempt property owner.62 
4. Exclusive possession as to third parties narrowly and strictly 
construes § 59-4-101(3)(e) giving meaning to each term and 
phrase. 
The County and ATK both agree that exemptions from taxation are to be strictly 
construed and all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of taxation.63 Yet ATK is 
critical that the County and the District Court fail to accept what really constitutes an 
expanded (and unworkable) interpretation by ATK of section 59-4-101 (3)(e) to include 
the exclusive possession from the exempt property owner. The County asserts that the 
"exclusive possession" clause is determined relative to third party users and not the 
exempt property owner. By arguing that "exclusive possession" is to be viewed relative 
to and include the exempt property owner, ATK has expanded the scope of section 
59-4-101(3)(e) and in so doing has violated the well established tenet of Utah law that 
exemptions are to be narrowly and strictly construed.64 
62
 ATK's assertion that the phrase "exclusive possession" cannot be equated with 
"shared possession" begs the question of whether "exclusive possession" in section 
59-4-101(3)(e) refers to third parties or the exempt property owner. 
63
 ATK Opening Brief p. 5. See also, fn. 39 herein. 
64
 In other words, ATK does what it accuses the County and District Court of doing -
broadly construing an exemption statute. See, ATK Opening Brief, p. 16 and Section I. 
C, pp. 26-28. 
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E. The Utah Supreme Court's rulings in Thiokol Chemical Corporation is 
determinative. 
The factual background and relationship between ATK and the Government is 
virtually identical to that between Thiokol Chemical Corporation and the Government in 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson. 
In Thiokol, Plaintiff Thiokol Chemical Corporation ("Thiokol") engaged in the 
research and development of the first stage of the Minute Man Missile under a cost-plus 
contract with the United States. Thiokol was an independent contractor and not an agent 
of the U.S. Government. It could deal with the property "practically as it chooses" 
pursuant to its cost-plus contract. The Supreme Court stated 
It ha[d] the right to inspect and reject any property found unsuitable to its 
uses. Upon acceptance it has the duty to maintain, but no liability for loss, 
damage or the using it up entirely. Thiokol is given the right to possession 
and to use it primarily in conjunction with the contract. This seems to 
imply that it could use the property for other purposes if it so desires.66 
Under the facts of this appeal, ATK is engaged in the manufacture and production 
of rocket motors under cost-plus contracts with the Prime Contractors, e.g., Lockheed 
Martin and McDonnell Douglas - cost-plus contracts that authorize ATK to use 
Government Property on a rent-free non-interference basis. ATK is an independent 
contractor and not an agent of the U.S. Government. By contract, ATK is given to "use, 
maintain, account for, and dispose of [NIROP facilities] in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of this facilities use contract." Consequently, ATK is subject to Utah's 
65
 Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964). Thiokol 
Chemical Corporation was purchased by ATK and is now ATK Thiokol, Inc. 
66
 393 P.2d 391, 394 (Utah 1964). 
67
 Statement of Facts, f 10, 12. 
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privilege tax as a for-profit business on its beneficial use and possession of NIROP and 
is not exempt under section 59-4-101(3)(e). This Court should affirm the District Court 
ruling. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ATK DID 
NOT HAVE STANDING TO RAISE THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE 
CHALLENGE BASED ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY 
FROM TAXATION. 
ATK argues that an assessment on the full value of the property taxes the U.S. 
Government's "retained interest" in the property and therefore violates the Supremacy 
/TO 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The District Court correctly determined, pursuant to 
this Court's decision in Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), that ATK did not 
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the privilege tax under the Supremacy 
Clause because it is asserting the constitutional rights of a third party. 
A. ATK failed to preserve the issue and argument that it was 
economically impacted and thus had standing in its own right to assert 
a violation of the Supremacy Clause under the Doctrine of Pre-
emption. 
ATK doesn't challenge the underlying correctness of Shelledy. However, for the 
first time on appeal, it contends that it can challenge the constitutionality of the statute 
because it has standing in its own right because it has suffered "economic impact."69 
Also for the first time on appeal, it contends that by asserting the Doctrine of Pre-emption 
under the Supremacy Clause it has standing to challenge the constitutionality of Utah's 
ATK Opening Brief at 28-29. 
ATK Opening Brief at 30. 
15 
privilege tax statute.70 The issue of economic impact and argument under the Doctrine of 
Pre-emption cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.71 Failure to raise them below 
precludes their consideration by the Court. 
Further, ATK's positions conflict with its pleadings and argument before the 
District Court. Although it did argue that it was asserting standing in its own right for the 
first time in oral argument before the District Court, it did not clearly articulate the basis 
for that standing. Further in its pleadings and oral argument in the District Court, it 
waived its Supremacy Clause challenge. In Reply to the County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ATK stated: "ATK has not requested relief from this Court based on an 
asserted violation of the supremacy clause, nor has it asserted a claim on behalf of the 
Navy."74 Further, in response to a question from the Court under what theory it had 
standing, it stated: 
Court: "So is your claim instead of a supremacy claim an 
equal protection claim?" 
70
 M a t 32. 
71
 OngInternational (USA), Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) 
(citing Espinalv. Salt Lake CityBd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990)). 
72
 850 P.2d at 455, fn. 31 (citing State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985)). 
73
 ATK also argues that the District Court committed "reversible legal error" in part 
because the Court cited Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 
953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997) in its decision on standing instead of Co. Bd. of Equal, v. Utah 
State Tax Comm 'n. However, ATK directed the Court to the Evans & Sutherland 
decision by its reference to it, instead of referring to it as the Co. Bd. of Equal, v. Utah 
State Tax Comm 'n case. Counsel for ATK did not give the Court a citation to which case 
he was relying on. This is important because the issue of ATK's standing in its own right 
was not raised in ATK's pleadings. 
74
 ATK Reply Brief at 17. 
16 
Mr. Crapo: "It would work that way as you look at ATK's 
claim would be the equal protection. The United States 
would be the supremacy." 
Hearing Transcript at 51, Addendum D. 
Thus, it is evident that ATK waived its Supremacy Clause challenge in the District 
Court and therefore is precluded from asserting it on appeal. 
ATK relies on two Utah cases to support its argument that it has standing to raise a 
challenge under the Supremacy Clause. Neither support ATK's argument. Both are 
cases wherein the Court held that the County had standing because of its budgeting and 
taxing functions.75 Kennecott did not involve a challenge under the Supremacy Clause 
nor the intergovernmental tax immunity of the U.S. In County Board of Equalization, the 
County contended that the Court should interpret an entirely different section of the 
privilege tax statute so as to avoid potential discrimination against the U.S. However, 
unlike ATK the County has a constitutional duty to assure that properties are taxed 
uniformly and equally. ATK is not in the same position as the County. Therefore, these 
two cases do not support ATK's claim that it has standing to assert a Supremacy Clause 
challenge to the privilege tax statute based on the alleged assessment of a retained interest 
inNIROPbytheU.S. 
ATK then relies on a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In California 
Pharmacists Ass 'n v. Maxwell-Jolly16 the plaintiffs asserted in their pleadings that they 
would suffer economic impact if the state statute reducing Medi-Cal payments to 
75
 Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454-55 (Utah 1985); County Bd of 
Equalization v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 927 P.2d 176, 181 (Utah 1996). 
76
 563 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009). 
hospitals and pharmacies by 10% became effective. Their Supremacy Clause argument 
was based on the doctrine of preemption; it did not involve the doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity. The reliance on the case is further misplaced and 
inapplicable because the plaintiffs were seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to 
preclude the implementation of the statute by State officials which conflicted with a 
federal statute. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of state privilege tax 
statutes wherein lessees and permittees of the U.S. have been subject to the privilege 
tax.77 Therefore the doctrine of preemption of the Supremacy Clause does not apply in 
the case of intergovernmental tax immunity. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the District Court's decision that 
ATK did not have standing to assert a Supremacy Clause challenge based on the United 
States' immunity from taxation; and, should not consider the issue and argument raised 
for the first time on appeal that ATK suffered economic impact and has standing under 
the doctrine of preemption to challenge Utah's privilege tax statute as violating the 
Supremacy Clause. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT 
THE PRIVILEGE TAX DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SUPREMACY 
CLAUSE. 
ATK asserts that when a privilege tax assessment is based on the full value of 
exempt property, the Supremacy Clause is violated because the government's retained 
77
 United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 78 S. Ct. 483, 2 L. Ed.2d 436 
(1957); United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 2 L. Ed.2d 424, 78 S. Ct. 474 
(1958). 
interest is taxed.78 ATK further contends that three circuit courts have rejected privilege 
tax provisions which require the privilege tax to be calculated based on the full value of 
the exempt property rather than the value of the taxpayer's beneficial use of the property. 
ATK's reliance on these cases is misplaced and its analysis is flawed. 
In United States v. New Mexico, the United States Supreme Court ruled: 
Tax immunity is appropriate in only one circumstance: when 
the levy falls on the United States itself, or on an agency or 
instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that 
the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities, at 
least insofar as the activity being taxed is concerned.79 
Relying on New Mexico, the Ninth Circuit stated: New Mexico fashioned a 
separation of powers framework for analyzing supremacy clause challenges to state 
taxation: 
if the immunity of federal contractors is to be expanded 
beyond its narrow constitutional limits, it is Congress that 
must take responsibility for the decision,.... But absent 
congressional action, we have emphasized that the States' 
power to tax can be denied only under the clearest 
constitutional mandate. 
The New Mexico test has set the standard for determining the constitutionality 
under the Supremacy Clause of a state tax upon a federal contractor. The Government's 
"immunity does not shield private parties with whom it does business from state taxes 
imposed on them merely because part or all of the financial burden of the tax eventually 
78
 ATK's Opening Brief at 34, fn. 11. 
79
 United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733 (1982) 
80 US v. County of San Diego, 965 F2d. 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting US v. New 
Mexico, at 737). 
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falls on the Government.' Moreover, it is permissible for the state to compute the value 
of the "beneficial use" with reference to the value of the property itself.82 
In determining whether the tax is a levy directly on the United States government 
the courts have looked carefully at the wording of the statute, generally striking down any 
statute which purports to tax the property itself, where the "legal incidence" of the tax 
falls on the Government, while upholding taxes on the "beneficial use" of the property by 
a private entity. If the tax falls upon a private entity, the fact that the costs might 
indirectly fall upon the Government does not invalidate the tax.83 
Rather than arguing that it meets the Supreme Court's standard stated in New 
Mexico, ATK implicitly urges the Court to ignore Supreme Court precedent and adopt a 
new standard: it is exempt because it does not have exclusive possession or control of 
NIROP because the Navy has the right to exercise oversight over the use of the property 
and therefore it also has possession or control of the property. Apparently, according to 
ATK, possession and control is a "retained interest" which is taxed by the County. ATK 
primarily relies on two circuit court cases to support its claim that the privilege tax 
violates the United States' Constitution. These cases are distinguishable, have been 
limited by subsequent decisions of the same circuit court or by the Supreme Court, and 
neither hold that the contractor is exempt because it does not have possession or control 
vested solely in itself.84 
81
 U.S. v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. at 469. 
82
 Mat 470. 
83
 Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964). 
84
 It is noteworthy that ATK is arguing for immunity, not the United States, which is the 
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The first case is United States v. Nye County, Nevada?5 which is distinguishable 
on the facts and the law. Areata Associates, Inc. (Areata), a defense contractor, 
maintained and operated government-downed electronic equipment. Areata (unlike ATK) 
did not have the right to use the equipment for its own account or business.86 Nevada's 
privilege tax statute, according to the Ninth Circuit, was a tax measure levied on the 
an 
property itself. Notably, the court found that privilege tax statutes which survive 
constitutional challenge "have been tax measures imposed on an isolated possessory 
interest or on a beneficial use of United States property;"88 these statutes which have 
survived challenge are similar to Utah's privilege tax statute. 
Circuit Judge Noonan dissented in Nye accusing the majority of "embark[ing] 
again on the course that [United States v. New Mexico] tried to block of letting 'wooden 
formalism' determine the great constitutional issue of the allocation of taxing power 
between the federal government and the states."89 He also noted that in both Colorado 
and Hawkins County, cases relied on by Nye I and ATK, the tax exceeded the profit of 
the contract.90 
Plaintiff in every case cited by ATK for authority that NIROP is exempt from the 
privilege tax by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, which suggests that the United States 
does not take the position that ATK's use of NIROP is exempt from privilege tax under 
federal law. 
85
 United States v. Nye County, Nevada, 938 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1991) (Noonan, J., 
dissenting). 
86/</.atl041. 
87
 938 F.2d at 1042. 
88
 Id 
89M atl043. 
907Vye,938F.2datl044. 
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Apparently heeding Judge Noonan's criticism, the Ninth Circuit limited Nye's 
precedential value finding that its decision was based solely on Nevada's statutory 
language.91 The Ninth Circuit, in County of San Diego, noted that it recognized in Nye 
County that Nevada could enact a valid statute which taxed the lessee's possessory 
interest in, or the beneficial use of property owned by the United States. County of San 
Diego upheld the taxation of a federal contractor and found that California's statute was 
not constitutionally defective because California taxed the beneficial use of the property 
(just as Utah does). 
The 1991 Nye County case has no precedential value in this jurisdiction because it 
is a Ninth Circuit decision and certiorari was denied.93 It is not persuasive authority 
because it has been limited by the Ninth Circuit in subsequent decisions to the specific 
statutory language found in Nevada's statute; and, Utah's statutory language taxes only 
the possession or other beneficial use94 just as Michigan's statute which was upheld by 
the U.S. Supreme Court as constitutional. 
As of June 1999, the Nye County decision now has no precedential value even in 
Nevada because Nevada amended its privilege tax statute "to tax federal contractors' 
beneficial use of federal property, rather than the property itself."95 
91
 United States v. County of San Diego, 965 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1992). 
92
 Mat 964. 
93
 503 U.S. 919, 112 S. Ct. 1292, 117 L. Ed.2d 515 (1992). 
94
 Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (l)(a). 
95
 See, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 361.157 (1997) (real property). Id § 361.159 (personal 
property). United States v. Nye County, 178 F.3d 1080, 1084, 1085 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that federal contractors, including Areata, the contractor in the 1991 Nye County 
decision, were subject to Nevada's privilege tax statute, which did not violate the United 
The second case relied on by ATK and upon which the 1991 Nye County decision 
rested is United States v. Colorado, 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980), aff d sub nom. 
Jefferson County v. United States, 450 U.S. 901, 101 S. Ct. 1335, 67 L. Ed.2d 325 (1981) 
affirming United States v. Colorado, 460 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Colo. 1978), which were 
decided before United States v. New Mexico, in 1982. Rockwell International 
Corporation (Rockwell) provided the services of its employees under a fixed fee contract 
and operated Rocky Flats. "No work of any kind on behalf of any private entities has 
ever been or is now undertaken or carried out at the plant."96 Further, the United Sates 
owned all property used in the production process. No property of Rockwell was used or 
required to be used in the Rocky Flats Operation. The Court also noted that Rockwell did 
not have a lease, permit or license to the property97. In contrast, ATK uses NIROP to 
produce rocket motors for private entities in addition to the Navy; ATK's own property 
or property it leases from any other private entity is used to produce the rocket motors for 
the Navy and private entities with NIROP in a supporting role. Without ATK's 
manufacturing plant, which it claims is the most modern in the world, the rocket motors 
would not be produced at its Salt Lake County facilities; and ATK uses NIROP for its 
sub-contracts with prime contractors or other private entities. 
Equally significant is that Colorado's privilege tax statute was struck down as 
unconstitutional as applied because it did not tax the possession or beneficial use of the 
States Constitution because Nevada shifted the subject of the taxes from the property 
itself to the beneficial use of that property). 
96
 Colorado, 460 F. Supp. at 1186. 
97627F.2dat219. 
property but the property itself. Also, practical considerations influenced the trial court. 
The "tax was approximately twice the value of the contract and [the court] found it 
unconscionable that the value to a user would be identical to an owner."99 In striking 
down Colorado's statute, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the facts involving Rocky Flats 
from United States v. City of Detroit and United States v. Township of Muskegon.100 The 
Court distinguished Detroit because Borg-Warner leased government property and 
conducted its own private manufacturing business thereon, in contrast to Rockwell which 
"is merely going onto government owned property where it performs its management 
services."101 
In Muskegon, Continental Motors Corporation had a permit to use a government 
owned manufacturing plant where it apparently made goods, which were sold to the 
United States under contract. Muskegon, then, like City of Detroit, involved private 
corporations going onto government property and producing goods which were later sold 
for a profit. Neither is akin to Colorado, where Rockwell was merely performing its 
contractual obligations on government owned property.102 
Thus, the Tenth Circuit distinguished between contractors who produce goods on 
government property, as opposed to those who "merely perform[ ] [their] contractual 
obligations on government owned property" noting that the former would be subject to 
98460F.Supp.atll87. 
99
 United States v. Nye County, 957 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (D. Nev. 1997). 
100
 United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 78 S. Ct. 483, 2 L. Ed.2d 436 
(1957). 
101627F.2dat220 
102627F.2d.at220. 
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privilege tax. ATK's use of NIROP to produce goods sold to the United States under 
contract is similar to Muskegon and City of Detroit which upheld the state's privilege tax 
statute. 
Although Colorado's distinction between services/goods was rejected by the 1999 
Ninth Circuit decision in Nye,104 "because we have serious reservations about the 
practicability of the distinction " and that the Supreme Court has "never invoked 
Colorado's goods/services distinction in evaluating the constitutionality of a tax/'105 any 
persuasive authority Colorado has favors taxation of ATK's use of NIROP because ATK 
is producing a product as opposed to providing a service. Therefore, Colorado is 
distinguishable factually because Rockwell was providing only a service as opposed to 
producing goods and selling them to the government such as ATK does; and, it is 
distinguishable legally because the Colorado statute, which is similar to Nevada's, differs 
substantially from Utah's which imposes a tax on the possession or beneficial use of the 
property by the private entity. Finally, Colorado's analysis has not been adopted by any 
court other than Nye County in 1991. 
ATK also relies on U.S. v. Hawkins.106 This case is distinguishable because the 
Sixth Circuit relied on the Tennessee Supreme Court's determination "which held that 
while the interest of Union Carbide could be subject to a privilege or use tax, it was not a 
real property interest taxable pursuant to Tennessee's ad valorem real property tax 
103
 United States v. Nye County, 178 F.3d at 1085 (quoting United States v. Colorado, 
627 F.2d 217, 220 (10th Cir. 1980) (alteration in original)). 
104
 178 F.3d at 1085. 
1 0 5 Mat l085 
106
 859 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, Tennessee v. U.S., 490 U.S. 1005 (1989). 
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statute."107 This is not the situation in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the 
beneficial use and possession for profit of owner exempt property by an independent 
1OR 
contractor is a taxable interest. 
Utah's privilege tax statute, which was modeled after Michigan's, was adopted 
after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Michigan's statute. In United 
States v. City of Detroit™9 the United States was the owner of an industrial plant in 
Detroit. It leased a portion of the plant to Borg- Warner Corp. for use in the latter's 
manufacturing business. The tax was based on the value of the property leased and 
computed at the rate used for calculating real property taxes. 
The Michigan statute imposed a tax on private lessees and users of tax-exempt 
property who used such property in a business conducted for profit. Any taxes due under 
the statute were the personal obligation of the private lessee or user. The owner was not 
liable for their payment nor was the property itself subject to any lien if they remain 
unpaid. So far as the United States was concerned as the owner of the exempt property 
used in that case, it seems there was no attempt to levy against its property or treasury.110 
In Muskegon, a companion case to City of Detroit, the Court upheld the 
assessment of a privilege tax on the permittee's use of a manufacturing plant which the 
United States provided at no cost to a private company to fulfill its contract to produce 
107
 Mat 21. 
108
 Thiokol 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964). 
109
 United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 2 L. Ed.2d 424, 78 S. Ct. 474 (1958). 
110
 Mat 471. 
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equipment for the government.111 The United States granted Continental Motors 
Corporation the right to use the plant in the course of perfonning several supply contracts 
Continental had with the United States. The fact that Continental was a permittee instead 
of a lessee and was using the government owned property to supply the government with 
products, did not affect the Court's decision that the privilege tax assessments did not 
violate the Supremacy Clause. 
Therefore, under New Mexico, City of Detroit, and Township of Muskegon, even 
though ATK is producing a product for which the Navy is one of its customers, the 
assessment of NIROP as measured by the value of the property, which ATK beneficially 
uses and possesses, does not violate the Supremacy Clause. The three circuit court cases 
relied on by ATK are distinguishable or limited by subsequent decisions of either the 
U.S. Supreme Court or applicable circuit courts. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the District Court's decision and 
should not find Utah's privilege tax statute unconstitutional either as applied or on its 
face. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying Utah law to undisputed facts, this Court should rule that ATK was in 
exclusive possession of the NIROP property as of 1 January 2000, as contemplated in 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-10 l(3)(e) through its permitted possession and use of the 
premises under its Facilities Use, Capital Maintenance and Production Contracts and 
111
 United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 2 L. Ed.2d 436, 78 S. Ct. 483 
(1958). 
112
 Mat 486. 
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subcontracts, even though the land-owner, the Navy, retained traditional levels of 
management and control in the NIROP Property. No one else other than the land owner 
(i.e., the Navy), had any possession, use, management, or control of the NIROP Property 
during 2000. The facts of this case are consistent with those in Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation v. Peterson where this Court affirmed the validity and imposition of Utah's 
privilege tax statute. 
The Court should further conclude that ATK failed to meet the Shelledy test and 
thus did not have standing to raise a Supremacy Clause claim challenging the imposition 
of the privilege tax to ATK; and, that it failed to preserve its claim of economic impact to 
support its claim to standing. And even if ATK did have standing, which it does not, the 
tax imposed under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 is constitutional and does not violate the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. ATK had "exclusive possession" of 
the NIROP Property. Since ATK's possession was exclusive, its beneficial use of the 
NIROP Property was the value of the NIROP Property and no tax was assessed against 
the federal government. 
Finally, the County concurs with the arguments set forth in the brief of Appellee 
Utah State Tax Commission and adopts them herein by reference. This Court should 
affirm on all points the ruling of the District Court. 
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030917933 ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS 
NOV 1 2 2009 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, and GRANITE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondents. 
RULING ON PETITIONER'S AND 
RESPONDENTS' CROSS MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030917933 (Third District Court 
case number) 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. The 
Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their supporting 
documentation, and the Court's case file. The Court also held a hearing on October 26,2009. 
Having considered all of the arguments, and being fully advised as to the premises, and for the 
reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES the Petitioner's motion and GRANTS the 
Respondents' motion. 
BACKGROUND 
In the year 2000, Petitioner, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("ATK"), manufactured missile 
rocket motors for private companies who, ultimately, provided these missile rocket motors to the 
United States Navy. ATK used property known as the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordinance Plant 
(the "NIROP Property") to produce these missile rocket motors. The NTROP Property was 
comprised of six (6) parcels constituting approximately 528.48 acres of land and 181 
improvements. The United States Navy (the "Navy") owned the NIROP Property and ATK used 
the NIROP Property under a facilities use agreement. This contract allowed ATK to use the 
NIROP Property on a rent-free non-interference basis. No other private company used the 
NIROP Property for any purpose and no other entity had a facilities use contract permitting use 
of the NIROP Property. However, the Navy had one (1) building and maintained fourteen (14) 
employees to manage the NIROP Property and inspect ATK's operations. 
Of the 181 improvements on the NIROP Property, ATK used 165 in connection with its 
operations, the Navy used 1 for maintenance of the NIROP Property and oversight of ATK and 
its operations, and 15 were vacant. 
In 2000, Salt Lake County assessed ATK a privilege tax against the NIROP Property, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101, based on the value of the property possessed or 
beneficially used by ATK. The Salt Lake County assessor determined that 144 of the 
improvements contributed 99.7% of the value of the NIROP Property, and that 15 of the 
improvements contributed no value. 
ATK has exhausted all of its administrative remedies through the Utah State Tax 
Commission and comes to the Court seeking relief from the assessed privilege tax imposed under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 based on an exemption found in subsection 3(e) of the statute. ATK 
argues that the Navy's retained control of the NIROP Property resulted in ATK having less than 
"exclusive possession." ATK also argues that assessing a privilege tax according to the full value 
of the property was a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution as a 
tax on the federal government's retained interest in the NIROP Property. 
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Respondents argue that ATK was subject to the privilege tax under Utah Code Ann. §59-
4-10L Respondents argue that ATK did not qualify for the exception to the tax contained within 
subsection 3(e) because ATK did not have a lease, permit, or easement from the Navy and/or 
because ATK had exclusive possession of the NIROP Property. 
Following a telephone conference on issues before this court,1 a complete briefing of the 
parties' cross motions, and at the conclusion of the October 26,2009 hearing, the Court took the 
matter under advisement. Accordingly, the cross motions are now ripe for determination. 
ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Here, the parties acknowledged at the October 26,2009 hearing that the relevant material 
facts to the parties' motions for summary judgment are not disputed. The court will therefore 
adopt the factual assertions of the parties' pleadings as its findings in this case. (See Petitioner's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; Respondents' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.). Accordingly, the Court shall make its 
determination on the parties' motions for summary judgment as a matter of law. Two issues are 
presented for the Court's determination. 
1
 According to the strict reading of the parties' Settlement Agreement dated October 1,2007, the parties were only 
to litigate the issue of whether ATK can claim an exemption to the privilege tax. (See Joint Motion for Entry of 
Order Resolving All Valuation Claims and for Stay Pending Transfer and Reassignment for Further Proceedings). 
During the September 11,2009 telephone conference with the parties, the Court inquired whether the Settlement 
Agreement barred ATK's Supremacy Clause argument. Following the telephone conference, however, the parties 
informed the Court of their stipulation and agreement that the Settlement Agreement does not bar ATK from raising 
its Supremacy Clause argument with the Court, Accordingly, this Ruling will address both of the issues raised by 
ATK. 
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I. Can ATK claim an exemption to the privilege tax assessed under Utah Code Section 59-
4-101? 
"[A] tax is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person of 
any real or personal property which for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that property is 
used in connection with a business conducted for profit." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(l)(a) 
(emphasis added). However, a tax is not imposed on "the use or possession of any lease, permit, 
or easement unless the lease, permit, or easement entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive 
possession of the premises to which the lease, permit, or easement relates." Utah Code Ann. § 
59-4-101(3)(e) (emphasis added). 
It is not disputed that the NIROP Property was exempt from state property taxation 
because it was owned by the federal government. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(3)(a). 
Further, it is undisputed that ATK used the NIROP Property in connection with a business 
conducted for profit. Accordingly, the only remaining issues in this matter are: A) Did ATK have 
a permit2 entitling it to use or possession of the NIROP Property; and B) Did ATK have 
exclusive possession of the NIROP Property? 
A. Did ATK have a permit to use the NIROP Property? 
According to Blacks Law Dictionary, the terms "permit" and "license" are synonymous 
and a "license" is defined as "[a] revocable permission to commit some act that would otherwise 
be unlawful " Black's Law Dictionary 418, 524 (2d Pocket ed. 2001). Pursuant to ATK's 
facilities use agreement, ATK had permission to occupy and use the NIROP Property, something 
that would otherwise be illegal (as a trespass) absent the Navy's permission. When asked at the 
October 26,2009 hearing what ATK had, if not a lease, a permit, or an easement, Respondents' 
2
 Respondents argue that ATK did not have a lease, permit, or an easement. ATK argues that it had a permit. There 
is not contention that ATK had a lease or easement with regard to the NIROP Property. 
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were without an answer and readily admitted their argument that ATK did not have a permit was 
"weak." The Court agrees and, accordingly, finds that the facilities use agreement is a permit. 
B. Did ATK have exclusive possession of the NIROP Property? 
Whether ATK had exclusive possession of the NIROP Property "is a matter of statutory 
construction and therefore is a conclusion of law." Gull Labs., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Common., 
936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). This Court is to "construe statutes that grant 
exclusions from taxation strictly against the party seeking an exemption, and that party, 
accordingly, bears the burden of proving that it qualifies for the exemption sought." Id. 
(quotations omitted). See also. Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, of Utah, 573 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1977) ("Exemptions from taxation are to be strictly 
construed and all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of taxation."). Further, this Court will 
"read the words of a statute literally unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable . . . [and] presume that the statute is valid and that the words and phrases used were 
chosen carefully and advisedly." Gull Labs., Inc., 936 P.2d at 1084 (quotations omitted). 
ATK argues it did not have exclusive possession of the NIROP Property because the 
Navy retained some amount of management and control of the NIROP Property. ATK relies on 
Keller v. Southwood North Medical Plaza, Inc. to argue that a lease transfers exclusive 
possession but that a permit does not. 959 P.2d 102,107 (Utah 1998). While this interpretation 
may be appropriate for forcible entry actions, such as in Keller, this interpretation would render 
the language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 non-sensical By their very definition and operation, 
a lease, a permit, and an easement transfer less than the full bundle of rights held by the 
landowner. Additionally, the language of the statute contemplates that a person may have 
exclusive possession under a lease, a permit, or an easement. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-
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101(3)(e). If, as ATK argues, the statute's use of exclusive possession excepted the retention of 
management and control by the landowner (i.e. the Navy), the privilege tax could only be 
assessed against a landowner in fee-simple. Such a reading is "unreasonably confused and 
inoperable/' because the landowner in fee simple, the Navy, is exempt from property taxes under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(3)(a). Gull Labs., Inc., 936 P.2d at 1084 (quotations omitted). 
Moreover, in this matter, much of the management and control exercised by the Navy on 
the NIROP Property was ancillary to ATK's operations and, therefore, beneficial to ATK. Cf. 
Loyal Order of Moose v. County Bd. Of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d 257, 261-63 
(Utah 1982). For example, the Navy used their office at ATK's administration building in Plant 
One to provide technical assistance to ATK in their fulfillment of Navy contracts. Additionally, 
the fourteen (14) Navy personnel were on site to manage the NIROP Property and assist ATK in 
the fulfillment of Navy contracts. 
Accordingly, because the Court is to interpret taxation statutes strictly against ATK, and 
since there is a presumption that the statute is valid, the Court concludes that ATK was in 
exclusive possession of its permit, as contemplated in Utah Code Section 59-4-101 (3)(e), even 
though the land-owner, the Navy, retained traditional levels of management and control in the 
NIROP Property. ATK has presented no evidence or argument that anyone other than the Navy, 
the land-owner, had any possession, use, management, or control of the NIROP Property during 
2000. Accordingly, the Court finds that ATK has not met its burden and is not able to avoid the 
privilege tax assessed under Utah Code Section 59-4-101. 
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II. Is the tax imposed under Utah Code Section 59-4-101 a violation of the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution? 
ATK argues that the privilege tax Salt Lake County assessed against ATK was a violation 
of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because such tax was based on the 
full value of the NIROP Property and was not apportioned for the management and control 
retained by the Navy. See U.S. Const, art. VI, § 2. However, the Court finds that ATK does not 
have standing to raise this issue on behalf of the United States government. 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution creates rights for the federal 
government, not for private individuals. Id. In Shelledv v. Lore, the Utah Supreme Court 
established a three-part test to determine when a party may assert the constitutional rights of a 
third party. 836 P.2d 786, 789 (Utah 1992). Under this test, the following factors must be 
established: 
First, the presence of some substantial relationship between the claimant 
and the third parties; second, the impossibility of the rightholders asserting 
their own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a dilution of 
third parties' constitutional rights that would result were the assertion of jus 
tertii not permitted. 
M. 
In this matter, even assuming the presence of a substantial relationship between ATK and 
the federal government, there is no impossibility of the federal government raising its own rights 
under the Supremacy Clause3 and there is no dilution of the federal government's rights by 
finding that ATK does not have standing to raise a claim on the federal government's behalf. 
3
 In all cases cited by ATK in support of its argument that the assessment of the privilege tax is a violation of the 
Supremacy Clause, the United States is the party asserting its own rights under the Supremacy Clause. See e.g. U.S. 
v. County of Fresno. 429 U.S. 452 (1977); U.S. v. Nve County. 178 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Nve County. 
938 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Hawkins County. 859 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Colorado. 627 F.2d 
217 (10th Cir. 1980). 
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Accordingly, the Court finds that ATK cannot establish the second and third requirements under 
the Shelledv test. 
ATK argues that Evans & Sutherland Computer Corporation v. Utah State Tax 
Commission allows the Court to hear constitutional issues raised by a party on behalf of a third 
party when interpreting the constitutionality of a statute. 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997). In Evans & 
Sutherland Computer Corporation, however, the constitutional rights being asserted are those of 
the defendant, not a third party, and thus, the case is inapplicable to this matter. Id. Accordingly, 
the Court finds that ATK does not have standing to assert that the assessed privilege tax is a 
violation of the Supremacy Clause on behalf of the federal government. 
Further, the Court notes that even assuming ATK has standing to assert their Supremacy 
Clause argument, the privilege tax assessed against ATK would not be unconstitutional. ATK 
argues that Salt Lake County assessed the privilege tax against both their beneficial use and 
against the rights retained by the Navy. However, Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 provides that "a 
tax is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person . . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (l)(a) (emphasis added). The Court has already found that ATK had 
"exclusive possession" of the NIROP Property. If ATK's possession of the NIROP Property was 
exclusive, its beneficial use of the NIROP Property was the value of the NIROP Property and 
there was no tax assessed against the Navy. See U.S. v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 741-42 
(1982). 
Additionally, and contrary to ATK's assertions, the privilege tax was apportioned 
according to ATK's beneficial use* ATK exclusively possessed and/or beneficially used all but 
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15 of the improvements on the NIROP Property 4 Salt Lake County did not assess a privilege tax 
against the unused buildings as they were found to have no value. Accordingly, Salt Lake 
County only assessed a privilege tax against ATK for the actual possession and the actual other 
beneficial use ATK enjoyed on the NIROP Property.5 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, ATK's arguments in favor of summary judgment are without merit. Based 
on the foregoing, the Court must DENY the Petitioner's motion for summary judgment and 
GRANT the Respondents' motion for summary judgment. The Court directs Respondents to 
prepare and submit an order that is consistent with and reflects this Ruling. Further, in 
accordance with Rule 6-103(6) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the Court shall 
order this Ruling published. 
Date s i g n e d : J l L l s J j A 
:x»»w\ \ ^ J r 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
JONM.MEMMOTT 
f&f STATE \ \ 
te\ UTAH m 
4
 ATK may argue that there are 16 improvements that were not used by ATK, i.e. as the Navy used one of the 
buildings. However, the Navy's use of that building was for ATK's benefit to supervise ATK's operations and 
maintain the NIROP Property. Accordingly, the Navy administration building was beneficially used, if not 
exclusively possessed, by ATK. 
5
 The Court notes that ATK failed to argue that the privilege tax assessed is a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV. However, the Court believes that, for the 
same reasons the tax would not violate the Supremacy Clause, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, and the GRANITE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Respondents. 
FINAL ORDER ON APPLICATION 
OF UTAH'S PRIVILEGE TAX 
Civil No. 030917933 
2000 Tax Year 
Tax Court Judge: JON M. MEMMOTT 
The Court has reviewed the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, including the 
moving and responding papers along with their supporting documentation and the Court's case 
file. Oral argument was held 26 October 2009, where David J. Crapo appeared for Petitioner 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("ATK"), Mary Ellen Sloan and Kelly W. Wright appeared for 
Respondent Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("BOE"), and John C. McCarrey and Laron 
J. Lind appeared for Respondent Utah State Tax Commission. After being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court issued its Ruling on Petitioner's and Respondent BOE's Cross Motions for 
l 2 / a i / 2 B - 3 9 i j » : 4 a : 4 ? AH14&7 
VD30455653 pages: 4 
Summary Judgment and published the same on 12 November 2009. Consistent with the Court's 
ruling, the reasons set forth therein, and with good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner ATK is subject to the privilege tax assessed 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 for tax year 2000. Respondent BOE's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED and Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, The Court 
adopts the factual assertions of the parties' pleadings contained in Respondent BOE's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Petitioner's Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment and concludes there are no material facts in dispute.1 Applying 
Utah law to the undisputed facts, the Court further concludes that ATK was in exclusive 
possession of the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant ("NIROP") as of I January 2000, as 
contemplated in Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (3 )(e) through its permitted possession and use of 
the premises under its Facilities Use, Capital Maintenance and Production Contracts and 
subcontracts, even though the land-owner, the Navy, retained traditional levels of management 
and control in the NIROP Property. No one else other than the land-owner (i.e., the Navy), had 
any possession, use, management, or control of the NIROP Property during 2000. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the tax imposed under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 
does not violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution creates rights for the federal government, not for private 
individuals. Under Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
1
 When the BOE filed its opposition to ATK's Motion for Summary Judgment, it also filed a Motion to Strike 
Portions of the Affidavit of Kim Abplanalp. Mr. Abplanalp is the Director of Business Operations for ATK's Space 
Launch Systems and he had submitted an affidavit setting forth certain facts relied on by ATK in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment At the 26 October 2009 oral argument, the Court denied the BOE's Motion to Strike Portions 
of the Affidavit of Kim Abplanalp. 
2 
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established a three-part test to determine when a party may assert the constitutional rights of a 
third party: "First, the presence of some substantial relationship between the claimant and the 
third parties; second, the impossibility of the rightholders asserting their own constitutional 
rights; and third, the need to avoid a dilution of third parties' constitutional rights that would 
result were the assertion of jus tertii not permitted." Shelledy, 836 P.2d at 789. The Court finds 
that ATK cannot establish the second and third requirements under the Shelledy test and 
therefore does not have standing to raise the Supremacy Clause claim. 
Even assuming ATK had standing to assert its Supremacy Clause argument, which it 
does not, the privilege tax assessed against ATK is constitutional. ATK had "exclusive 
possession" of the NIROP Property. Since ATK's possession was exclusive, its beneficial use of 
the NIROP Property was the value of the NIROP Property and no tax was assessed against the 
Navy. 
DATED this *1 day of December, 2009. 
-g^ftv m 
HONORABLE JON WUK 
Tax Court Judge 
4? 
3 
i-2^2i. /2e&5 i<3:<£2:4? i*m.^iS 
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John E. S. Robson, Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 S. State Street, Suite 1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210 
jrobson@fabianlaw.com 
John C. McCarrey, Esq, 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
jmccarrey@utah.gov 
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq. 
Kelly W. Wright, Esq. 
2001 S. State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
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By: 
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ADDENDUM B - Tax Commission Decision for 2000 Tax Year 
Michae l 0 . Leavi t t 
Governor 
Olene S. Walker 
l ieutenant Governor 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
210 N o r t h 1950 West Sa l t L a k e City, U t a h 84134 
Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair 
R. Bruce Johnson, Commissioner 
Palmer DePaulis, Commissioner 
Marc B. Johnson, Commissioner 
Rodney G. Marrelli, Executive Director 
July 16, 2003 
Dear Parties: 
The Final Order for Alliant Techsystems, Inc., Appeal No. 01-0974, was inadvertently mailed 
without the state seal and date. This is the same order with today's date and the official seal. 
,/o? x w - ^ ^ ^ 
G. Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge 
If you need an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, contact the Tax Commission at (801) 297-3811 or 
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD) (801) 297-2020. Please allow three working days for a response. 
Udi! 
Where ideas connect 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 01-0974 
Tax Type: Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
Tax Year: 2000 
Judge: Davis 
Presiding: 
G. Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge 
Palmer DePaulis, Commissioner 
Marc B. Johnson, Commissioner 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Mr. Maxwell Miller, from the law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
Mr. Randy Grimshaw, from the law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
For Respondent: Mr. Bill Thomas Peters, from the law firm of Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn 
& Peters 
Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on 
November 19, 2002 through November 22,2002. Each party submitted its Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, and Briefs on or before February 21, 2003. Based 
upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
Appeal No. 01-0974 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PROCEDURE AND ORIGINAL VALUE 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The year in question is 2000. The lien date is January 1,2000. 
3. The Salt Lake County Assessor initially valued the land and improvements at 
$238,367,000. That value was sustained by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY 
4. Alliant either owns or is a permittee of the subject property, which is 
operated as a solid rocket motor manufacturing facility, commonly called the "Bacchus Works." 
Bacchus Works is located at approximately 4600 South 7200 West, West Valley City, Utah, on 
approximately 4,278 acres of land. Bacchus Works is comprised of over 600 buildings and 
structures with a gross usable area of approximately 1.9 million square feet. 
5. The subject property is zoned for commercial and industrial purposes and 
West Valley City and Salt Lake County have imposed an over-pressure zone which prohibits 
residential development aroimd the site. Gullies and canyons divide the property and a railroad 
right-of-way exists through the subject property, so the site cannot be fully utilized because of the 
development difficulty posed by the subject's terrain and other limitations. The property is not 
vacant or available for development for residential use. There was no evidence of the likelihood of a 
change in the zoning from industrial to residential The buildings and structures are widely dispersed 
because of the highly explosive nature of the manufactured products. 
6. The Bacchus Works includes three plants: Plant One, Bacchus West, and the 
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Naval Industrial Reserve Ordinance Plant ("NIROP"). 
7. Plant One includes 464 buildings, 201 of which are primary buildings, and 
263 of which are support and storage buildings containing approximately 983,000 square feet in the 
aggregate. The use of the buildings at Plant One ranges from administrative, directive, and security 
offices to storage, shipping and receiving warehouses, and bunkered high-tech research and 
development facilities. 
8. Bacchus West is the newest and most modern facility at the Bacchus Works 
and includes approximately 33 major buildings and 18 support and storage buildings. Bacchus West 
includes specialized features which are uniquely geared toward the construction of rocket motors. 
The improvements also include excavated silos used to inject propellants into rocket motor casings. 
9. The Naval Industrial Reserve Ordinance Plant (NIROP) is owned by the 
United States Navy. It includes approximately 59 major structures and 83 support buildings 
containing approximately 456,000 square feet. 
NAVAL INDUSTRIAL RESERVE ORDINANCE PLANT (NIROP) EXEMPTION STATUS 
10. Alliant uses property referred to as NIROP owned by the United States Navy 
in connection with its business at Bacchus Works. NIROP consists of 528.48 acres and 181 
improvements. Alliant uses 165 improvements at NIROP in connection with its business to fulfill 
and perform its government contracts. The uses and features of the structures within this facility 
(NIROP) are similar to those of Plant One. 
10. Petitioner has alleged that the NIROP property is exempt from both the 
property taxes and the privilege tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101, et.seq. 
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11. Alliant's use of NIROP is pursuant to a facilities use contract with the United 
States Navy. The contract provides "that the terms and conditions of the facilities use contract shall 
apply to these facilities provided to the contractor by the Government.. .for the contractor's use in 
performance of contracts or subcontracts, or both, for the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) systems. The 
contractor agrees to use, maintain, account for, and dispose of such facilities in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of this facilities use contract." Respondent's Exhibit 4, Part 1, Section B. 
12. NIROP is used by Alliant in the performance of its supply subcontract to 
produce the Trident II missile. Alliant has employees who work routinely at NIROP in connection 
with its for-profit business. 
13. There are 181 improvements located at NIROP. Phillip Cook testified that 15 
of those improvements no longer contribute value, six contribute less than $1,000 value each, and 16 
contribute less than $5,000 value each, and 144 of the improvements contribute 99.7% of the value 
for NIROP. Robert Reilly testified that 46 of the 181 improvements are either fully or partially 
functionally obsolete; therefore, at least 135 of the 181 improvements are fully functional. 
14. The Navy5 s administrative offices are in the administration building at Plant 
One. When a guest enters Alliant's facilities at NIROP, such guests must sign in and receive a 
badge. 
15. The Navy Strategic Systems Program maintains an office at Plant One for the 
purpose of providing technical assistance under Navy supply and facilities contracts. 
16. The NIROP property is and has been used for Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile 
(FBM) programs, including D5 (Trident), C3 (Trident), C4 (Poseidon), and A3 (Polaris), which are 
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all U.S. Navy missile systems worked on by Petitioner. 
17. First priority for the use of NIROP is given to work on behalf of the Navy. 
Contract, Section H. Special Contract Requirements at 3,^ [ 3. 
18. Alliant must obtain approval before making either capital modifications to or 
usage changes of facilities. Contract, Section H. Special Contract Requirements at 3, If 4. 
19. The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 52.245-11(e)(1) requires the 
Contractor (Alliant) to notify the Contracting Office...(1) Whenever use of all facilities for 
government work in any quarterly period averages less than 75 percent of the total use of the 
facilities.55 
20. Alliant operates NIROP within the bounds of the Facilities Use Contract and 
its rights to the facility are determined by that contract. 
21. The entire Bacchus Works Facility, including NIROP, is enclosed in fencing, 
warns trespassers to keep out and is not open to the public. No member of the public may gain 
entrance to the Bacchus Works, including NIROP, without the express permission of Alliant. 
22. In order to gain access to the Bacchus Works facility, including NIROP, one 
must pass through Alliant5 s designated entrance, register with Alliant5 s security officers at Alliant5 s 
administration building, obtain permission from an Alliant employee to gain access, wear an Alhant 
identification badge, and be transported to, from and through the facility by an Alliant employee in 
an Alliant vehicle. 
23. The entrance of NIROP does not require separate permission, registration, 
identification, or accompaniment by a Navy employee. 
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24. The Navy's Trident II (commonly called the D-5) rocket motor is not 
primarily produced at NIROP. The primary manufacturing process of the Trident rocket motor is at 
Alliant's privately owned facility located at Bacchus West. NIROP property is used in a supporting 
role in the manufacturing process, but all of the actual rocket motor manufacturing occurs on 
Alliant's privately owned property. 
25. Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor for the Titan (and Trident), has an on-
site team, located very close to Alliant's program office, and the Lockheed Martin team 
communicates and interacts daily with Alliant employees. 
26. The Navy does have some employees on the property who are there primarily 
for repair, maintenance, and administrative purposes. 
27. On January 6,2003, the Commission received a letter from Mr. Maxwell A. 
Miller, counsel for Alliant, which contained the following statements: 
Ms. Sloan's letter impliedly raises a critical issue concerning the Tax 
Commission's appropriate role in Alliant's 2000 valuation case pending before it. 
On the one hand, the Tax Commission is supposed to be an impartial adjudicator of 
the issues presented, including the NIROP issues Alliant raised in the 2000 
proceedings. The Tax Commission's decisions are to be based exclusively on the 
evidence. See, e.g. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b~10(l)(a). On the other hand, the Tax 
Commission intervened in the independent NIROP action as an adverse party to, and 
as an advocate against, Alliant. The incompatibility of simultaneously acting as an 
impartial adjudicator and an advocate in the same matter is obvious. In fact, Judge 
Lynn Davis commented that the Tax Commission had acted improperly by 
attempting to "contest" proposed supplemental facts Alliant submitted in the NIROP 
action. Said the Court, "A contestation of the facts by the Utah State Tax 
Commission may cross the line into an advocacy role, may suggest partiality of the 
State Tax Commission, and would hopelessly weaken or destroy its jurisdictional 
arguments based upon an exhaustion of administrative remedies theory," Tax Court 
Ruling (Sept. 7, 2001) p. 6. 
With respect to NIROP action, Alliant submits the Tax Commission 
cannot simultaneously adjudicate the NIROP issues in Alliant's pending 2000 
assessment case and participate as a Defendant-Intervenor in the NIROP action, 
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without violating Allianfs constitutional due process rights. Simultaneous 
participation in such incompatible roles may trigger an action against the Tax 
Commission. To avoid this problem, Alliant recommends that the Tax Commission, 
as a matter of comity, abstain from deciding the NIROP issues in Alliant's 2000 
valuation case pending before the Commission. 
LAND VALUE 
29. In the prior proceeding for this same property, the parties stipulated to the land 
values for each year, excluding any effect of contamination and/or stigma as follows: 
YEAR VALUE 
1997 $35,545,692 
1998 $39,322,360 
1999 $41,052,358 
30. For the current year of 2000, Mr. Robert ReiUy for Petitioner, and Mr. Philip 
Cook for Respondent each made an estimate of the land value, excluding any effect of contamination 
and/or stigma, by examining sales of large parcels of property in the general area. Notwithstanding 
that they each selected different comparable sales, Mr. Cook estimated the value of the land to be 
$10,750 per acre, or a total value of $44,660,875 which he rounded to $44,660,000. Mr. Reilly 
estimated a value for the land of $10,664 per acre, or a total site value, before environmental 
considerations, of $44,458,589. Those individuals also used a difference of approximately 14.5 
acres, but the overall differences in land value are not material. The primary issues relating to land 
value are whether the deductions taken by Mr. Reilly for "RCRA Corrective Action Program 
Liability adjustment," "Delay in sale,55' Stigma,555 "Additional Financing Costs 'Stigma,55'and "Cost 
to Repair Natural Resources Damages55 are appropriate. Mr. Cook determined that it was not 
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appropriate to take deductions from the land value for any of those items. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION 
31. The highest and best use of the subject property as improved is its existing 
industrial use. 
32. The zoning for the subject property is industrial manufacturing. 
33. The subject property is subject to a partial remediation plan under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) for soil contamination. 
34. The Bacchus West portion of the property does not contain any soil 
contamination. A large part of the northeast quadrant of Plant One is not contaminated and a large 
part of the south part of Plant One is not contaminated. Approximately twenty to thirty percent of 
the land at Plant One and NIROP contains contamination of some kind. 
35. Accordingto an RCRA Facility Assessment performed in 1989, Plant One and 
NIROP have seventy-seven solid waste management units (SWMU's) that may potentially contain 
contamination and warrant further investigation. These units are divided into various classes based 
on the operations conducted at each unit. These classes include earthen sumps, buried waste sites or 
landfills, open burning ground, burning pads, storage units, an incinerator, open detonation areas, 
salvage areas, surface impoundments, sewage lagoons, spill areas, septic systems, a waste pile, the 
wastewater treatment plant, 90-day storage tanks, satellite accumulation stations, and a sanitary 
septic system. 
36. Of these seventy-seven SWMU's, approximately thirty-three have had no 
analysis or testing done, and there is no knowledge of actual contamination on these thirty-three 
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sites. Forty-three sites have not had an interim corrective action plan estabUshed. Approximately 
twenty-two percent of the SWMU's are located on NIROP property, which is owned by the United 
States Navy. 
37. There are twenty-two SWMU's (earthen sumps) that are now subject to an 
interim corrective action plan, and it is anticipated that these sites will be cleaned up during fiscal 
year 2003. By contrast, there are 25 SWMU's that are not proposed to have any interim corrective 
action plan in place before fiscal year 2006 and are not anticipated to be cleaned up until 2013. 
38. Alliant has a permit to use eight of the seventy-seven sites for burning and 
storage of hazardous and explosive materials. This use is necessary for Alliant to conduct its 
business on the subject property. Alliant uses these eight sites as part of its ongoing operation and 
utilizes these eight sites on a regular basis. This permit is not transferable to another site, but is 
assignable to another owner. These eight sites will not have to be cleaned up until the business 
ceases its operation. 
39. The permit allows storage of hazardous material for one year, instead of the 
normal storage period of 90 days. 
40. Since the 1989 RCRA Facility Assessment came out, some interim corrective 
action measures have occurred on the subject property. Some of the seventy-seven sites have been 
cleaned up, but further administrative action is needed before such sites are closed. 
41. In addition to the soil contamination, there are contaminated plumes of 
groundwater owned by the State of Utah that resulted from operations performed on the subject 
property. These plumes have begun to encroach on Barton #5 well owned by Magna Water 
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Company as well as several other wells owned by Kennecott Copper. There is no evidence that the 
groundwater contamination affects the utility of the subject property. 
42. The sources of the groundwater contamination have been eliminated or 
controlled to prevent additional contamination of the site. Groundwater monitors have been installed 
to track the groundwater contamination plumes. Considerable amounts of contaminated soil have 
been removed from the various sumps and disposed of offsite. This all occurred prior to Alliant's 
acquisition of the subject property. There is no specific remediation plan for the groundwater 
contamination. 
43. In the Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the 
fiscal year ended March 31, 2000, Petitioner made the following representations: 
As part of the Hercules Aerospace Company acquisition, the Company 
has generally assumed responsibility for environmental compliance at the aerospace 
facilities used by the operations acquired in the acquisition. There may also be 
significant environmental remediation costs associated with these aerospace facilities 
that will, in some cases, be funded in the first instance by the Company, subject to 
reimbursement or indemnification as described below. Management believes that 
much of the compliance and remediation cost associated with these aerospace 
facilities will be covered by Hercules under environmental agreements entered into in 
connection with the Hercules Aerospace Company acquisition. Under these 
environmental agreements, Hercules has agreed to indemnify the Company for: 
• environmental conditions relating to releases or hazardous waste activities 
occurring prior to the closing of the Hercules Aerospace Company acquisition, 
fines relating to pre-closing environmental compliance, and 
• environmental claims arising out of breaches of Hercules' representations 
and warranties. 
The indemnity obligation of Hercules is subject to a total deductible of $1.0 
million for all claims (including non-environmental claims) that the Company may 
assert under the Hercules Aerospace Company acquisition purchase agreement. In 
addition, Hercules is not required to indemnify the Company for any individual 
claims below $50,000. Hercules is obligated to indemnify the Company for the 
lowest cost response of remediation required at the facility, (page 18) 
* * * * 
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Contingencies - Environmental Matters 
The Company is subject to various local and national laws relating to 
protection of the environment and is in various stages of investigation or remediation 
of potential, alleged, or acknowledged contamination. At March 31, 2000, the 
accrued liability for environmental remediation of $27.7 million represents the 
Company's known remediation obligations. It is expected that a significant portion 
of the Company's environmental costs will be reimbursed to the Company. As 
collection of those reimbursements is estimated to be probable, the Company has 
recorded a receivable of $7.8 million, representing the present value of those 
reimbursements at March 31, 2000. Such receivable primarily represents the 
expected reimbursement of costs associated with the Aerospace operations acquired 
from Hercules in March 1995 (Aerospace acquisition), whereby the Company 
generally assumed responsibility for environmental compliance at Aerospace 
facilities. It is expected that much of the compliance and remediation costs 
associated with these facilities will be reimbursable under U.S. Government 
contracts, and that those environmental remediation costs not covered through such 
contracts will be covered by Hercules under various indemnification agreements, 
subject to the Company having appropriately notified Hercules of issues identified 
prior to the expiration of the stipulated notification periods (March 2000 or March 
2005, depending on site ownership). The Company has performed environmental 
condition evaluations and notified Hercules of its findings prior to the expiration of 
the March 2000 deadline. The Company's accrual for environmental remediation 
liabilities and the associated receivable for reimbursement thereof, have been 
discounted to reflect the present value of the expected future cash flows, using a 
discount rate, net of estimated inflation, of approximately 4.5 percent. The following 
is a summary of the Company's amounts recorded for environmental remediation at 
March 31,2000: 
Environmental Costs-
Accrued Environmental Liability Reimbursement Receivable 
(In Thousands) (In Thousands) 
Amounts (Payable)/Receivable $(35,788) 
Unamortized Discount 8,133 
Present Value of Amounts 
(Payable)/Receivable $(21,655) 
At March 31,2000, the aggregate undiscounted amounts payable for 
environmental remediation costs, net of expected reimbursements, are 
estimated to be $3.5, $5.4, $1.9, $1.7, and $1.2 million for the fiscal years 
ending March 31, 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2005, respectively; estimated 
amounts payable thereafter total $12.1 million. Amounts payable/receivable 
in periods beyond fiscal 2001 have been classified as non-current on the 
Company's March 31,2000, balance sheet. At March 31,2000, the estimated 
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discounted range of reasonably possible costs of environmental remediation 
is between $27.7 and $42.7 million. The Company does not anticipate that 
resolution of the environmental contingencies in excess of amounts accrued, 
net of recoveries, will materially affect future operating results. There were 
no material insurance recoveries related to environmental remediations 
during fiscal 2000, 1999, or 1998. (pages 34 & 35) 
A. RCRA Corrective Action Program Liability Adjustments 
44. Petitioner has proposed a $7,000,000 decrement to the value of the land for a 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action adjustment. Mr. Reilly didnot 
present substantial justification or exploration for this proposed adjustment. Mr. Cook for the 
Respondent did not propose any such adjustment. In the prior appeal of this matter, Appeal Nos. 
98-0452, 98-0608, and 99-0190, the Commission decision stated: 
"Petitioner has proposed a deduction from the RCNLD (replacement cost new 
less depreciation) values stipulated to by the parties to adjust for contamination 
which has occurred on the property. Because of the contamination, the property is 
subject to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action 
pursuant to a consent order between Hercules, Inc. (the former owner of the property) 
and the State of Utah. That consent order requires certain corrective action and 
contamination monitoring 
Petitioner has requested the deduction from RCNLD for contamination be 
based upon its projected monitoring costs, and page 29 of Exhibit 1 Reilly projects 
those monitoring costs to be $500,000 per year. Therefore, Petitioner has requested a 
reduction in value for monitoring costs of $8,000,000 for 1997, $7,500,000 for 1998, 
and $7,000,000 for 1999. 
The actual costs of remediation to the RCRA corrective action for the 
years 1997 to 1999 are as follows: 
1997: $314,219 
1998: $550,061 
1999: $806,415 
Liabilities for remediation are not contained in the Bacchus Works financial 
statements but are booked at the corporate level and are contained in the annual 
reports of the year 2000 form 10-K. 
12 
Appeal No. 01-0974 
The remediation and monitoring costs are included in Alliant's costs 
submitted to the United States Government. The costs have been considered an 
allowable indirect contract cost and have been reimbursed by the United States 
Government. 
As part of the sale transaction, Alliant and Hercules, Inc. entered into an 
Environmental Agreement which provides for indemnification to Alliant by Hercules 
in the event the United States Government does not reimburse Alliant for remediation 
costs. 
The Alliant Annual Reports to Shareholders for 1998 states that Alliant has a 
reimbursement receivable for environmental costs reported to be approximately 
$ 10.5 million, in which the report states it is expected that a significant portion of the 
company's environmental costs will be reimbursed to the company by the United 
States Government and those not covered through government contracts will be 
covered by Hercules under the indemnification agreement subject to the company 
notifying Hercules of claims prior to March 2000 and March 2005. 
The Report to Shareholders for 1996 through 1999 and the year 2000 form 
10-K contain similar representations regarding indemnification and reimbursement. 
* * * * 
The evidence is unclear from the record what obligations the federal 
government would have to continue making those reimbursements for monitoring if 
Alliant did not continue to own the property, particularly if there were not any 
government contracts for productions on the property. 
It is not clear from the evidence that the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) corrective action consent order between Hercules, Inc., and the State of 
Utah runs with the land and would be binding on any future owners of the land. 
Because of the reimbursement of all remediation and monitoring costs; the 
lack of evidence to show whether the consent order runs with the land; and the 
difficulty in quantifying any contamination, the Commission concludes Petitioner 
failed to meet its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that there 
should be a decrement in the land values for contamination remediation and/or 
monitoring. 
B. Stigma 
45. Petitioner also proposed an adjustment to the site value for "stigma." The first 
adjustment for "stigma" proposed by Mr. Reilly is for the "Delay in Sale" component of 
environmental "stigma." The second adjustment for "stigma" proposed by Mr. Reilly is for the 
"Additional Financing Costs" component of environmental "stigma." The appraisal prepared by Mr. 
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Cook did not propose any adjustment for "stigma" to the site value. 
46. Mr. Reilly proposed an adjustment to the value of the land of $3,464,000 for 
the "Delay in Sale" component of environmental stigma, which he represented is an adjustment of 
10% for the time value of money. This proposed adjustment is presumably to allow for the 
additional time it would take to find a buyer for a contaminated property compared with a shorter 
time it would take to find a buyer for an uncontaminated property. However, Mr. Reilly did not 
submit any actual market studies or comparable sales data to support the appropriateness of such a 
"stigma" deduction. 
47. Mr. Reilly also proposed a "stigma" adjustment to the uncontaminated site 
value in an amount of $1,872,000 for additional financing costs. Mr. Reilly represented that he 
contacted several mortgage bankers and some of them said they would not make a loan on 
contaminated property under any circumstances, while others said they would make such a loan only 
if they received a 100% indemnification. According to Mr. Reilly, other financing options for 
contaminated property would be either a public placement of funds through a bank's investment 
banking division, or a private placement of general corporate debt through a bank. With either of 
those options, the interest rate on the borrowed money would be greater than if the property were not 
contaminated. Therefore, according to Mr. Reilly, the higher interest rate would cause a prospective 
purchaser to offer a lower price on the property because a higher portion of the payment would be 
consumed by the higher interest rate. 
48. Mr. Cook, testifying for Respondent, did not make a decrement in value to the 
site for the RCRA corrective action program, for the "delay in sale stigma," or for additional 
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financing costs stigma." Although he acknowledged there is some soil contamination to Plant One 
and NIROP, he maintained that Petitioner will be reimbursed by Hercules pursuant to an 
indemnification agreement which he originally stated "ran with the land." Upon further review, he 
concluded that the indemnification agreement does not "run with the land," but believes the site 
value should not be diminished for contamination if Hercules will ultimately indemnify Petitioner for 
any necessary clean-up costs. 
49. Mr. Cook also testified that the groundwater contamination has been 
controlled to prevent further contamination, and the amount of clean-up costs are unknown and 
speculative because there is no present specific remediation plan for either soils or ground-waters. 
50. Mr. Cook examined sales of industrial properties containing contamination 
located in or near Salt Lake County. He testified there are several instances of sophisticated buyers, 
purchasing sites with a history of contamination, and with on-going remediation and monitoring, but 
they would require an indemnification agreement from the seller. He further represented that such 
contaminated properties did not sell for a discount below fair market value if there was an 
indemnification agreement, and the presence of contamination did not measurably extend the 
marketing period. He also testified the parties did not deduct the potential remediation costs from 
the normal sales price. 
51. Mr. Cook further stated there was another sale in Lehi which sold without 
a discount after the remediation had been completed. 
52. When Petitioner purchased the subject property from Hercules, Chase 
Manhattan Bank financed the property without an interest premium for the contamination. There 
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was an indemnification agreement in place on that purchase. The original loan was on March 15, 
1995, and it was later refinanced in November 1998 without any significant value discount or interest 
premium. 
C. Natural Resource Damage Claim 
53. On or about November 14, 2001, nearly two years after the lien date in this 
matter, the Utah State Department of Environmental Quality sent to Petitioner a Notice of Claim for 
natural resource damages "resulting from the release of hazardous substances" into the water. The 
total amount of the claim asserted by the state of Utah against Petitioner was $ 139,667,006. Based 
upon that claim, Mr. Reilly reduced the site value by an amount of $139,000,000 to allow for that 
damage claim. Because the site value was less than $139,000,000, Mr. Reilly reduced the site value 
to zero, and said the site had no net value. 
54. Mr. Cook did not make a deduction from the site value for the Notice of Claim 
received from the Utah State Department of Environmental Quality. This was based upon the claim 
being unknown or unknowable on the lien date, his understanding that the claim was filed to prevent 
a statute of limitations defense by Alliant to any liability for clean-up that is ultimately determined, 
and the representations in the annual reports of Alliant that any required remediation costs will be 
significantly smaller than $139,000,000 and that any such costs will be reimbursed by Hercules. 
55. Mr. Brent Eyre testified that if Mr. Reilly based his $139,000,000 deduction 
on that one letter, "that would be improper and would be contrary to... the IAAO standards." 
56. Based upon the above, Alliant and Salt Lake County estimated the site value 
to be calculated as follows: 
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Uncontaminated Site Value: 
RCRA Corrective Action 
Program Liability Adjustment: 
Estimated Effect of "Delay In 
Sale" Component of 
Environmental Stigma. 
Alliant 
$44,458,589 
-$7,000,000 
-$3,464,000 
County 
$44,660,000 
0 
0 
Estimated Effect of "Additional 
Financing Costs" Component of 
Environmental Stigma. 
Cost to Repair Natural 
Resources Damages: 
Indicated Market Value of 
Bacchus Works Site: 
-$1,872,000 
-$139,000,000 0 
$44,660,000 
IMPROVEMENT VALUE 
57. Both Petitioner and Respondent based the value of the improvements upon the 
cost approach to value. Both parties based the initial determination of value upon a study originally 
performed by Mr. Ed Kent from the Salt Lake County Assessor's Office several years ago, but then 
trended forward and depreciated by each of the parties. 
5 8. Based upon that methodology, Mr. Reilly determined a cost approach value of 
$214,754,081, whereas Mr. Cook determined a cost approach value of $218,659,165. The 
calculation by Mr. Reilly did not include buildings #58 and #59, which had a total value of 
$3,433,134, so adding those buildings to the value determined by Mr. Reilly would bring the total to 
$218,187,215. The rest of the difference is attributable to different methods of calculating the 
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depreciation subsequent to the base year depreciation. Mr. Reilly used straight-line depreciation, 
whereas Mr. Cook used the depreciation from Marshall and Swift Valuation Services. 
A. Functional Obsolescence 
59. From the cost approach value determined by each of the parties, Mr. Reilly 
deducted $21,200,000 for functional obsolescence, whereas Mr. Cook deducted an amount of 
$16,400,778. 
60. Mr. Reilly wrote down buildings that were not either 1) being used by Alliant 
either at all, or for their designed purpose, and 2) for improvements where Alliant only used part of 
the building, he wrote down the unused portion. Mr, Cook also wrote down buildings that were not 
being used, but if the building was being used for other than the intended purpose, then Mr. Cook 
made a deduction based on the difference in cost for the actual use compared to the cost determined 
by the Salt Lake County Assessor. Mr. Cook treated such facilities for purposes of functional 
obsolescence the way Alliant treated such facilities in its accounting records. 
61. Mr. Cook identified and estimated extraordinary functional obsolescence in 
two ways. First, relative to functional obsolescence relating to super adequacies, improvements that 
are in use but no longer used for their designed purpose have been identified. The reproduction cost 
new of the improvement is compared to the replacement cost new for the actual use rather than the 
designed use. The difference in cost is then adjusted for depreciation already assessed. The result is 
extraordinary functional obsolescence. The second way Mr. Cook determined functional 
obsolescence is based on buildings that are abandoned or have no use at all. These buildings were 
treated similarly to Mr. Reilly's approach. 
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62. One hundred and sixty (160) improvements in Plant One have been written 
down by Mr. Cook for extraordinary functional obsolescence, twelve (12) improvements in NIROP 
are written down, and two improvements in Bacchus West have been written down. A total of 174 
improvements are written down for extraordinary functional obsolescence, most of which are 
completely written off. 
63. This different approach resulted in Mr. Reilly making a deduction for 
functional obsolescence of $21,200,000, and he depreciated to some extent 56 improvements that 
Mr. Cook did not depreciate. 
B. Economic Obsolescence 
64. The largest issue in this proceeding is whether the property of Alliant has 
suffered economic obsolescence, and if so, the quantification of such obsolescence. Mr. Reilly 
deducted economic obsolescence in an amount of $87,099,336, whereas Mr. Cook did not deduct 
any such obsolescence. 
65. Economic obsolescence, or external obsolescence, is a loss in value due to 
negative influences that are external, or outside, the subject property. There are many causes of 
economic obsolescence, including a decrease in the demand for the product, changes in economic 
conditions, interest rate changes, economic recessions, and changes in governmental regulations that 
create additional expenses. However, the fact that those factors are present does not mean there is 
economic obsolescence. It is incumbent upon the appraiser to actually determine there is an 
economic detriment resulting from those conditions, which reduces the value below the unadjusted 
cost approach. It is also incumbent upon the appraiser to quantify that economic detriment. The 
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unadjusted cost approach represents the potential value absent any of those negative influences. 
66. Mr. Jeffrey Foot, the President of the Affiant Space Group testified and 
presented exhibits to support the request for an economic obsolescence adjustment. He testified 
regarding the following matters: 
a. There has been a decline in the industry demand for solid rocket motors 
since 1984, the year when Hercules Incorporated first appropriated funds for the construction of 
Bacchus West. 
b. There has also been a decline in the industry demand for solid rocket 
motors since 1990, the year when Hercules Incorporated completed the initial construction. 
c. The decline in demand for solid rocket motors has resulted in unused 
capacity at the Bacchus Works facility. 
d. There has been a staffing reduction from approximately 3,900 in 1989 to 
approximately 1,700 in 2000. (The Commission notes that in 1995, the year that Affiant purchased 
the Bacchus West facility, the staff was only slightly more than 1,700.) 
e. In "then-year dollars," the solid rocket motor market has declined from 
$2.5 billion in 1991 to $1.1 billion in 2000. 
f. AlUant estimates the propellant production at the Bacchus Works will 
decline from 1990 to 2002. However, the actual production for 2000, the year at issue, is 
significantly higher than for either 1990 or 1995. Petitioner claims it has the capacity to produce 
slightly less than 20 million pounds of propellant per year, and in 2000 it produced slightly less than 
10 million pounds. 
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g. For most of the motor and solid rocket fuel manufactured by Petitioner, 
it has orders to "buy" more than it is ultimately able to deliver. That is because it regularly receives 
slowdown notification orders from its initial baseline contracts. 
67. Petitioner used the declines in production to attempt to establish the existence 
of economic obsolescence. 
68. Mr. Reilly attempted to measure economic obsolescence by comparing (1) 
historical Bacchus Works' results of operations vs. current results of operation; (2) Bacchus Works' 
capital appropriation requests vs. actual financial performance; (3) projected Bacchus Works' 
financial performance vs. actual financial performance; and (4) industry demand analysis. Mr. Reilly 
eliminated two additional measures of economic obsolescence which he had included in his 1997 to 
1999 appraisal. Those two are the required Bacchus Works' cost of capital vs. actual return on 
invested capital; and, projected Bacchus Works' internal rate of return vs. actual rate of return. 
69. Petitioner argues that to properly consider the economic obsolescence issue, it 
is important to differentiate whether the cost approach has been based upon "reproduction costs" or 
"replacement costs." In its proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and final decision 
submitted by Petitioner, the issue was presented as follows: 
Mr. Cook's appraisal labels the preliminary cost value as 
"reproduction/replacement costs." However, neither Mr. Cook's direct 
testimony, nor his appraisal attempts to identify the difference between the 
two types of costs. This is not of serious concern to the County Board. Mr. 
Cook's oral testimony at the Formal Hearing paid little attention to the issue, 
though Mr. Cook did claim the "Kent numbers" from "1978 and earlier are 
replacement cost numbers. For - subsequent to 1978 or from 1979 and 
beyond, they are reproduction cost numbers." Mr. Cook claimed 38% of the 
"Kent numbers" are "replacement," and 62% are "reproduction costs." Test. 
of Philip Cook, Tr., 449-450. 
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For ATK, "the case turns on the definition of economic obsolescence: 
The diminution in value to the original investment, the original investment 
for the reproduction costs which form the basis of the assessment. " Opening 
Stat, of Maxwell Miller, Tr. 10 (emphasis added). Accordingly, ATK 
stresses the preliminary cost values are reproduction costs. Mr. Reilly 
testified, "I have relied upon the reproduction costs new which Mr. Ed Kent 
of the County originally prepared and which the County has factored forward 
every year since Ed Kent's valuation." Reilly Dir. Test., 4, In. 3-4. Mr. 
Reilly further explained, "Then what Mr. Kent does is take the '78 costs, 
trends them up to 1995, takes '79 and after costs and trends them up to 1995, 
and Mr. Cook and I go from there. So for every asset purchased in 1979 and 
after, it's clearly a reproduction cost... [F]or every asset in place as of 1979, 
by 1/1/00 these costs have been trended up, and these costs have been 
trended up so 100 percent of these costs are reproduction costs, meaning 
trended up costs... " Test, of Robert Reilly, Tr., 706-707(emphasis added). 
Mr. Michael Remsha, an appraiser with American Appraisal Associates 
who submitted a Review Appraisal of Mr. Cook's appraisal, likewise testified 
that Mr. Cook and Mr. Reilly both used reproduction costs, and not 
replacement costs as a starting point. He testified the difference between the 
two costs is significant, and can, as a practical matter, make an enormous 
difference in assessed values. "Replacement cost is the cost as of the 
appraisal date of a property that has the same utility and capacity of the 
subject property but represents current or modern technology," whereas 
"Reproduction cost is the cost of what is being appraised that represents 
exactly what is currently there as of the appraisal date, including all of its 
inefficiencies and negative attributes." Test, of Michael Remsha, Tr., 268. 
Neither Mr. Cook's direct testimony, nor his oral testimony, nor his 
appraisal report acknowledge any awareness of a significant difference 
between replacement 
and reproduction costs. Likewise, neither the County's Opening Statement 
nor Closing Argument mentions the issue. Mr. Cooks' appraisal report 
acknowledges the "source data" available to George Christopolous that are 
the preliminary cost values "were developed by Ed Kent" and "based on 
original costs." Cook App. Exhibit R-Cook 1, 76. However, Mr. Cook 
labels the "reproduction/replacement" costs as though such were an 
undefined and indistinguishable lump. 
Contrary to Mr. Cook, ATK repeatedly stresses the distinction between 
reproduction and replacement costs. Mr. Remsha testified the replacement 
cost would be "much smaller, much different" for the Bacchus Works, 
because "such costs would have the same utility but would incorporate 
modern technology as of the appraisal date." Test, of Michael Remsha, Tr., 
269 Mr. Reilly testified he would use "exactly the methodology Mr. Cook 
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used" for measuring economic obsolescence "if we were doing a replacement 
cost analysis. If we were looking at today's cost, you would want to look at 
today's structures." Test, of Robert Reilly, Tr., 711. Mr. Miller argued that 
"Robert Reilly5 s methodology [for measuring economic obsolescence] is only 
applied to reproduction costs," and "the reason why in a nutshell there's 
obsolescence is because the reproduction costs are $200 million. No sane 
person would build an overcapacity facility." ATK Opening Statement, Tr., 
9, In. 13. Mr. Reilly testified, "for every asset purchased in 1979 and after, 
it's clearly a reproduction cost." Test, of Robert Reilly, Tr. 706, In. 23. 
70. Mr. Reilly testified that this distinction between reproduction cost and 
replacement cost is very significant. It is his position that economic obsolescence must be measured 
by an income shortfall approach, and what is being measured is the difference in the income being 
earned by the property on the lien date versus the income the property was intended to earn. 
Therefore, he argues we must determine the economic obsolescence from the reproduction cost new 
by going back to the base period when those costs were incurred. Accordingly, his position is that 
reproduction costs of the property at issue in 1984 through 1990, determine the costs for the 
benchmark base period which must be used. His position is that economic obsolescence is defined 
as a decrease in value from a time when there was little or no economic obsolescence to the current 
time. 
71. Mr. Reilly also argues that the methodology used by Mr. Cook is erroneous 
because he is measuring only the difference between two assumed numbers. As an example, Mr. 
Reilly notes that Mr. Cook's estimate of an 18.41% rate ofreturn for Alliant and the 16.00% required 
rate of return are both assumptions. Mr. Reilly further argues that this ignores the economic 
obsolescence that is imbedded in the historical costs, i.e. the reproduction costs, which is the cost 
used by Mr. Kent in his original study and which was relied upon by both parties. 
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72. The position of Mr. Cook is very different from that of Mr. Reilly. Mr. Cook 
did not believe it is necessary to compare the production of Petitioner with any base line time period. 
Instead, his approach is to determine if the property is earning an adequate return, and if not then 
there is economic obsolescence. If the property is earning an adequate return, then Mr. Cook 
maintains there is no economic obsolescence. Mr. Cook's method of determining and measuring 
economic obsolescence was obtained from a Mr. Don Drysdale1, and is described in his prepared 
testimony as follows: 
"The excess earnings method is applied as follows: 
• Estimate the fair market values of the net tangible assets. 
• Estimate a normalized level of earnings. 
• Estimate the required rate of return of the tangible assets. 
• Estimate the required return on net tangible assets by multiplying the 
required rate of return on the tangible assets by the net tangible assets. 
• Subtract the required return on net tangible assets by the normalized 
level of earning to determine excess earnings. If the result is a positive 
number, there are excess earnings. If the result is a negative number, there 
are not excess earnings. 
• Estimate an appropriate capitalization rate to apply to the excess 
earnings. 
• Divide the excess earnings by the capitalization rate to determine 
capitalized excess earnings (intangibles). 
• Add the fair market value of the tangible assets to the capitalized 
excess earnings. This results in the value of the subject company. 
• Apply discounts and premiums as appropriate." 
"Note: The blended capitalization rate (the required return on tangible assets 
and the excess earnings capitalization rate) should approximate the weighted 
average cost of capital." 2 
73, Mr. Cook then utilized that methodology and determined that the net tangible 
assets are producing an adequate return, and therefore, in his opinion, there is no economic 
1 Drysda le , Don M., CPA, "Common Approaches t o Bus ines s V a l u a t i o n / ' 
Fundamental issues in Utah Business Valuations (Eau C l a i r e , Wiscons in : NBI< 
I n c . , 1998) : 5 6 - 5 7 . 
2 Update a p p r a i s a l of Mr. J . P h i l i p Cook, E x h i b i t 2 of Respondent , page 97 . 
24 
Appeal No. 01-0974 
obsolescence which has occurred. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just administration of property 
taxes to ensure that property is valued for tax purposes according to fair market value. Utah Code 
Ann. §59-1-210(7). 
2. To prevail, the Petitioner must (1) demonstrate that the County's original 
assessment contained error, and (2) provide the Commission with a sound evidentiary basis for 
reducing the original valuation to the amount proposed by Petitioner. Nelson v. Bd. Of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County, 9 A3 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997). However, in this case, neither party presented 
evidence to support the determination of value made by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. 
Accordingly, each party has an equal burden of proof to provide the Commission with a sound 
evidentiary basis, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the fair market value of the 
property. 
3. A tax is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any 
person on any real or personal property which for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that property 
is used in connection with a business conducted for profit. This includes property which is owned by 
the United States Government but used in connection with a bus mess conducted for profit. Utah 
CodeAnn.§59-4-101. 
DISCUSSION 
NIROP 
As stated above, legal counsel for Petitioner suggested: 
With respect to NIROP action, Alliant submits the Tax Commission 
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cannot simultaneously adjudicate the NIROP issues in Alliant's pending 2000 
assessment case and participate as a Defendant-Ihtervenor in the NIROP action, 
without violating Alliant's constitutional due process rights. Simultaneous 
participation in such incompatible roles may trigger an action against the Tax 
Commission. To avoid this problem, Alliant recommends that the Tax Commission, 
as a matter of comity, abstain from deciding the NIROP issues in Alliant's 2000 
valuation case pending before the Commission. 
Notwithstanding the arguments of Petitioner, the Commission believes it has a 
constitutional and statutory responsibility, pursuant to Article 13 of the Utah Constitution, and Utah 
Code Ann. §59-1-210, to interpret the tax laws of the state of Utah, including the exemption 
provisions and the interpretation of the privilege tax provisions of Title 59, Chapter 4. Such a review 
should be prior to the matters being presented to a court for interpretation. However, Petitioner 
chose to bring an independent action in the District Court, thereby bypassing the Tax Commission on 
an issue the Commission believes is its initial prerogative pursuant to the Constitution and statutes of 
the state of Utah. Therefore, in the opinion of the Commission, it had aresponsibihty to intervene in 
the separate NIROP action in District Court to preserve what it believes is its constitutional and 
statutory responsibility. In the view of the Commission, it was improper for the matters to be 
presented to the court prior to the time there had been a ruling on those issues by the Commission. 
The Commission therefore intervened in the District Court NIROP action, not to take a position on 
any valuation or exemption issues before the Court, but to preserve the constitutional and statutory 
process of having tax matters presented to the Tax Commission prior to those matters being 
presented to the Court for judicial determination. 
Once that decision has been made by the Commission, the decision may be reviewed 
by the appropriate judicial process. In this proceeding, the NIROP issue is one which is clearly 
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within the jurisdiction of the Tax Commission. This NIROP issue was presented and argued to the 
Commission, evidence was adduced, and if the Commission does not decide that issue in this Order, 
then there is no other body with original jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 
When reviewing the evidence relating to whether the NIROP property is exempt from 
the privilege tax, the Commission determines that there is no evidence which was presented which 
persuades the Commission that the NIROP property is exempt from the privilege tax in the state of 
Utah. Petitioner has the exclusive possession and enjoys the beneficial use of the NIROP facilities in 
connection with its business being conducted for profit. In so holding, the Commission 
acknowledges that the Navy, as landlord of the facility, still retains rights to access the facility. The 
Commission also recognizes that Lockheed-Martin, as the genera] contractor, still has a presence at 
the facility at the direction of the United States Navy. However, this is not unlike Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation v. Peterson, 15Utah2d355,393P.2d391 (1964 Utah) in which the Supreme Court of 
Utah stated: 
The test which has been applied in ascertaining whether a tax offends 
against this federal immunity has been referred to as the "legal incident" test. 
It is stated that if the tax is directly upon the United States or an agency 
thereof, it is invalid. But the converse is also true: If the tax falls upon 
another, the fact that the tax might indirectly fall upon the United States does 
not render it invalid. It could hardly be otherwise. 
* * * * 
The contract with which we are concerned is written in broad terms. 
The import of its provisions is to require of Thiokol to produce the end 
results, and it does not specify in detail how the research and development 
shall be conducted. There is nothing to suggest that the Government 
presumes to enter into such problems, nor into the policy making or the 
management of plaintiffs operation of this military production plant. 
Consistent with the conclusion that it was the understanding of the parties 
that Thiokol was looked to only for the end result is the testimony of the Air 
Force Contract Administrator: 
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"Q. And did the contract specify exactly how that research and 
development would be conducted? 
"A. No, sir, these contracts are in very broad terms. 
"Q. Specifying the end that was desired, rather than the means by 
which the end would be achieved? 
"A. That is correct, sir." 
The above conclusion is not changed by the fact that under the 
contract the Government maintains a staff of about 60 people to supervise 
such things as security, safety measures, labor relations, accounting, 
procurement and the Company's organization structure, including wages and 
salaries. These measures are quite understandable because of the desirability 
of safeguarding the interests of the Government in the expenditure of such 
large sums of Government money; and more importantly, because of the 
necessity for maximum security in this field vital to the national defense. But 
they are not inconsistent with the main purport of the contract which is 
directioned toward requiring Thiokol to pursue its own course in 
accomplishing "the end result," rather than the Government having actual 
management and direction of the enterprise. 
Fitting into that same general character is the provision of the contract 
with respect to the property in question. Even though it recites that the 
Government retains title, it appears to be intended that Thiokol will deal with 
it practically as it chooses. It has the right to inspect and reject any property 
found unsuitable to its uses. Upon acceptance it has the duty to maintain, but 
no liability for loss, damage or the using it up entirely. Thiokol is given the 
right to possession and to use it primarily in conjunction with the contract. 
This seems to imply that it could use the property for other purposes if it so 
desires. The foregoing leads us to agree with the 
conclusion of the trial court that under the facts shown and the terms of the 
contract, Thiokol is not properly regarded as an instrumentality of the United 
States Government, but as an independent contractor. 
Therefore, in accordance with the evidence in this case, and with the previous 
decisions of the Commission and, based upon the rule of law established in the Thiokol case, the 
Commission determines that the NIROP property is subject to, and not exempt from the privilege tax 
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imposed by Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101, et seq. 
LAM) VALUE 
The parties made estimates of the land value, without contamination, which were 
extremely close. Both parties acknowledged that the difference is not significant or material, and is 
less than $100 per acre. Therefore, based upon the testimony of the appraisers, the Commission 
determines a reasonable land value, prior to any adjustments for environmental issues, is 
$44,600,000. 
A. Environmental Contamination 
Mr, Reilly proposed reductions in the land value for environmental contamination. 
Those reductions were for Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action 
monitoring, and environmental stigma caused by both the delay in sale and additional financing costs 
because of the environmental contamination. 
Mr. Cook examined several sales of industrial properties and represented that, in his 
opinion, an adjustment for contamination was not necessary because the market did not reflect a 
reduction in value for contamination if the selling party provided an indemnification agreement to 
the purchasing party. Therefore, Mr. Cook recommended that no reduction in value be made for 
contamination because it is not reflected in the market place. 
The Commission has considered that reasoning of Mr. Cook, but determines that if it 
is necessary for the selling party to give an indemnification agreement, then there are potential costs 
to the seller associated with fulfilling the terms of any such indemnification agreement. The nominal 
purchase price must be reduced by such costs to arrive at fair market value. In other words, expert 
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testimony established that the indemnification agreement does not run with the land. Therefore, we 
must attempt to determine the price at which this property would sell to a willing buyer without an 
indemnification agreement. Therefore, the Commission determines that appropriate adjustments 
must be made for any contamination which exists to the land. 
B. RCRA Corrective Action Program Liability Adjustments 
Mr. Reilly recommended an adjustment to the value of the land for the monitoring 
costs averaging approximately $500,000 per year which are paid to comply with the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act. The Commission's understanding is that there are 13 years 
remaining including the year 2000, which would be a total cost of $6,500,000. Because that amount 
will not all be paid out immediately, and will instead be paid out over the next 13 years, the 
Commission determines it is appropriate to reduce that amount to a present value using a discount 
rate of 10% per annum, the same discount rate proposed by Mr. Reilly in other adjustments. 
Therefore, the Commission determines it is appropriate to reduce the value of the land by 
$3,550,000, which is the present value of $500,000 per year for 13 years, rounded to the nearest 
$10,000. 
C. Stigma 
Mr. Reilly proposed an^adjustment to the value of the land of $3,464,000 for the 
"delay in sale" component of environmental stigma, and an additional $ 1,872,000 for the "financing 
costs" component of environmental stigma. With respect to both of these adjustments, Respondent 
did not present substantial challenge to those adjustments except that it did not observe such a stigma 
in the sales which had occurred. 
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If it is necessary to provide an indemnification agreement, then it is likely that such 
stigma exists. As noted above, we must attempt to determine value without regard to any potential 
indemnification agreement. The Commission therefore approves those adjustments as proposed by 
Mr. Reilly. 
D. Cost to Repair Natural Resources Damages 
Based upon the letter received from the Utah State Department of Environmental 
Quality in November of 2001, Mr. Reilly recommended an adjustment to the site value of 
$139,000,000 to allow for that damage claim, which reduced the value of the land to "nil". There 
was testimony that the primary reason the Department of Environmental Quality presented that 
damage claim was to prevent the statute of limitations from running, and does not provide definitive 
evidence of the specific amount for the damage to those resources. 
Also, the claim was made nearly two years after the lien date in this proceeding. In 
view of the circumstances here, the Commission determines that the amount of the claim is 
speculative and does not establish the amount of contamination as of the lien date. Further, if the 
amount is actually spent, or if the damages are corrected by spending any amounts necessary, then 
the amounts of the claim would be duplicative of the amounts in the RCRA corrective action 
adjustment and the "stigma" adjustments, i.e., if the problem is corrected by the payment of such 
damages, then no further monitoring would be needed and the property would no longer have the 
"stigma" of contamination. 
In addition, to the extent that the damages were known or knowable on the lien date, 
the Commission determines those damages to be included in the contamination adjustments 
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approved herein by the Commission. To the extent that any such damage claim exceeds those 
amounts, the Commission believes that such damages were not known or knowable on the lien date, 
and therefore it is not appropriate to make an adjustment for such damages which were not known or 
knowable. This interpretation is consistent with representations made by the management of Alliant 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the public in the Form 10-K for the fiscal year 
ended March 31,2000. It is also consistent with the fact that large portions of the entire tract are not 
contaminated land and could be sold separately. 
IMPROVEMENT VALUE 
Mr. Reilly determined a cost approach value of $214,754,081, whereas Mr. Cook 
determined a cost approach value of $218,659,165. After consideration of the two buildings 
omitted by Mr. Reilly, the values are very close. 
Although the resulting difference is not of major significance, for purposes of this 
decision, the Commission will accept the determination of value made by Mr. Cook of 
$218,659,165. The Commission has made this choice because Marshall and Swift make an attempt 
to base its depreciation calculations upon the market place, whereas straight-line depreciation is 
primarily an accounting procedure for spreading the costs over an equal number of periods. 
A. Functional Obsolescence 
Mr. Reilly determined the property suffered "functional obsolescence" in an amount 
of $21,200,000. Mr. Cook determined the property suffered "excessive functional obsolescence in 
an amount of $16,400,778. 
Both Mr. Reilly and Mr. Cook used, to some extent, similar methods in determining 
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which buildings suffered from functional obsolescence, by examining each of the buildings on the 
facilities of Petitioner. Mr. Reilly wrote down the full value of buildings that were either not being 
used by Alliant or were not being used for the designed purpose, and he also wrote down the unused 
portions of buildings that were being partially used. Mr. Cook wrote down the full value of 
buildings that were abandoned or unused, and he also wrote down only a portion of the buildings that 
were underutilized. 
Based upon the testimony of Mr. Reilly and Mr. Cook, the parties did not believe that 
the difference in functional obsolescence was significant or material. Mr. Cook did not eliminate the 
full value of buildings which were underutilized. The Commission finds that buildings may be 
underutilized without being functionally obsolete. Therefore, the Commission finds there was 
functional obsolescence of $16,400,778, as determined by Mr. Cook. 
B. Economic Obsolescence 
Mr. Reilly proposed economic obsolescence in an amount of $87,099,336. Mr. Cook 
determined that there was no economic obsolescence to be deducted from the RCNLD value of the 
property. 
Mr. Reilly used substantially the same methodology he used in the earlier proceedings 
before this Commission, relying on a base period or bench mark of 1984 through 1990 from which to 
measure economic obsolescence. He measured economic obsolescence at the Bacchus Works by 
comparing (1) Historical Bacchus Works results of operations vs. current results of operations: (2) 
Bacchus Works Appropriation requests vs. actual financial performance: (3) Projected Bacchus 
Works financial performance vs. actual performance: and (4) Industry demand analysis. 
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Mr. Cook attempted to determine whether there was economic obsolescence by 
estimating the return earned by the assets and comparing it with his estimated rate of return the assets 
should be earning. When Mr. Cook determined that in his opinion the assets were earning an income 
greater than was required, he determined there was no economic obsolescence. 
One of the problems in trying to determine economic obsolescence is that the subject 
property is a unique special service facility for which some traditional methods of determining 
economic obsolescence are not applicable. In addition, most of the available financial statements are 
for the company as a whole, which includes other facilities besides the property at issue in this 
proceeding. Therefore, the income figures are primarily business income earned by the entire 
company and not just by this property. Although the underlying premises and hypothesis for both of 
the appraisers appear to be reasonable on the surface, the Commission has concerns about the 
application of those hypotheses. 
With respect to Mr. ReiUy's determination, he relied to a large extent upon averages, 
and in doing so any single discrete point can have an abnormal quantitative impact on those 
averages, causing exaggerations or skewings of otherwise normalized measurements. This is most 
certainly the case in his use of "financial measures" under the "historical results of operations versus 
current results of operations." (Exhibit IV-1). In that case, the 1984 return of 170% was so high that 
it resulted in a seven-year average which was higher than five out of the seven years. Therefore, the 
use of an average in that case significantly distorted the economic obsolescence determined by Mr. 
ReiUy. Mr. ReiUy did testify that averaging removes the subjective appraisal judgment, but the 
Commission believes that the exercise of judgment is not only appropriate, but is essential to the 
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appraisal process. Without the application of such judgment, we are left with only simple averages 
which may or may not represent actual obsolescence. 
With respect to Mr. Cook's determination, although he attempted to apply his 
judgment in determining economic obsolescence, it leaves a question as to whether it is possible to 
generate sufficient business earnings from the total enterprise, which then overlooks real economic 
obsolescence in the underlying tangible real property. This may well be the case in this matter, 
because it is clear the overall space market economy has declined, while the company appears to be 
earning an adequate return. Nevertheless, the physical assets as they exist are not completely 
necessary to produce this return, i.e., the company could perhaps make a lower investment and still 
meet its production requirements. In addition, from a review of Mr. Cook's analysis, it could be 
concluded that no obsolescence exists at all, i.e., if functional obsolescence is added back into the 
depreciated cost figure, there is only a minimal impact on the residual income. (Especially in light of 
the fact that most of the primary buildings were not critically examined for functional obsolescence.) 
Further, while Mr. Cook's techniques appear reasonable, there is a concern about the specific rates 
of return used by him, specifically based upon the critique of Mr. Remsha. Also, the rates may not 
take into account the level of risk associated with a business as volatile as the space industry. 
One additional factor is that both Mr. Reilly and Mr. Cook have attempted to make 
one calculation for functional obsolescence and another calculation for economic obsolescence. In 
reality, a substantial part of what has been classified as functional obsolescence maybe either in full 
or in part economic obsolescence. When Mr. Reilly and Mr. Cook classified unused and/or 
underutilized buildings as functionally obsolete, it is possible that the buildings were unused or 
35 
Appeal No. 01-0974 
underutilized because of the declines of business in the industry and in particular the declines of the 
business of Petitioner. There was no evidence presented by either party to indicate those buildings 
would not or could not still be in use if the production levels were at the levels that were anticipated 
when the facility was built or when Petitioner acquired the property. Therefore, it is possible that 
part of the obsolescence that was caused by economic conditions has been classified as functional 
obsolescence. Accordingly, if an additional deduction is made for economic obsolescence, the value 
of the property may be reduced below fair market value. 
In this matter, the data clearly show that the economic performance of both the overall 
industry and Petitioner itself peaked in the early 1990's, and then experienced significant declines 
during the mid 1990's, but then increased in the late 1990's. As of 1999, various indicators remain 
below peak period levels, but are equal to performance levels in approximately 1989, or the base 
period used by Mr. Reilly. The conclusion of this information is that it is possible that economic 
obsolescence may exist, but if it does exist, it is in an amount significantly less than that determined 
by Mr. Reilly. 
In this case, the Commission is faced with testimony of two experts, one of whom 
asserts $87,099,336 of economic obsolescence and one of whom asserts no economic obsolescence. 
We do not believe that any methodology has been presented that would allow it to apply its own 
appraisal judgment to come up with an intermediate number. Accordingly, we believe we must 
choose the adjustment of whichever expert most closely approximates the amount of economic 
obsolescence that may be present. 
We accept Petitioner's assertion that no reasonable person would build, on the lien 
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date, the Alliant facility in the same way or with the same capacity as originally designed. The 
question before us, however, is not whether the original costs were justified. The question is whether 
additional reductions are appropriate given the substantial physical depreciation, functional 
obsolescence and environmental reductions already allowed. 
In light of these facts, the Commission believes and finds that the determination of 
economic obsolescence made by Mr. Reilly is significantly exaggerated, and the determination of 
Mr. Cook of no economic obsolescence beyond the functional obsolescence and physical 
depreciation allowed more closely reflects fair market value. Therefore, the Commission is not 
persuaded that any additional adjustment is necessary to reflect economic obsolescence. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the market value of the 
subject property as of January 1,2000, is $238,032,387, as calculated on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
The County Auditor is ordered to adjust the assessment records as appropriate in compliance with 
this order. 
DATED this J / ^ day of _ ^ , 2003. 
G. Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION: 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision. 
DATED this / ^ ^ c l a y of -Jfr^ >2003-
Pam Hendrickson fco/r*CAl \ \ Palmer DePaulis 
Commission Chair ft • btnt» 1*0 Commissioner 
37 
Appeal No. 01-0974 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for Reconsideration 
with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for Reconsideration must 
allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the 
Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue 
judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
GBD/cW/01-0974.fof 
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EXHIBIT A 
VALUE DETERMINED BY THE COMMISSION 
Uncontaminated Site Value: $ 44,660,000 
RCRA Corrective Action Program Liability Adjustment: $ 3,550,000 
Estimated Effect of "Delay In Sale" Component of 
Environmental Stigma: $ 3,464,000 
Estimated Effect of "Additional Financing" 
Component of Environmental Stigma: $ 1,872,000 
Cost to Repair Natural Resource Damages: $ 0 
Indicated Market Value of Bacchus Works Site: $ 35.774.000 
RCNLD: $218,659,165 
Functional Obsolescence: $ 16,400,778 
Economic Obsolescence: $ 0 
Total Value of Bacchus Real Estate Improvements: $202,258,387 
Total Value of the Bacchus Works Real Property (rounded): $238.032,387 
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Concurring Opinion 
I concur in the opinion of the majority but wish to make an additional point on 
economic obsolescence. Mr. Reilly's approach is creative and flexible. Such an 
approach may be necessary for an aging special use facility in many cases. In my view, 
however, his approach is both unnecessary and unwarranted in this case. The existence 
and amount of economic obsolescence can be ascertained by reviewing the most 
significant economic event in the recent life of this property, namely, its purchase by 
Alliant a few years before the lien date. 
In pro forma financial statements provided to shareholders at the time of the 
acquisition, Alliant represented to shareholders that the value of the acquired assets 
would be based on their respective fair market values as supported by appraisals. [SL 
004368.] Beginning with a book value for Hercules' net property, plant and equipment 
of $278,459,000, Alliant then increased that value by $189,128,000 to "[r]eflect[] the 
adjustment of property, plant and equipment to fair value . . . " [SL 004373, 004377.] At 
the same time, Hercules' booked goodwill was written off [SL004377 (n. 20)] and a 
$40,000,000 adjustment was made to "reflect the adjustment of unfavorable purchased 
contracts to their fair market value." [SL 004378 (n. 23).] These entries would not 
indicate any incremental economic obsolescence as of the purchase date unless the 
original cost figures on Hercules books are substantially lower than the stipulated cost 
figures used by the parties as a starting point for their appraisals. 
Apparently, at some subsequent time, an adjustment to goodwill was made to 
reflect the fact that the purchase price exceeded the fair market value of tangible assets. 
Alliant's 1990 financial statement reflects goodwill from acquisitions of $125,000,000. 
This adjustment, of course, to the extent it relates to the Hercules acquisition, supports 
Alliant's contention that it was acquiring significant intangibles as part of the purchase. 
Alliant essentially argues that the issue on economic obsolescence is whether any 
reasonable person would make the same investment decisions Hercules made from 1980 
through 1990, if they knew what the state of the industry would be as of the lien date. 
That question, however, ignores the arm's length purchase of this property by Alliant at a 
point in time much closer to the lien date and after most of the market disruptions had 
occurred that allegedly gave rise to economic obsolescence. uIn assessment litigation, 
under the 'rules of evidence' a bona fide sale of the subject property is considered the 
best evidence of market value." Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, p. 
153, International Association of Appraisal Officers (1990 ed.). The values recorded by 
Alliant on its books, and reported to its shareholders, its lenders, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, would be far more persuasive evidence of the existence and 
amount of economic obsolescence than the analyses prepared solely for purposes of this 
proceeding. 
Alliant criticizes Mr. Cook's allocation of the purchase price, but it makes no 
effort to provide its own allocation. Mr. Cook does not rely on his own allocation. Thus, 
the Commission is left without definitive analysis by either party on a critical issue. 
Without guidance from knowledgeable witnesses, we are unwilling and unable to parse 
the financial statements ourselves. I am prepared to assume, however, that Alliant 
devoted significant resources to ensuring that its financial statements accurately reflect its 
financial position. The Hercules acquisition was given great attention in the SEC filings 
and was obviously material. Alliant has not presented evidence or testimony that the 
purchase price allocated on its books and reported to its shareholders in 1995, or in 
subsequent adjustments, was substantially lower than the values asserted by the County. 
Thus, I can only conclude that the relevant entries on Alliant's own books and records 
would not support Mr. Reilly's calculations. (I find no evidence of any factors that 
would support a finding of material economic obsolescence arising after the purchase 
date.) 
For this reason, in addition to the arguments adopted in the majority opinion, I 
find that no additional allowance is justified for economic obsolescence. 
\#L—^ 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
CONCURRING OPINION 
A potential buyer for this property, as it exists on the lien date, would find improvements 
that suffer from wear and tear (physical deterioration) and to some extent, are either unused or 
underutilized (functional obsolescence). The question is whether, after adjusting for these types 
of depreciation, there would be an incremental loss in value from external forces. 
The record clearly shows, as noted in the majority opinion, that the space industry has 
been in decline since a peak during the early 1990's, bottoming in the mid 1990's, and beginning 
to recover in the late 19905s. The record is also clear that on the whole, current industry 
performance is only now reaching its prior levels, but has not been able to perform at levels of 
even nominal growth that might have been expected based on market and economic conditions 
for the industry in the late 1980's and early 1990's. This same pattern holds true for Alliant. 
The evidence, on the whole, suggests to me that economic obsolescence is embedded in 
the structures, as they exist on the lien date. I am persuaded the Petitioner is correct in its 
general assertion that historic performance can be compared with current performance to 
properly analyze whether reproduction costs should be reduced by economic obsolescence. Two 
expert appraisers advocate this general position. Although experts testifying for the Respondent 
stated that they were not aware of that premise, they did nothing to refute it. Nonetheless, I am 
also persuaded that Petitioner's specific techniques exaggerated the amount of obsolescence. 
Respondent's analysis, at worst, was conservative in estimating risk associated with 
required rates of return. However, as stated in the majority opinion, there is no reason to believe 
a going concern or business enterprise cannot earn an adequate, or even a high return, even 
though some of its assets are economically obsolete. I note, however, there is no reason for an 
acknowledged expert to use techniques that he does not advocate. 
Neither party provided an acceptable alternative; Petitioner's techniques were 
exaggerated or overly selective while Respondent, in my opinion, did not go far enough in 
analyzing overall performance for the company and the industry. I am left, however, believing 
that economic obsolescence exists, could have been measured, is far less than Petitioner's 
estimate, and perhaps slightly more than Respondent's. Examining what I feel to be some 
critical numbers, taken from Petitioner's data, reveals the following: 
Category Peak Year Amount (ooo's) 1999 % Change Avg./Yr. 
Total Sales 1990 527,300 434,495 -18% -2% 
Operating Profit 1986 94,975 81,712 -14% -1% 
EBITDA 1989 89,045 102,023 15% 2% 
Although EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization) is 
the most relevant of the categories listed, it has only increased at a modest rate, and most, if not 
all, of the increase can be attributed to a significant decrease in administrative expenses, not to 
economic growth. In fact those cost decreases result from reduced production relative to 
designed capacity, which in turn is the basis for possible economic obsolescence. 
Given these factors and the nature of the reproduction cost, I can only conclude that there 
is a loss in value to the subject property, resulting from an industry decline in the missile sector, 
in spite of a partial recovery via the commercial space launch sector in the past few years. 
Unfortunately, neither party provided an approach with which I am completely 
comfortable. Nor should I impose my own methodology. I rely on the basic numbers only to 
indicate obsolescence, not to measure it. At best, I believe these, and other financial and 
economic data could be used in an alternative appraisal methodology to measure obsolescence, 
or possibly as a way to approximate a true measure of obsolescence. 
2 
Under special circumstances in the past, the Commission has incorporated it's own 
judgment and made adjustments to a party's evidence. However, given the complexities of the 
present case and the disparity between two acknowledged experts, doing so here would not be 
appropriate. 
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General Intent: 
The purpose of this modification is to add a Section H provision 
concerning siting of facilities. This modification results in no 
change in the estimated cost of the contract. This modification 
represents a full and equitable adjustment for the change 
identified herein. The Contractor hereby releases the Government 
from any and all liability for further equitable adjustment 
attributable to such change. 
Modification: 
Section H, Special Contract Requirements: At the end thereof 
ADD: 
11. Facilities Siting: 
The Contractor will site the NIROP facilities to the 1.25 TNT equivalence criteria to process 
Trident propeilani. 
N00030-96-E-0068 
Mod. No. P00001 
Page 2 
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PROPOSAL/CONTRACT NAME: NiROP FAC1UTIES 
| USE CONTRACT 
CONTRACT NOTPROPOSAL NO. N00030-96-E-0068 
CHARGE CODE: CX 0003 EE 
° * ^ 
_ IEWS REQUIRED:(CHECK) 
4doREJ±l5-POUCY LE£AL 
DATE PREPARED: 10-10-96 
^ D A T E REQUIRED: ASAP 
IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR REVIEW: K. J. 
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.PRGMMGR 
CONTRACT/CUSTOMER: SSP CORE REVIEW: COST SJ CNTRy^J^V 
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POUCY REVIEW: 
DAVID H. PEET (or designee) 
LEGAL REVIEW; 
M. L BELLO. SIGGINS 
DATE: DATE: 
PERTINENT INFO: 
RFP T/C & PPl: 
CHECKLISTS: 
DELEG. PKG: 
MODEL CNT: 
SUMMARY OF ACTION: THIS MOD STATES: The contractor will site the NIROP facfflties to the 1.25 TNT equivalence criteria to process Trident 
propettant THERE ARE NO FUNDS PROVIDED FOR THIS REQUIREMENT. 
^ORE REVIEW COMMENTS: 
•  & ~ -
D AOOmONAL COMMENTS ATTACHED 
POUCY REVIEW COMMENTS: 
D ADOmONAL COMMENTS ATTACHED 
LEGAL REVIEW COMMENTS: 
D ADDmONAL COMMENTS ATTACHED 
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AILIAHT TECHSYSTEM: 
Memorandum Bacchus Worics Magna, Utah 84044-0098 
3-17-97 
Subject NKOP Facilities Mod POOOOl 
To Those Approving Mod POOOOl 
From J. W. ChristerLsen 
Department N400 Conteact Management 
M/S GA24 
Telephone 23433 
This Mod POOOOl for contract N00030-96-0068 has been held since October, pendingr the outcome of the 
different options. After study of the issue it has been determined that the impact is minimal and we 
should go ahead and send the signed mod to SSP. Please refer to the attached memo from C. F. Davis 
and D. Wheatley dated 6 March 1997 for more details. 
Please approve or re-approve the attached review sheet if you concur with this decision. 
TnanK you: 
ALL000078 
Memorandum 
Date 
Subject 
To 
6 March 1997 
1.25 TNT Equivalency 
H. L. Aure 
mmm TECHSYSTEiiS 
Bacchus Works 
Magna, Utah 84044-0093 
Ref. BH-NIR/003-97 
From 
Department 
M/S 
Telephone 
C. F. Davis, 
D. Wbeatl 
C240/3140 
X3G1/15 
23595/16058 
The reauest by the Navy to have all buildings on NIROP wh^c^ rnnrain hia-h pnercrv 
propellant (D5) sited using a 1.25 TNT equivalency has been studied to determine the 
potential impact on processing and motor and propellant storage. The facilities that are 
most impacted are the rest houses (magazines). Most newer NIROP manufacturing 
facilities have been sited and posted to account for the 1,25 TNT equivalency. Buildings 
49A and 47A have had site plans submitted to increase the explosive limit to 
accommodate First Stage D5. Use of the 1.25 TNT equivalency means four rest houses 
now being used or that will be used for motor or propellant storage must be reduced from 
100,000 lbs. to 80,000 lbs. explosive limits. This reduces the storage capacity of 
individual rest houses from four S/S D-5 motors to three S/S B-5 motors and a 
subsequent reduction in the total storage capacity of motor resthouses (magazines) of four 
S/S D-5 motors. These four motors can be stored/accommodated in 36A or some other 
storage facilities on the Bacchus Works. If the additional resthouses are needed in the 
future, the limits will have to be reduced to 80,000 lbs. and facilities located to store the 
ingredients. 
Based on the capacity review made by operations the current Bacchus propellantSmotor 
storage and operating requirements can be met, including contractually required D-5 
storage for motors and propellant ingredients, if the 1.25 TNT equivalency criteria for 
high energy propellant is imposed on NIROP facilities containing D5 propellant. The 
facilities reviewed are shown in Attachments 1 and 2. 
cc: D. Sticinski ^p> 
S. B o o n e ^ ^ ^ 
J. Vosburgh 
S. Marston 
J. Anderson 
AXL000079 
rtlMTZO CH U.S.A. 
From: Jerry Anderson 
To: JWCHRISTENSEN 
Data:- 3/12/97 2:01pm 
subject: 1.25 TNT Equivalency 
Jared, please send the contract letter agreeing to siting NIROP 
buildings to the 1.25 TNT equivalency immediately. If there are any 
questions please call at ex. 22154. 
CC: HLAURE 
ALL000080 
ITECHSYSTEUS ifr'*1** 
J. W. Christensen AJIiant Techsystems Tel (801) 250-5911 
Contract Administrator Bacchus Works FAX (801)251-2940 
P.O. Box 98 
12 September 1996 Magna, Utah 84044-0098 
In Reply Refer To: 
FAQN400\96-042 
DIRECTOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS 
CODE SPN-62 (T. L. HEILIG) 
1931 JEFFERSON DAVIS HWY 
ARLINGTON, VA 22202-3518 
Subject NIROP Facilities Use Contract N0030-96-E-0068 Modification POOOOl 
Correction Request 
Enclosure: Six (6) Copies of Modification POOOOl 
AHiant hereby requests that the subject Mod POOOOl, Section H, Special Contract 
Requirements, 11. Facilities Siting be changed from: 
The Contractor will site theiT facilities to the 1.25 TNT equivalence criteria to 
process Trident propellant 
To the corrected wording as follows: 
The Contractor will site the NIROP facilities to the 1.25 TNT equivalence 
criteria to process Trident propellant. 
We feel the wording "the NIROP facilities" more accurately indicates which facilities are 
involved. We have enclosed the six (6) copies of Mod POOOOl. 
Please call me at 801-251-3433 or J. J. Anderson, Program Manager, at 801-251-2154 if you 
have any questions. 
J. W. Christensen 
Contract Administrator 
::(FAC 
cc: 
Wtrjndl) 
J. J. Anderson 
C W. Shearer (DCMO) 
LCDR J. G. Giaquinto 
A24 
X11W 
Bl 
H. L. Aure 
B. B. Kasperek 
K. J. Abplanalp 
A2 
Bl 
ATR 
sw-toocma(R£V *n\) 
ALL000081 
AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT 
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POOOOi 
SUED BY 
fRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS 
01 Jefferson Davis Hwy 
Arlington, VA 22202-3518 
Buyer/Symbol: T.Heilig/SPN-62 
Phone: (703)607-0910 
a. NAME AMD AOORE&S OP COKTBACTOfl 
Alliant Techsysiernjs, Inc. 
Bacchus Works 
P.O. Box 98 
Magna, UT 84044-0098 
COOE 3761 
COO 
X EFFECTIVE DATE 
Sec Block 16C 
N00030 
Autovon: 327-0910 
! *>. REQUISTCKSN^PURCMASE REQ. NO 
IMR 396QSPN50 
7. ADMINISTERED BY (Mother** 
DCMAO, Denver 
Orchard Place 2 
5975 Greenwood Plaza Blvd. 
Suite 200 
Exiglewood, CO 80111-4715 
(No, street, county, Sum and ZIP Code) 
FACILITY COOE 10396 I 
SPN-*2/5PLe:DRB/nb 
j 1. CONTRACT tO COOS 
1 U 
PAGE OF PAGES 
i 1 2 
1 5. PROJECT NO. (It app*ca£*«* "" 
1 N/A 
in Item S) | 
CO 
X^) 
X 
I 
DE 1 S0602A 
ADP Point: 
S 2 6 0 3 A 
9A» AMEN0M6NT OF SOLICITATION NO. 
98. DATED (SEE ITEM 11) 
10A. MOaFK^TONOFCONTRACT/OROERNO. 
N00030-96-E-0068 
106. 6 A T S 6 ( § 5 S I T 5 M I 3 ) 
8 Auz 1996 
1 1 . TH IS ITEM ONLY APPLIES TO A M E N D M E N T S OF SOLICITATIONS 
j Thtt above r a s n b f d *na>. I aann a amaodad as sat faflh in ham 14. Tha hour and d a * spaciSsd for racaipt of Off art | j '* ajdandadj | is not axtandad. 
ISfars must acknowiadgs racaipt ol this arnandrnant prior to tha hour spacifiad in tha aoftatation or as amaodad, by ona of trtaioaowing mathodt: (s) By compJating Hams 8 and 15, 
and ts<u»ang _ _ _ _ _ copias ol ths arnandmant; (b) By ac*no*4sdoing racaipt ofthia amaiidmant on aach copy of tha oflar tubrnittad: or (c) By saparats laaar or taiaoram which indo-
dssarafersnes to tha aoiotstfon and arnandmant numbar*. FAILURE OF YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO BE RECEIVED AT THE PLACE DESIGNATED FOR THE RECSPTOF 
OFFERS PRIOR TO THE HOUR AND DATE SPECIFIED MAY RESULT IN REJECTION OF YOUR OFFER. If by virtua of this arnandmant you dasir* to changa an <rfTar aJrsaoy suorntoad 
such changa* may ba msda by taiagram or Urttar, providad asch tataoram or taoar makaa nriarsnea to tha tofiduboo and this arnandmant and la rscarvad prbr to tha opaning hour 
12.ACCOurmNQ AND APPROPRIATION DATA 
N O F U N D S I N V O L V E D 
(Hrequreo) 
13. THIS ITEM APPUES ONLY TO MODIFICATIONS OF COffTRACTS/ORDERS, 
IT MOOIFIES THE CONTRACT/ORDER NO. AS DESCRIBED IN ITEM 14. 
THl£rcT»sGTSra5S^ 
EL THE ABOVE NUM85RED CONTRACT/ORDER IS MOCHFJED TO REFLECT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES (such i s Changs* in paying ofScs. approprobon data, ate.) 
SET FORTH IN ITEM 14, PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF FAR 43.103(b). 
C TV^^PPLflUE^AlAGTtESI^ 
The "Changes-Cost Reimbursement" clause and the mutual agreement of the parties. 
D. OTHER (Specoy typa otrntxiocukm ana autnorityj. 
E. IMPORTANT: Contractor • is not. is required to skjn this document and return 6 copies to the issuing office. 
14. QgSCWPTON OF MieHOUEHTMCOURCMlOH (Organized by UCFsection naarfrtcs, inducing soecHatiorvbontract subject matter where feas&e.) 
See Next Page 
Eacaptas prwidad h iaJn . a l »«mt and turObom of 0>a documart md»mricad to *»m 9A 
\£± UAIAZ AKS TOLE 0? 5i&NER (Type, cr pnttq 
rsk d&HrtwZtdteiFFiA&h 
(Signature of parson authorized to sign) 
15C. DATE SIGNED 
or 10A, M hantfoloni ttangad, ramaina gncnanqad and in tut tore* and •ffacL 
16A I^IAME AND TiTLE OF CONTRACTING CPftCSfl (Type or pant) 
168 UNITE0 STATES OF AMERICA 
f HY (Signature of Contracting Officer) 
16C DATE SIGNED 
540-01-152-8070 
OUS EDmON UNUSABLE 
30-105 
ALL000082 
STANDARD FORM 30 (REV. 10-83) 
PrvscribadbyGSA 
fAR (48 CFR) 53-243 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS CO/ITRACT/PROPOSAL REVIEW SHEET 
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CONTRACT NOTPROPOSAL NO. 
FAC/N4O0/96-O42 
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IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR REVIEW: 
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DATE PREPARED: 
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omitted; or (c) By separate letter or telegram which includes a reference to the solicitation and amendment numbers. FAILURE OF YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO 8E 
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10A. 
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CONTRACTING OFFICER WILL COMPLETE ITEM 17 OR 18 AS APPLICABLE 
j CONTRACTOR'S NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT (Contractor is required 
6 copies to issuing office.) to sign Shis document and return 
Contractor agrees to furnish and deliver an Hems or perform atf the services set 
forth or otherwise identified above and on an/ continuation sheets for the 
consideration staled herein. The rights and obligations of the parties to this 
contract sha* be subject to and governed by the following documents: (a) this 
awvard&ontract. (b) the solicitation, "rf any. and (c) such provisions, representations, 
cerufeatsora, and specifications, as are attached or incorporated by reference 
herein (Attachments ere Ssted herein.) 
(Type or print) NAME ANO TITLE OF SIGNER 
L. Aure 
ice President>#avy Programs 
18. AWAR (Contractor is not required to sign this document) Your offer 
on Solicitation Number Including tha 
additions or changes made by you which additions or changes are set 
forth in fufl above, is hereby accepted as to the items listed above and on any 
continuation sheets. This award consummates the contract which consists of 
the following documents: (a) the Government's solicitation and your offer, and 
(b) this award/contract No further contractual document is necessary. 
20A. NAME ANO TITLE OF CONTRACTING OFFICER 
THOMAS L.HBLM 
Contracting Officer 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA j20 . DATE SIGNED 
(Signature of Contracting Offio JZ 4*tf,/9?& 
N 7540-01-152-8069 26-107 A T T Annual STANDARD FORM 26 (REV. 4-35) 
PART I - THE SCHEDULE 
SECTION B- SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS 
The parties hereto agree that the terms and conditions of this 
facilities use contract shall apply to those facilities provided 
to the Contractor by the Government (Strategic Systems Programs, 
Department of the Navy) for the Contractor's use in performance 
of contracts or subcontracts, or both, for the Fleet Ballistic 
Missile (FBM) System. The Contractor agrees to use, maintain, 
account for, and dispose of such facilities in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of this facilities use contract. 
Item 0001 - Severable Facilities 
Item 0002 - Non-Severable Facilities 
SECTION C - DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS/WORK STATEMENT 
N/A 
SECTION D - PACKAGING AND MARKING 
N / A 
SECTION E - INSPECTION OR ACCEPTANCE 
N/A 
SECTION F - DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE 
N / A 
SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA 
S S P 5 2 5 2 . 2 0 4 - 9 7 5 0 
C o g n i z a n t : C o n t r a c t A d m i n i s t r a t e nn S e r v i c e s (CAS) Component (Feb 
.1993) 
E x c e p t a s s p e c i f i e d e l s ewhe re in t h i s c o n t r a c t , t h e Defense 
C o n t r a c t Management Command (DCMAO), Denver. Orchard P lace 2, 
5975 Greenwood P l a z a B l v d . . Su i t e 200. Enalewood. CO 80111-4715, 
i s d e s i g n a t e d a s t h e C o n t r a c t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n S e r v i c e s (CAS) 
Component h a v i n g c o g n i z a n c e over t h i s c o n t r a c t . The CAO i s 
a u t h o r i z e d a p p r o v a l of c o n t r a c t o r c a t e g o r y D w a i v e r s a s de f ined 
i n SSPINST 4 2 0 0 . 1 and OD 40825, u n l e s s t h i s a u t h o r i t y i s 
s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h h e l d . Approval of a l l o t h e r Waivers and 
D e v i a t i o n s from c o n t r a c t u a l r equ i r emen t s i s n o t a u t h o r i z e d except 
t o t h e e x t e n t d e l e g a t e d by o f f i c i a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e from e i t h e r 
t h e D i r e c t o r , S t r a t e g i c Systems Programs (DIRSSP) o r t h e 
P r o c u r i n g C o n t r a c t i n g O f f i c e r . Except a s modi f i ed by s e p a r a t e 
d e l e g a t i o n s from t h e DIRSSP, normal c o n t r a c t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
f u n c t i o n s w i l l be pe r fo rmed in accordance w i t h FAR 42 .302 . 
ALL000086 NOOOSO-SS-E-OOSS 
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SSP 5252.204-9751 
Cognizant Contract Programmatic and Technical Authority (F^h 
1393} 
The PMO SSP, Detachment, Magna, Utah has been designated as the 
on-site representative of the Director, Strategic Systems 
Programs (DIRSSP) with delegated authorities on programmatic and 
technical requirements on the FBMWS/SWS. Guidance regarding 
programmatic and technical requirements shall be provided to the 
CAS Component by the PMO/SSP, Detachment, Magna, Utah in 
accordance with DOD FAR Supplement (DFARS) 246.103(c), as 
necessary. 
SSP 5252.204-9752 
Exception to Contract Administration Delegation (Dec 1995) 
The administration and reporting of individual small business 
subcontracting plans under this contract shall be retained by the 
DIRSSP (SP-01G1) despite other delegations of contract 
administration functions. 
Additional Exception to Contract Administration Delegation: 
The function identified in FAR 42.302(a) (30) (iii) shall be 
retained by the DIRSSP notwithstanding the other delegations of 
contract administration functions. 
SECTION H - SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS 
Facilities: 
1. The facilities accountable under this contract (and 
previously accountable under Contract N0003 0-91-E-0119) are 
identified in enclosure (1) to Aliiant Ltr Fac/N400/96-013 
of 02 April 1996, which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
This list shall be revised from time to time, as necessary, 
to reflect additions to and deletions from the list of 
facilities which have been provided to the Contractor. The 
revised list shall not be effective until approved by the 
cognizant Government Property Administrator. 
2- Unless otherwise approved by the DCMAO, Denver, all 
facilities covered hereunder shall be located and used at 
Alliant Techsystems Inc., Bacchus Works Plant #1, Magna, 
Utah; Plant #2 in Clearfield, Utah; and the Navy-owned Plant 
#81 in Magna, Utah; and the Tekoi Test Range. 
3. The Contractor shall, unless otherwise directed in writing 
by the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO)(SPN), give first 
priority of use for the facilities accountable under this 
contract to work on behalf of SSP (Code SP-27) . 
4. The Contractor must obtain PCO approval before making either 
capital modifications to or usage changes of facilities. 
ALL000087 NOOO3O-96-E-OO6 8 
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5. On or before 31 October 1996 and annually thereafter, the 
Contractor shall submit to the PCO via the ACO, DCMAO, 
Denver,an updated list indicating the following information 
for all facilities which are accountable under this 
contract: 
(a) Abbreviated description, acquisition cost, and 
year of acquisition of each item together with the 
total cost of all facilities. 
(b) Identification number assigned to each item. 
6. Contaminated Government Property: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this contract, the 
Contractor shal l not be required to s e l l any Government 
property and/or material determined by the Contractor (and 
approved by the cognizant Government Property Administrator 
for the Contractor 's plant) to have become contaminated in 
any manner, to the extent that such property/material may be 
in jur ious to the health and/or l i f e of any would-be 
purchaser. 
7. Retention Review: 
An annual review by the Contractor and the ACO (and/or other 
Government representatives) will be made of the updated list 
of facilities for a current determination as to the 
continued requirement for retention. This review may be 
requested by the Contracting Officer at more frequent 
intervals if deemed necessary. 
8. Capital Maintenance: 
The Government will provide no maintenance, repair, 
rehabilitation, or replacement of the severable facilities 
accountable to this contract. 
9. Correspondence: 
All correspondence pertaining to this contract and requiring 
action not delegated to DCMAO shall be forwarded via the 
Cognizant Administration Contracting Officer (ACO) DCMAO, 
Denver: 
Director Strategic Systems Programs 
1931 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Arlington, Virginia 22202-3518 
Attn: Code SPN-S2 
10- Period of .this Contract: 
Item 0001 - 5 August 1996 through 4 August 2001. 
Item 0002 - 5 August 1996 through 4 August 1997, unless 
extended by mutual agreement of the parties. 
PART I I - CONTRACT CLAUSES 
SECTION I - CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE (FACILITIES 
USE) 
a . T h i s c o n t r a c t i n c c r p o r a t i e s t h e f o l l o w i n g c l a u s e s b y r e f e r e n c e , 
w i t h t h e same f o r c e a n d e f f e c t a s i f t h e y were g i v e n i n f u l l t e x t . 
Upon r e q u e s t , t h e C o n t r a c t i n g O f f i c e r w i l l make t h e i r f u l l t e x t 
a v a i l a b l e . 
F e d e r a l A c c r u i s i t i o n R e g u l a t i o n (FAR) (48 CFR C h a n t e r 1) C l a u s e s 
and POD FAR Supp lemen t (48 CFR C h a p t e r 2) C l a u s e s 
C l a u s e No. T i t l e and D a t e C l a u s e T e x t 
1 . D e f i n i t i o n s (Oct 1995) 5 2 . 2 0 2 - 0 1 
2. G r a t u i t i e s (Apr 1984) 5 2 . 2 0 3 - 0 3 
3 . C o v e n a n t A g a i n s t C o n t i n g e n t F e e s 5 2 . 2 0 3 - 0 5 
(Apr 1984) 
4. Anti-Kickback Procedures (Jul 1995) 52.203-07 
5. Security Requirements (Apr 1984) 52.204-02 
6. Printing/Copying Double-Sided on 52.204-04 
Recycled Paper (May 199 5) 
7. Examination of Records by Comptroller 52.215-01 
General (Jul 199 5) 
8. Audit-Negotiation (Oct 1995) 52.215-02 
Alternate I (Apr 1984) 
9. Order of Precedence (Jan 1986) 52.215-33 
10. Allowable Cost and Payment - 52.216-14 
Facilities Use (Apr 1984) 
11. Convict Labor (Apr 1984) 52.222-03 
12. Contract Work Hours and Safety 52.222-04 
Standards Act - Overtime 
Compensation (Jul 1995) 
13. Equal Opportunity (Apr 1984) 52.222-26 
14. Affirmative Action for Special 52.222-35 
Disabled and Vietnam Era 
Veterans (Apr 1984) 
15. Affirmative Action for Handicapped 52.222-3 6 
Workers (Apr 1984) 
16. Clean Air and Water (Apr 1984) "52.223-02 
17. Restrictions on Certain Foreign 52.225-11 
P u r c h a s e s (May 1992) 
1 8 . I n t e r e s t ( J a n 1991) 5 2 . 2 3 2 - 1 7 
( U n d e r l i n i n g d e n o t e s c h a n g e s made i n t h i s R e v i s i o n ) 
96 
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Limitation of Cost (Facilities) 52.232-21 
(Apr 1984} 
Assignment of Claims {Jan 1986) 52.232-23 
Prompt Payment (Mar 1994) 52.232-25 
Disputes (Oct 1995) - Alternate I 52.233-01 
(Dec 1991) 
Notice of Intent to Disallow Costs 52.242-01 
(Apr 1984) 
Changes - Cost Reimbursement (Aug 1987) 52.243-02 
Alternate IV (Apr 1984) 
Change Order Accounting (Apr 1984) 52.243-05 
Subcontracts Under Cost Reimbursement 52.244-02 
and Letter Contracts (Feb 1995) 
Alternate I (Jul 1995) 
Competition in Subcontracting 52.244-05 
(Apr 1984) 
Liability for the Facilities {Apr 1984) 52.245-08 ^ 
Use and Charges (Apr 1984) 52.245-09^ 
Government Property (Facilities Use) 52 .245-11^ 
(Apr 1984) 
Facilities Equipment Modernization 52.245-16 
(Apr 1985) 
Inspection of Facilities (Apr 1984) 52.246-10^ 
Commercial Bill of Lading Notations 52.247-01 
(Apr 1984) 
Failure to Perform (Apr 1984) 52-249-13 
Computer Generated Forms (Jan 1991) 52.253-01 
Contracting Officer's Representative 252.201-7000 
(Dec 1991) 
Disclosure of Information (Dec 1991) 252.204-7000 
Control of Government Personnel work 252.204-7003 
Product (Apr 1992) 
Drug-Free Work Force (Sep 1988) 252.223-7004 
Prohibition on Storage and Disposal 252.223-7005 
of Toxic and Hazardous Materials 
(Apr 1993) 
Safety Precautions for Ammunition and 252.223-7002 
Explosives (May 1994) 
Change in Place of Performance - 252.223-7003 
Ammunition and Explosives {Dec 1991) 
Reduction or Suspension of Contract 252.232-7006 
Payments Upon Finding of Fraud 
(Aug 1992) 
Postaward Conference (Dec 1991) 252.242-7000 
Reports of Government Property 252.245-7001 
(May 1994) 
Notification of Proposed Program 252.249-7002 
Termination or Reduction 
(May 1995) 
LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS, AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS 
LIST OF ATTACHMENTS 
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SECTION K - REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS, AND OTHER STATEMENTS OF 
OFFERORS 
The Offeror/Quoter represents and certifies as part of his 
proposal/quotation that: (Check or complete all applicable boxes or 
blocks. ) 
1. CERTIFICATE OF INDEPENDENT PRICE DETERMINATION (Apr 1985) 
(Applicable only to offers where a firm fixed price contract or 
fixed price contract with escalation is to be awarded) 
(FAR 52.203-02) 
(a) The offeror certifies that— 
(1) The prices in this offer have been arrived at 
independently, without, for the purpose of restricting competition, 
any consultation, communication, or agreement with any other offeror 
or competitor relating to (i) those prices, (ii) the intention to 
submit an offer, or £iii) the methods or factors used to calculate 
the prices offered; 
(2) The prices in this offer have not been and will not be 
knowingly disclosed by the offeror, directly or indirectly, to any 
other offeror or competitor before bid opening (in the case of a 
sealed bid solicitation) or contract award (in the case of a 
negotiated solicitation) unless otherwise required by law; and 
(3) No attempt has been made or will be made by the 
offeror to induce any other concern to submit or not to submit an 
offer for the purpose of restricting competition. 
(b) Each signature on the offer is considered to be a 
certification by the signatory that the signatory — 
(1) Is the person in the offeror's organization 
responsible for determining the prices being offered in this bid or 
proposal, and that the signatory has not participated and will not 
participate in any action contrary to subparagraphs (a) (1) through 
(a)(3) above; or 
(2) (i) Has been authorized, in writing, to act as agent 
for the following principles in certifying that those principles have 
riot participated, and will not participate in any action contrary to 
subparagraphs (a) (1) through (a) (3) above 
[insert full name of person (s) in the 
offeror's organization responsible for determining the prices offered 
in this bid or proposal, and the title of his or her position in the 
offeror's organization]; 
(ii) As an authorized agent, does certify that the 
principles named in subdivision (b) (2) (i) above have not 
participated, and will not participate, in any action contrary to 
s ubparagraphs (a) (1) through (a) (3 ) above; and 
(Underlining denotes changes made in this edition) 
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(iii) As an agent, has not personally participated, and 
will not participate, in any action contrary to subparagraphs (a) (1) 
through (a)(3) above. 
(c) If the offeror deletes or modifies subparagraph (a)(2) 
above, the offeror must furnish with its offer a signed statement 
setting forth in detail the circumstances of the disclosure. 
2. CONTINGENT FES REPRESENTATION AND AGREEMENT (Apr 1984) 
(FAR 52.203-04) 
(a) Representation. The offeror represents that, except for 
full-time bonafide employees working solely for the offeror, the 
offeror -- [Note: The offeror must check the appropriate boxes. For 
interpretation of the representation, including the term "bona fide 
employee," see Subpart 3.4 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.] 
(1) [ ] has, [X3 has not employed or retained any person or 
company to solicit or obtain this contract; and 
(2} [ ] has, [XI has not paid or agreed to pay to any person or 
company employed or retained to solicit or obtain this contract any 
commission, percentage, brokerage, or other fee contingent upon or 
resulting from the award of this contract. 
(b) Agreement. The offeror agrees to provide information 
relating to the above Representation as requested by the Contracting 
Officer and, when subparagraph (a) (1) or (a) (2) is answered 
affirmatively, to promptly submit to the Contracting Officer— 
(1} A completed Standard Form 119, Statement of Contingent or 
Other Fees, (SF 119); or 
(2) A signed statement indicating that the SF 119 was previously 
submitted to the same contracting office, including' the date and 
applicaJble solicitation or contract number, and representing that the 
prior SF 119 applies to this offer or quotation. 
3. CERTIFICATE OF PROCUREMENT INTEGRITY (NOV 1990) (Applicable if 
required by paragraph (c) of the clause of this contract 
entitled, "Requirement for Certificate of Procurement Integrity 
(NOV 1990) Alternate I (SEP 1990}" (FAR 52,203-08)) 
J. W. Christensen 
(1) I, [Name of certifier], am the officer or employee 
responsible for the preparation of this offer and hereby certify 
that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, with the exception of 
any information described in this certificate, I have no information 
concerning a violation or possible violation of subsection 27(a), 
(b) , (d) , or (f) of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, as 
amended (41 U.S.C. 423), (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), as 
implemented in the FAR, occurring during the conduct of this 
procurement (solicitation number) . 
FAC/N400/96-011 
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(2 ) As r e q u i r e d by s u b s e c t i o n 2 7 ( e ) ( 1 ) ( B ) of t h e Act.. I f u r t h e r 
c e r t i f y t h a t , t o t h e b e s t o f my k n o w l e d g e and b e l i e f , e a c h o f f i c e r , 
e m p l o y e e , a g e n t , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , a n d c o n s u l t a n t of [Name o f O f f e r o r ] 
who h a s p a r t i c i p a t e d p e r s o n a l l y a n d s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n 
o r s u b m i s s i o n of t h i s o f f e r h a s c e r t i f i e d t h a t he o r s h e i s f a m i l i a r 
w i t h , a n d w i l l comply w i t h , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of s u b s e c t i o n 27 (a ) of 
t h e A c t , a s i m p l e m e n t e d i n t h e FAR, and w i l l r e p o r t i m m e d i a t e l y t o me 
a n y i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g a v i o l a t i o n o r p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n of 
s u b s e c t i o n s 27 (a) , (b) , (d) , o r ( f ) of t h e A c t , a s i m p l e m e n t e d i n t h e 
FAR, p e r t a i n i n g t o t h i s p r o c u r e m e n t . 
(3 ) V i o l a t i o n s o r p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s : ( C o n t i n u e on p l a i n bond 
p a p e r i f n e c e s s a r y a n d l a b e l C e r t i f i c a t e of P r o c u r e m e n t I n t e g r i t y 
( C o n t i n u a t i o n S h e e t ) , ENTER NONE I F NONE EXIST 
None 
(4 ) I a g r e e t h a t , i f a w a r d e d a c o n t r a c t u n d e r t h i s s o l i c i t a t i o n , 
t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s r e q u i r e d b y s u b s e c t i o n 27 (e ) (1) (3) of t h e Act 
s h a l l b e m a i n t a i n e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h p a r a g r a p h ( f ) o f t h i s 
p r o v i s i o n . 
[ S i g n a t u x A o f t h e o f f i c e r o r e m p l o y e e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e o f f e r and 
date] \U^J ! ' I CAu^Miu^ 7 - " 7 A - ?£ 
[ T y p e d ^ n a m e o f t h e o f f i c e r o r e m p l o y e e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e o f f e r ] 
J . W. Chris tensen, Contract Administrator _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
" S u b s e c t i o n s 27 (a) , (b) , a n d (d) a r e e f f e c t i v e on December 1 , 1 9 9 0 . 
S u b s e c t i o n 2 7 ( f ) i s e f f e c t i v e o n J u n e 1 , 1 9 9 1 . 
THIS CERTIFICATION CONCERNS A MATTER WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF AN 
AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF A FALSE, FICTITIOUS, OR 
FRAUDULENT CERTIFICATION MAY RENDER THE MAKER SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION 
UNDER T I T L E 1 8 , UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1 0 0 1 . 
[End of C e r t i f i c a t i o n ] 
4 . CERTIFICATE OF PROCUREMENT INTEGRITY-MODIFICATION (NOV 1990) ( I n 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e c l a u s e o f t h i s c o n t r a c t e n t i t l e d " R e q u i r e m e n t 
f o r C e r t i f i c a t e o f P r o c u r e m e n t I n t e g r i t y - M o d i f i c a t i o n (NOV 1 9 9 0 ) " 
(FAR 5 2 . 2 0 3 - 0 9 ) , a p p l i c a b l e t o any m o d i f i c a t i o n w h i c h i n c l u d e s 
t h i s C e r t i f i c a t e } 
( 1 ) I , [Name of c e r t i f i e r ] am t h e o f f i c e r o r e m p l o y e e r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n p r o p o s a l a n d h e r e b y c e r t i f y 
t h a t , t o t h e b e s t of my k n o w l e d g e a n d b e l i e f , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of 
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a n y i n f o r m a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s c e r t i f i c a t i o n , I have no 
i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g a v i o l a t i o n or p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n of 
s u b s e c t i o n 27 (a) , (b) , (d) , or ( f ) of the O f f i c e of F e d e r a l Procurement 
P o l i c y A c t , a s amended* (41 U . S . C . 4 2 3 ) , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as 
" t h e A c t " ) , a s implemented i n t h e FAR, o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g the conduct 
o f t h i s procurement ( c o n t r a c t and m o d i f i c a t i o n number) . 
( 2 ) As r e q u i r e d by s u b s e c t i o n 2 7 ( e ) ( 1 ) ( B ) of t h e Act , I f u r t h e r 
c e r t i f y t h a t t o the b e s t o f my knowledge and b e l i e f , each o f f i c e r , 
e m p l o y e e , a g e n t , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , and c o n s u l t a n t of [Name o f O f f e r o r ] 
who h a s p a r t i c i p a t e d p e r s o n a l l y and s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n the p r e p a r a t i o n 
o r s u b m i s s i o n o f t h i s p r o p o s a l has c e r t i f i e d t h a t he or she i s 
f a m i l i a r w i t h , and w i l l comply w i t h , the r e q u i r e m e n t s of s u b s e c t i o n 
2 7 ( a ) o f t h e A c t , as implemented i n the FAR, and w i l l r e p o r t 
i m m e d i a t e l y t o me any i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g a v i o l a t i o n or p o s s i b l e 
v i o l a t i o n o f s u b s e c t i o n s 27 (a) , (b) , (d) , o r ( f ) o f t h e Act , as 
i m p l e m e n t e d i n t h e FAR, p e r t a i n i n g t o t h i s p r o c u r e m e n t . 
( 3 ) V i o l a t i o n s o r p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s : (Cont inue on p l a i n bond 
p a p e r i f n e c e s s a r y and l a b e l C e r t i f i c a t e o f Procurement I n t e g r i t y -
M o d i f i c a t i o n ( C o n t i n u a t i o n S h e e t ) . ENTER "NONE" IF NONE EXISTS) 
[ S i g n a t u r e o f t h e o f f i c e r o r employee r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e 
m o d i f i c a t i o n p r o p o s a l and d a t e ] 
[ T y p e d name o f t h e o f f i c e r o r employee r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e 
m o d i f i c a t i o n p r o p o s a l ] 
• S u b s e c t i o n s 27 ( a ) , {b} , and {d} a r e e f f e c t i v e on December 1 , 1990 . 
S u b s e c t i o n 2 7 ( f ) i s e f f e c t i v e on June 1 9 9 1 . 
THIS CERTIFICATION CONCERNS A MATTER WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF AN 
AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF A FALSE, FICTITIOUS, OR 
FRAUDULENT CERTIFICATION MAY RENDER THE MAKER SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION 
UNDER TITLE 1 8 , UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1 0 0 1 . 
[End of C e r t i f i c a t i o n ] 
5 - CERTIFICATION AND DISCLOSURE REGARDING PAYMENTS TO INFLUENCE 
CERTAIN FEDERAL TRANSACTIONS {APR 1991) ( A o p l i c a b l e t o C o n t r a c t s 
i n e x c e s s o f $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 (FAR 5 2 . 2 0 3 - 1 1 ) ) 
(a) The d e f i n i t i o n s and p r o h i b i t i o n s conta ined in the c lause , at 
FAR 5 2 . 2 0 3 - 1 2 , L imi ta t ion on Payments to Inf luence Certain Federal 
T r a n s a c t i o n s , inc luded i n t h i s s o l i c i t a t i o n , are hereby incorporated 
b y r e f e r e n c e i n paragraph (b) of t h i s c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 
(b) The o f f e r o r , by s i g n i n g i t s o f f e r , hereby c e r t i f i e s to the 
b e s t o f h i s or her knowledge and b e l i e f tha t on or a f t e r December 23, 
1 9 8 9 , 
[see next page] 
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(1) No Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be 
paid co any person for influencing or attempting to influence an 
officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer 
or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress on 
his or her behalf in connection with the awarding of any Federal 
contract, the making of any federal grant, the making of any Federal 
loan, the entering into of any cooperative agreement, and the 
extension continuation, renewal, amendment or modification of any 
Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement; 
(2) If any funds other than Federal appropriated funds 
{including profit or fee received under a covered Federal 
transaction) have been paid, or will be paid, to any person for 
influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any 
agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or 
an employee of a Member of Congress on his or here behalf in 
connection with this solicitation, the offeror shall complete and 
submit, with its offer. OBM standard form LLL, Disclosure of Lobbying 
Activities, to the Contracting Officer; and 
(3) He or she will include the language of this 
certification in all subcontract awards at any tier and require that 
all recipients of subcontract awards'in excess of $100,000 shall 
certify and disclosure accordingly. 
(c) Submission of this certification and disclosure is a 
prerequisite for making or entering into this contract imposed by 
section 1352, title 31, United States Code. Any person who makes an 
expenditure prohibited under this provision or who fails to file or 
amend the disclosure form to be filed or amended by this provision, 
shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $10,000, and not 
more than $100,000, for each such failure. 
(End of provision) 
6. TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION (May 1994} (FAR 52.204-03) 
(a) Definitions. 
"Common parent," as used in this solicitation provision, means 
that corporate entity that owns or control an affiliated group of 
corporations that files its Federal income tax returns on a 
consolidated basis, and of which the offeror is a member. 
Corporate status, " as used in this solicitation provision, means 
a designation as to whether the offeror is a corporate entity, an 
unincorporated entity (e.g., sole proprietorship or partnership), or 
a corporation providing medical and health care services. 
-Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) , • as used in this 
solicitation provision, means the number required by the IRS to be 
used by the offeror in reporting income tax and other returns. 
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(b) All offerors are required to submit the information 
required in paragraphs (c) through (e) of this solicitation provision 
in order to comply with reporting requirements of 25 U.S.C. 6041, 
6041A, and 6050M and implementing regulations issued by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) . If the resulting contract is subject to the 
reporting requirements described in 4.903, the failure or refusal by 
the offeror to furnish the information may result in a 31 percent 
reduction of payments otherwise due under the contract. 
(c) Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN). 
(*} TIN: 41-1672694 . 
( ) TIN has been applied for 
( ) TIN is not required because: 
( ) Offeror is a nonresident alien, foreign corporation, or 
foreign partnership that does not have income effectively connected 
with the conduct of a trade of business in the U.S. and does not have 
an office or place of business or a fiscal paying agent in the U.S.; 
( ) Offeror is an agency of instrumentality of a foreign 
government; 
( ) Offeror is an agency or instrumentality of a Federal,-
state, or local government; 
( ) Other, State basis. 
(d) Corporate Status. 
( ) Corporation providing medical and health care services, 
or engaged in the billing and collecting of payments for such 
services; 
(X) Other corporate entity; 
{ ) Not a corporate entity; 
{ ) Sole proprietorship; 
( ) Partnership; 
{ ) Hospital or extended care facility described in 26 CFR 
501(c) (3) that is exempt from taxation under 26 CFR 501(a) . 
(e) Common Parent. 
(X) Offeror is not owned or controlled by a common parent as 
defined in paragraph (a) of this clause. 
( ) Name and TIN of common parent: 
Name 
TIN 
7. WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESS (OCT 1995) (FAR 52.204-05) 
(a) Representation. The offeror represents that it [ ] is, 
[)Q is not a women-owned business concern. 
(b) Definition.* "Women-owned business concern, " as used in this 
provision, means a concern which is at least 51 percent owned by one 
or more women; or in the case of any publicly owned business, at 
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least 51 percent of the stock of which is owned by one or more women; 
and whose management and daily business operations are controlled by 
one or more women. 
8. ECONOMIC PURCHASE QUANTITY-SUPPLIES (AUG 1987) (Applicable to 
Contracts for Supplies only) (FAR 52.207-04') 
(a) Offerors are invited to state an opinion on whether the 
quantity(ies) of supplies on which bids, proposals or quotes are 
requested in this solicitation is (are) economically advantageous to 
the Government. 
(b) Each offeror who believes that acquisition in different 
quantities would be more advantageous is invited to recommend an 
economic purchase quantity. If different quantities are recommended, 
a total and a unit price must be quoted for applicable items. An 
economic purchase quantity is that quantity at which a significant 
price break occurs. If there are significant price breaks at 
different quantity points, this information is desired as well. 
OFFEROR RECOMMENDATIONS 
PRICE 
ITEM QUANTITY QUOTATION TOTAL 
(c) The information requested in this provision is being 
solicited to avoid acquisitions in disadvantageous quantities and to 
assist the Government in developing a data base for future 
acquisitions of these items. However, the Government reserves the 
right to amend or cancel the solicitation and resolicit with respect 
to any individual item in the event quotations received and the 
Government's requirements indicate that different quantities should 
be acquired. 
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9 . JEWEL BEARINGS AND RELATED ITEMS CERTIFICATE (Aor 19841 
{FAR 52.208-02} 
(a) T h i s i s t o c e r t i f y t h a t - -
(1) Jewel b e a r i n g s a n d / o r r e l a t e d i t e m s , a s d e f i n e d in the 
R e q u i r e d Sources fo r Jewel Bear ings and Re la ted I t ems c l a u s e , w i l l by 
i n c o r p o r a t e d ir.so one QTT mora i t o m o / w i l l no t be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o any 
i t e m [ d e l e t e one] c o v e r e d by t h i s o f f e r ; 
(2) Any j e w e l b e a r i n g s r e q u i r e d (or an e q u a l q u a n t i t y of 
t h e same t y p e , s i z e , and t o l e r a n c e s ) w i l l be o r d e r e d from the Will iar . 
L a n g e r P l a n t , Ro l l a , Nor th Dakota 583 67, as p r o v i d e d i n t h e Required 
S o u r c e s f o r Jewel B e a r i n g s , and Re la t ed I tems c l a u s e ; and 
(3) Any r e l a t e d i tems r e q u i r e d (or an e q u a l q u a n t i t y of 
t h e same t y p e , s i z e , and t o l e r a n c e s ) w i l l be a c q u i r e d from domestic 
m a n u f a c t u r e r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e P l a n t , i f t h e i tems can be o b t a i n e d from 
t h o s e s o u r c e s , 
(b) A t t a c h e d t o t h i s c e r t i f i c a t e a r e e s t i m a t e s of t h e q u a n t i t y , 
t y p e , a n d s i z e , ( i n c l u d i n g t o l e r a n c e s ) of t h e j ewe l b e a r i n g s and 
r e l a t e d i t e m s r e q u i r e d , and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the components , 
s u b a s s e m b l i e s , or p a r t s t h a t r e q u i r e j ewe l b e a r i n g s o r r e l a t e d i tems. 
D a t e of E x e c u t i o n :
 mmmm 
S o l i c i t a t i o n No . : 
Name: , 
T i t l e : 
F i r m : 
A d d r e s s : 
1 0 , CERTIFICATION REGARDING DEBARMENT, SUSPENSION, PROPOSED 
DEBARMENT, AND OTHER RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS (MAY 1989) (FAR 
5 2 . 2 0 9 - 0 5 ) 
(a) (1) The O f f e r o r c e r t i f i e s , t o t h e b e s t of i t s knowledge and 
b e l i e f , t h a t -
( i ) The O f f e r o r and /o r any of i t s P r i n c i p a l s -
(A) Are [ ] a r e no t [ \] p r e s e n t l y d e b a r r e d , 
suspended , p roposed f o r debarment , or d e c l a r e d 
i n e l i g i b l e f o r t h e award of c o n t r a c t s by any F e d e r a l 
agency ; 
(B) Have [ ] have not [%], w i t h i n a t h r e e - y e a r 
p e r i o d p r e c e d i n g t h i s o f f e r , been c o n v i c t e d of o r had a 
c i v i l judgment r e n d e r e d a g a i n s t them f o r : commission of 
f r a u d o r a c r i m i n a l o f f ense i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o b t a i n i n g , 
a t t e m p t i n g t o o b t a i n , o r pe r fo rming a p u b l i c ( F e d e r a l , 
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state, or local) contract or subcontract; violation of 
Federal or state antitrust statutes relating to the 
submission of offers; or commission of embezzlement, 
theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of 
records, making false statements, or receiving stolen 
property; and 
(C) Are [ ] are not [X] presently indicted for, 
or otherwise criminally or civilly charged by a 
governmental entity with, commission of any of the 
offenses enumerated in subdivision (a)(1)(i)(B) of this 
provision, 
(ii) The Offeror has [ ] has not [^  ]< within a 
three-year period preceding this offer, had one or more 
contracts terminated for default by any Federal agency. 
(2) "Principals," for the purposes of this certification, 
means officers; directors; owners; partners; and, persons having 
primary management or supervisory responsibilities within a 
business entity (e.g., general manager; plant manager; head of a 
subsidiary, division, or business segment, and similar 
positions). 
THIS CERTIFICATION CONCERNS A MATTER WITHIN THE 
JURISDICTION OF AN AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
MAKING OF A FALSE, FICTITIOUS, OR FRAUDULENT CERTIFICATION 
MAY RENDER THE MAKER SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 
1001, TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE. 
(b) The Offeror shall provide immediate written notice to 
the Contracting Officer if, at any time prior to contract award, 
the Offeror leams that its certification was erroneous when 
submitted or has become erroneous by reason of changed 
circumstances. 
(c) A certification that any of the items in paragraph (a) 
of this provision exists will not necessarily result in 
withholding of an award under this solicitation. However, the 
certification will be considered in connection with a 
determination of the Offeror's responsibility. Failure of the 
Offeror to furnish a certification or provide such additional 
information as requested by the Contracting Officer may render 
the Offeror nonresponsible. 
(d) Nothing contained in the foregoing shall be construed 
to require establishment of a system of records in order to 
render, in good faith, the certification required by paragraph 
(a) of this provision. The knowledge and information of an 
Offeror is not required to exceed that which is normally 
possessed by a prudent person in the ordinary course of business 
dealings. 
(e) The certification in paragraph (a) of this provision 
is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was 
placed when making award. If it is later determined that the 
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O f f e r o r knowingly rendered an erroneous c e r t i f i c a t i o n , in 
a d d i t i o n to other remedies ava i lab le to the Government, the 
C o n t r a c t i n g Officer may terminate the cont rac t r e su l t i ng from 
t h i s s o l i c i t a t i o n for d e f a u l t . 
1 1 . AUTHORIZED NEGOTIATORS (Apr 1984) (FAR 52.215-11} 
The o f f e r o r or quoter r epresen t s t ha t the following persons are 
a u t h o r i z e d to nego t i a t e on i t s behalf with the Government in 
c o n n e c t i o n with t h i s reques t for proposals or quota t ions : [ l i s t 
names, t i t l e s , and telephone numbers of the authorized nego t i a to r s ] . 
J. W. Christensen, Contract Administrator - (801) 251-3433 
K- J. Abplanalp, Manager Navy Contracts (801) 251-3735 
D. H. Peer, Director Cont. Ad». Policy & Proposal Adm. (801) 251-5607 
J. J . Andersonf Program Manager (801) 251-2154 
1 2 . PLACE OF PERFORMANCE (Apr 1984) (FAR 5 2 . 2 1 5 - 2 0 ) 
(a) The offeror or quote r , in the performance of any cont rac t 
r e s u l t i n g from t h i s s o l i c i t a t i o n , [ ] in tends , [X] does not intend 
(check a p p l i c a b l e block) to use one or more p lan ts or f a c i l i t i e s 
l o c a t e d a t a d i f f e r e n t address from the address of the offeror or 
q u o t e r a s i n d i c a t e d in t h i s proposal or quota t ion. 
(b) I f t he offeror or quo te r checks " intends" in paragraph (a) 
above , i t s h a l l i n s e r t in the spaces provided below the required 
i n f o r m a t i o n : 
P l a c e of Performance (S t r ee t Name and Address of Owner and 
A d d r e s s , C i t y , County, S t a t e , Operator of the Plant or F a c i l i t y 
Z ip Code) Other than Offeror or Quoter 
1 3 . FACILITIES CAPITAL COST OF MONEY (Sep 1987) (Applicable to 
c o n t r a c t s subjec t to FAR Pa r t 31) (FAR 52.215-30) N/4 
I n accordance with the c l ause of t h i s cont rac t e n t i t l e d 
" F a c i l i t i e s Cap i t a l Cost of Money (Sep 1987)", the Offeror ( ] has, 
[ ] h a s n o t proposed f a c i l i t i e s c a p i t a l cos t of money as an allowable 
c o s t . 
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1 4 . SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAM REPRESENTATION (OCT 1995) (FAR 5 2 . 2 1 9 - 0 1 ) 
(a) (l)The standard industrial classification (SIC) code for this 
acquisition is 3761 
(insert SIC code). 
(2) The small business size standard is 1,000 Employees 
(insert size standard). 
(3)The small business size standard for a concern which submits 
an offer in i ts own name, other than on a construction or service 
contract, but which proposes to furnish a product which it did nci 
i t se l f manufacture, is 500 employees. 
(b) Representations. (1) The offeror represents and certifies as 
part of i t s offer that i t [ ] is, [XI is not a small business concern. 
(2) (Complete only if offeror represented itself as a small 
business concern in block (b)(1) of this section.) The offeror 
represents as par of i ts offer that i t [ ] is, [ ] is not a small 
disadvantaged business concern. 
(3) (Complete only if offeror represented i tself as a small 
business concern in block (b)(1) of this section.) The offeror 
represents as part of i t s offer that i t [ 1 is , [ ] is not a 
women-owned small business concern, 
(c) Definitions. "Small business concern,- as used in this 
provision/ means a concern, including its affil iates, that is 
independently owned and operated, not dominant in the field of 
operation in which i t is bidding on Government contracts, and qualified 
as a small business under the criteria in 13 CFR Part 121 and the size 
standard in paragraph (a) of this provision. 
"Small disadvantaged business concern," as used in this provision 
means a small business concern that (1) is at least 51 percent 
unconditionally owned by one or more individuals who are both socially 
and economically disadvantaged, or a publicly owned business having a', 
l eas t 51 percent of i t s stock unconditionally owned by one or more 
social ly and economically disadvantaged individuals, and (2) has i ts 
management and daily business controlled by one or more such 
individuals. This term also means a small business concern that is a' 
l eas t 51 percent unconditionally owned by an economically disadvantage : 
Indian tr ibe or Native Hawaiian Organization, or a publicly owned 
business having at least 51 percent of i ts stock unconditionally ownei 
by one or more of these entities, which has i ts management and daily 
business controlled by member of an economically disadvantaged Indian 
t r ibe or Native Hawaiian Organization, and which meets the requiremen: \ 
of 13 CFR Part 124. 
"Woman-owned small business concern, * as used in this provision, 
means a small business concern-
[see next page] 
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(1) Which i s A l e a s t 51 p e r c e n t owned by one o r more women or . 
i n t h e c a s e of any p u b l i c l y owned b u s i n e s s , a t l e a s t 51 p e r c e n t of 
t h e s t o c k of which i s owned by one or more women; and 
(2) Whose management and d a i l y bus ines s o p e r a t i o n s a re 
c o n t r o l l e d by one o r more women. 
(d) N o t i c e . (1) If t h i s s o l i c i t a t i o n i s for s u p p l i e s and has been 
s e t a s i d e , i n whole or i n p a r t , for smal l bus iness c o n c e r n s , then the 
c l a u s e i n t h i s s o l i c i t a t i o n p r o v i d i n g n o t i c e of the s e t - a s i d e c o n t a i n s 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on the s o u r c e of t h e end i tems to be f u r n i s h e d . 
(2) Under 15 U .S .C . 6 4 5 ( d ) , any person who m i s r e p r e s e n t s a 
f i r m ' s s t a t u s as a sma l l o r smal l d i sadvantaged b u s i n e s s concern in 
o r d e r t o o b t a i n a c o n t r a c t t o be awarded under t h e p r e f e r e n c e 
p r o g r a m s e s t a b l i s h e d p u r s u a n t to s e c t i o n s 8 ( a ) , 8 ( d ) , 9, or 15 of the 
S m a l l Bus iness Act o r any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n of F e d e r a l law t h a t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r e n c e s s e c t i o n 8(d) for a d e f i n i t i o n of program 
e l i g i b i l i t y , s h a l l -
( i ) Be p u n i s h e d by i m p o s i t i o n of f ine , impr i sonment , or 
b o t h ; 
( i i ) Be s u b j e c t t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e remedies , i n c l u d i n g 
s u s p e n s i o n s and deba rmen t ; and 
( i i i ) Be i n e l i g i b l e f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in p rog rams conducted 
u n d e r the a u t h o r i t y of t h e ' A c t . 
[End of p r o v i s i o n ] 
1 5 - CERTIFICATION OF NONSEGREGATED FACILITIES (Apr 1984) 
(FAR 52.222-21) 
(a ) "Segrega ted f a c i l i t i e s , " as used in t h i s p r o v i s i o n , means 
a n y w a i t i n g rooms, work a r e a s , r e s t rooms and wash rooms, r e s t a u r a n t s 
a n d o t h e r e a t i n g a r e a s , t ime c l o c k s , l ocke r rooms and o t h e r s t o r a g e 
o r d r e s s i n g a r e a s , p a r k i n g l o t s , d r i n k i n g f o u n t a i n s , r e c r e a t i o n a l o r 
e n t e r t a i n m e n t a r e a s , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , and housing f a c i l i t i e s p r o v i d e d 
f o r e m p l o y e e s , t h a t a r e s e g r e g a t e d by e x p l i c i t d i r e c t i v e o r a r e i n 
f a c t s e g r e g a t e d on t h e b a s i s of r a c e , c o l o r , r e l i g i o n , o r n a t i o n a l 
o r i g i n b e c a u s e of h a b i t , l o c a l custom, or o t h e r w i s e . 
^ (b) By t h e submiss ion of t h i s o f f e r , the o f f e r o r c e r t i f i e s t h a t 
i t d o e s n o t and w i l l n o t m a i n t a i n or p r o v i d e for i t s employees any 
s e g r e g a t e d f a c i l i t i e s a t any of i t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t s , and t h a t i t does 
n o t a n d w i l l n o t pe rmi t i t s employees t o perform t h e i r s e r v i c e s a t 
a n y l o c a t i o n under i t s c o n t r o l where s eg rega t ed f a c i l i t i e s a r e 
' m a i n t a i n e d . The o f f e r o r a g r e e s t h a t a b reach of t h i s c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
i s a v i o l a t i o n of t h e Equa l O p p o r t u n i t y c l a u s e in t h i s c o n t r a c t . 
( c ) The o f f e r o r f u r t h e r a g r e e s t h a t (except where i t has 
o b t a i n e d i d e n t i c a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n s from proposed s u b c o n t r a c t o r s f o r 
[ s e e nex t page] 
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(1 ) O b t a i n i d e n t i c a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n s from, p r o p o s e d 
s u b c o n t r a c t o r s b e f o r e t h e a w a r d of s u b c o n t r a c t s u n d e r which t h e 
s u b c o n t r a c t o r w i l l be s u b j e c t t o t h e E q u a l O p p o r t u n i t y c l a u s e ; 
(2 ) R e t a i n t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i n t h e f i l e s ; and* 
( 3 ) ^ F o r w a r d t h e f o l l o w i n g n o t i c e t o t h e p r o p o s e d s u b c o n t r a c t o r s 
( e x c e p t i f t h e p r o p o s e d s u b c o n t r a c t o r s h a v e s u b m i t t e d i d e n t i c a l 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n s f o r s p e c i f i c t i m e p e r i o d s ) : 
NOTICE TO PROSPECTIVE SUBCONTRACTORS OF REQUIREMENT FOR 
CERTIFICATIONS OF NONSEGREGATED FACILITIES. 
A C e r t i f i c a t i o n of N o n s e g r e g a t e d F a c i l i t i e s m u s t be s u b m i t t e d b e f o r e 
t h e a w a r d o f a s u b c o n t r a c t u n d e r wh ich t h e s u b c o n t r a c t o r w i l l b e 
s u b j e c t t o t h e Equa l O p p o r t u n i t y c l a u s e . The c e r t i f i c a t i o n may b e 
s u b m i t t e d e i t h e r f o r e a c h s u b c o n t r a c t o r f o r a l l s u b c o n t r a c t s d u r i n g 
a p e r i o d ( i . e . , q u a r t e r l y , s e m i a n n u a l l y , o r a n n u a l l y ) . 
NOTE: T h e p e n a l t y f o r m a k i n g f a l s e s t a t e m e n t i n o f f e r s i s p r e s c r i b e d 
i n 18 U . S . C . 1 0 0 1 . 
1 6 . PREVIOUS CONTRACTS AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS (Apr 1984) 
(FAR 52 . 222 -22} 
T h e o f f e r o r r e p r e s e n t s t h a t - -
( a ) I t [ X ] h a s , [ ] h a s n o t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a p r e v i o u s 
c o n t r a c t o r s u b c o n t r a c t s u b j e c t e i t h e r t o t h e E q u a l O p p o r t u n i t y 
c l a u s e o f t h i s s o l i c i t a t i o n , t h e c l a u s e o r i g i n a l l y c o n t a i n e d i n 
S e c t i o n 3 1 0 of E x e c u t i v e O r d e r No. 1 0 9 2 5 , o r t h e c l a u s e c o n t a i n e d i n 
S e c t i o n 2 0 1 of E x e c u t i v e O r d e r No. 11114 ; 
(b ) I t [ X] has, [ ] h a s n o t , f i l e d a l l r e q u i r e d c o m p l i a n c e 
r e p o r t s ; a n d 
( c ) R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n d i c a t i n g s u b m i s s i o n of r e q u i r e d 
c o m p l i a n c e r e p o r t s / s i g n e d b y p r o p o s e d s u b c o n t r a c t o r s , w i l l be 
o b t a i n e d b e f o r e s u b c o n t r a c t a w a r d s . 
1 7 . AFFIRMATIVE ACTION COMPLIANCE (Apr 1984} (FAR 5 2 . 2 2 2 - 2 5 ) 
T h e o f f e r o r r e p r e s e n t s t h a t (a) i t [ )/ ] h a s d e v e l o p e d and h a s on 
f i l e , [ ] h a s n o t d e v e l o p e d a n d d o e s n o t n a v e on f i l e , a t e a c h 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t , a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n p r o g r a m s r e q u i r e d b y t h e r u l e s a n d 
r e g u l a t i o n s of t h e S e c r e t a r y o f L a b o r (41 CFR 6 0 - 1 a n d 6 0 - 2 ) , o r (b) 
i t [ ] h a s n o t p r e v i o u s l y h a d c o n t r a c t s s u b j e c t t o t h e w r i t t e n 
a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n p r o g r a m s r e q u i r e m e n t o f t h e r u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s 
o f t h e S e c r e t a r y of L a b o r . 
1 8 . CLEAN AIR AND WATER CERTIFICATION (Apr 1984) (FAR 5 2 . 2 2 3 - 0 1 ) 
T h e o f f e r o r c e r t i f i e s t h a t — 
( a ) Any f a c i l i t y t o b e u s e d i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of t h i s p r o p o s e d 
c o n t r a c t i s [ ] , i s n o t [ ^ ] l i s t e d on t h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o t e c t i o n 
A g e n c y L i s t of V i o l a t i n g F a c i l i t i e s ; 
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(b) The offeror will immediately notify the Contracting 
Officer, before award, of the receipt of any communication from the 
Administrator, or a designee, of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
indicating that any facility that the Offeror proposes to use for the 
performance of the contract is under consideration to be listed on 
the EPA List of Violating Facilities; and 
(c) The Offeror will include a certification substantially the 
same as this certification, including this paragraph (c) , in every 
nonexempt subcontract. 
19. HAZARDOUS MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION AND MATERIAL SAFETY DATA (NOV 
1991 (FAR 52.223-03) 
(a) "Hazardous material", as used in this clause, includes any 
material defined as hazardous under the latest version of Federal 
Standard No. 313 (including revisions adopted during the term of the 
contract). 
(b) The offeror must list any hazardous material, as defined in 
paragraph (a) of this clause, to be delivered under this contract. 
The hazardous material shall be properly identified and include any 
applicable identification number, such as National Stock Number or 
Special Item Number. This information shall also be included on the 
Material Safety Data Sheet submitted under this contract. 
Material Identification No. 
(If none, insert "None") 
MMZ 
(c) The apparently successful offeror, by acceptance of the 
contract, certifies that the list in paragraph (b) of this clause is 
complete- This list must be updated during performance of the 
contract whenever the Contractor determines that any other material 
to be delivered under this contract is hazardous. 
(d) The apparently successful offeror agrees to submit, for 
each item as required prior to award, a Material Safety Data Sheet, 
meeting the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.1200(g) and the latest 
version of Federal Standard No. 313, for all hazardous material 
identified in paragraph (b) of this clause. Data shall be submitted 
in accordance with Federal Standard No. 313, whether or not the 
apparently successful offeror is the actual manufacturer of these 
items. Failure to submit the Material Safety Data Sheet prior to 
award may result in the apparently successful offeror being 
considered nonresponsible and ineligible for award. 
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(e) If, after award, there is a change in the composition of 
the itemfs) or a revision to Federal Standard No. 313, which renders 
incomplete or inaccurate the data submitted under paragraph (d) of 
t h i s .clause or the ce r t i f i ca t ion submitted under paragraph (c) of 
t h i s c l ause , the Contractor sha l l promptly notify the Contracting 
Cff icer and resubmit the data. 
(f) Neither the requirements of this clause nor any act or 
f a i l u r e to act by the Government shal l rel ieve the Contractor of any 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or l i a b i l i t y for the safety of Government, Contractor, 
or subcontractor personnel or property. 
(g) Nothing contained in t h i s clause shall re l ieve the 
Contractor from complying with applicable Federal, Sta te , and local 
laws, codes, ordinances, and regulat ions (including the obtaining of 
l i c e n s e s and permits) in connection with hazardous mater ia l . 
(h) The Government's r igh t s in data furnished under this 
con t r ac t with respect to hazardous material are as follows: 
(1) To use, duplicate and disclose any data to which this 
c lause i s applicable. The purposes of this r ight are to-
(i) Apprise personnel of the hazards to which they may be 
exposed in using, handling, packaging, transporting, or disposing 
of hazardous materials; ( i i ) Obtain medical treatment for those affected by the 
m a t e r i a l s ; and 
( i i i ) Have others use, dupl icate , and disclose the data for 
Government for these purposes. 
(2) To use, duplicate, and disclose data furnished under this 
c l ause , in accordance with subparagraph (h) (1) of th i s clause, in 
precedence over any other clause of th is contract providing for 
r i g h t s in data. 
(3) The Government i s n o t p r e c l u d e d from u s i n g s i m i l a r or 
i d e n t i c a l d a t a a c q u i r e d from o t h e r s o u r c e s . 
2 0 . CERTIFICATION REGARDING A DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE ( J u l 1990) {FAR 
5 2 . 2 2 3 - 0 5 ) 
(a) D e f i n i t i o n s , a s u sed i n t h i s p r o v i s i o n , " C o n t r o l l e d 
s u b s t a n c e " means a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e i n s chedu le s I t h rough V of 
s e c t i o n 202 of the C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e s Act (21 U.S .C . 812) and as 
f u r t h e r d e f i n e d i n r e g u l a t i o n a t 21 CFR 1308.11 - 13 0 8 . 1 5 . 
- C o n v i c t i o n * means a f i n d i n g of g u i l t ( i n c l u d i n g a p l e a of no lo 
c o n t e n d e r e ) o r i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e , o r b o t h , by any j u d i c i a l body 
c h a r g e d w i t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e v i o l a t i o n s of the 
F e d e r a l o r S t a t e c r i m i n a l d rug s t a t u t e s . 
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"Criminal drug statue* means a Federal or non-Federal criminal 
s t a t u e involving the manufacture, d i s t r ibu t ion , dispensing, 
possess ion or use of any controlled substance. 
"Drug-free workplace" means the s i t e ( s ) for the performance of 
work done by the Contractor in connections with a specific contract 
a t which employees of the Contractor are prohibited from engaging in 
the unlawful manufacture, d i s t r ibu t ion , dispensing, possession, or 
use of a controlled substance. 
"Employee" means an employee of a Contractor d i rec t ly engaged in 
the performance of work under a Government contract. "Directly 
engaged" i s defined to include a l l d i rec t costs employees and any 
other Contractor employee who has other than a minimal impact or 
involvement in contract performance. 
"Individual" means an offeror/contractor that has not more than 
one employee including the of feror /contractor , 
(b) By submission of i t s offer, the offeror, if other than an 
i n d i v i d u a l , who is making an offer that equals or exceeds $25,000, 
c e r t i f i e s and agrees that , with respect to a l l employees of the 
o f fe ro r t o be employed under a contract resul t ing from this 
s o l i c i t a t i o n , i t will - no l a t e r than 3 0 calendar days after contract 
award (unless a longer period i s agreed to in writing) , for contracts 
of 3 0 ca lendar days or more performance duration, or as soon as 
p o s s i b l e for contracts of less than 30 calendar days performance 
d u r a t i o n ; but in any case, by a date p r io r to when performance is 
expected to be completed -
(1) Publish a statement notifying such employees that the 
unlawful manufacture, d i s t r ibu t ion , dispensing, possession or use of 
a c o n t r o l l e d substance i s prohibited in the Contractor's workplace 
and spec i fy ing the actions that wi l l be taken against employees for 
v i o l a t i o n s of such prohibi t ; 
(2) Establish an ongoing drug-free awareness program to inform 
such employees about -(i) The dangers of drug abuse in the workplace; 
( i i ) The Contractor 's policy of maintaining a drug-free 
workplace; ( i i i ) Any available drug counseling, rehabi l i ta t ion , and 
employee assistance programs; and 
<vi) The penalt ies tha t may be imposed upon employees for 
drug abuse violat ions occurring in the workplace; (3) Provide a l l employees engaged in performance of the 
c o n t r a c t with a copy of the statement required by subparagraph (b) (1) 
of t h i s provis ion; 
(4) Notify such employees in wri t ing in the statement required 
by subparagraph (b) (1) of th is provision that, as a condition of 
cont inued employment on the contract resu l t ing from this 
s o l i c i t a t i o n , the employee wil l -
[see next page] 
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( i ) Abide by t h e te rms of the s t a t e m e n t ; and 
( i i ) No t i fy the employer in w r i t i n g of t h e employee ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n under a c r i m i n a l drug s t a t u t e for a v i o l a t i o n 
o c c u r r i n g in the workplace no l a t e r than 5 c a l e n d a r days 
a f t e r such c o n v i c t i o n ; 
(5) N o t i f y t h e C o n t r a c t i n g Of f ice r in w r i t i n g w i t h i n 10 
c a l e n d a r d a y s a f t e r r e c e i v i n g n o t i c e under s u b d i v i s i o n (b) ( 4 ) ( i i ) of 
t h i s p r o v i s i o n , from an employee or o the rw i se r e c e i v i n g a c t u a l n o t i c e 
of s u c h c o n v i c t i o n . The n o t i c e s h a l l i n c l u d e the p o s i t i o n t i t l e of 
t h e e m p l o y e e ; and 
(6) W i t h i n 30 c a l e n d a r days a f t e r r e c e i v i n g n o t i c e under 
s u b d i v i s i o n (b) (4) ( i i ) of t h i s p r o v i s i o n of a c o n v i c t i o n , take one of 
t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t to any employee who i s conv ic ted 
of a d r u g a b u s e v i o l a t i o n o c c u r r i n g in t h e work p l a c e : 
( i ) Take a p p r o p r i a t e pe r sonne l a c t i o n a g a i n s t such employee, 
up t o and i n c l u d i n g t e r m i n a t i o n ; or 
( i i ) Requ i r e such employee to s a t i s f a c t o r i l y p a r t i c i p a t e in a 
d r u g abuse a s s i s t a n c e o r r e h a b i l i t a t i o n program approved for 
s u c h p u r p o s e s by a F e d e r a l , S t a t e , or l o c a l h e a l t h , law 
e n f o r c e m e n t , o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e agency. 
(7) Make a good f a i t h e f f o r t to m a i n t a i n a d r u g - f r e e workplace 
t h r o u g h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of subparagraphs (b) (1) t h r o u g h (b) (6) of t h i s 
p r o v i s i o n . 
(c) By submis s ion of i t s off e r , t h e o f f e r o r , i f an i n d i v i d u a l 
work i s mak ing an o f f e r of any d o l l a r v a l u e , c e r t i f i e s and agrees 
t h a t t h e o f f e r o r w i l l n o t engage i n the unlawful m a n u f a c t u r e , 
d i s t r i b u t i o n , d i s p e n s i n g , p o s s e s s i o n , or u s e of a c o n t r o l l e d 
s u b s t a n c e i n t h e pe r fo rmance of t h e c o n t r a c t r e s u l t i n g from t h i s 
s o l i c i t a t i o n . 
(d) F a i l u r e of t h e o f f e r o r t o p r o v i d e t he c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
r e q u i r e d b y p a r a g r a p h s (b) o r (c) of t h i s p r o v i s i o n , r e n d e r s the 
o f f e r o r u n q u a l i f i e d and i n e l i g i b l e for award. (See FAR 9 .204-1 (g) 
a n d 1 9 . 6 0 2 - 1 ( a ) (2) ( i ) .) 
(e) I n a d d i t i o n t o o t h e r remedies a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Government, 
t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n p a r a g r a p h s (b) or (c) of t h i s p r o v i s i o n concerns 
a m a t t e r w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of an agency of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
a n d t h e m a k i n g of a f a l s e , f i c t i t i o u s , o r f r a u d u l e n t c e r t i f i c a t i o n 
may r e n d e r t h e maker s u b j e c t t o p r o s e c u t i o n under T i t l e 18 , United 
S t a t e s Code , S e c t i o n 1 0 0 1 . 
[end of c l a u s e ] 
2 1 . CERTIFICATION OF TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE REPORTING (OCT 1995) 
(FAR 5 2 . 2 2 3 - 1 3 ) ( A p p l i c a b l e to C o n t r a c t s in e x c e s s of $100,000) 
(a) The o f f e r o r , by s i g n i n g t h i s o f f e r , c e r t i f i e s t h a t 
(NOTE: The o f f e r o r must check the a p p r o p r i a t e b o x ( e s ) .) 
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[ ] (1 ) To t h e b e s t of i t s knowledge and b e l i e f , i t i s not: 
s u b j e c t t o t h e f i l i n g and r e p o r t i n g requ irement s d e s c r i b e d i n 
E m e r g e n c y P l a n n i n g and Community Right- to-Know A c t of 1985 
{.EPCRA) s e c t i o n s 313(a) and (g) and P o l l u t i o n P r e v e n t i o n Ace of 
1 9 9 0 (PPA) s e c t i o n 6607 b e c a u s e none of i t s owned or o p e r a t e d 
f a c i l i t i e s t o be used i n t h e performance of t h i s c o n t r a c t 
c u r r e n t l y -
[ ] ( i ) Manufacture, p r o c e s s or o t h e r w i s e u s e any t o x i c 
c h e m i c a l s l i s t e d under s e c t i o n 3 1 3 ( c ) of EPCRA, 42 U . S . C . 
1 1 0 2 3 ( c ) . 
( ] ( i i ) Have 10 or more f u l l - t i m e employees a s s p e c i f i e d i n 
S e c t i o n 313 (b) (1) (A) of EPCRA, 42 U . S . C . 1 1 0 2 3 ( B ) ( 1 ) ( A ) . 
[ ] ( i i i ) Meet the r e p o r t i n g t h r e s h o l d s of t o x i c c h e m i c a l s 
e s t a b l i s h e d under s e c t i o n 3 1 3 ( f ) of EPCRA, 42 U . S . C . 1 1 0 2 3 ( f ) 
i n c l u d i n g t h e a l t e r n a t e t h r e s h o l d s a t 40 CFR 3 7 2 . 2 7 , p r o v i d e d an 
a p p r o p r i a t e c e r t i f i c a t i o n form has been f i e l d w i t h EPA) . 
[ ] ( i v ) F a l l w i t h i n S t a n d a r d I n d u s t r i a l C l a s s i f i c a t i o n Code 
(SIC) d e s i g n a t i o n s 20 through 39 as s e t f o r t h i n FAR s e c t i o n 
1 9 . 1 0 2 . 
[ J (2) I f awarded a c o n t r a c t r e s u l t i n g from t h i s 
s o l i c i t a t i o n , i t s owned o r o p e r a t e d f a c i l i t i e s t o be used i n t h e 
p e r f o r m a n c e of t h i s c o n t r a c t u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e exempt , w i l l f i l e 
a n d c o n t i n u e t o f i l e f o r t h e l i e f of t h e c o n t r a c t t h e T o x i c . 
C h e m i c a l R e l e a s e I n v e n t o r y Form (Form R) as d e s c r i b e d i n EPCRA 
s e c t i o n s 3 1 3 ( a ) and (g) and PPA s e c t i o n 6607 (42 U . S . C . 1 3 1 0 6 ) . 
(b) S u b m i s s i o n of t h i s c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r making 
o r e n t e r i n g i n t o t h i s c o n t r a c t imposed by E x e c u t i v e Order 12969 , 
A u g u s t 8 , 1995 (60 FR 4 0 9 8 9 - 4 0 9 9 2 ) . 
2 2 . COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NOTICES AND CERTIFICATION (NOV 1993) 
(FAR 5 2 . 2 3 0 - 0 1 ) 
NOTE: T h i s n o t i c e d o e s n o t a p p l y t o smal l b u s i n e s s e s o r f o r e i g n 
g o v e r n m e n t s . T h i s n o t i c e i s i n t h r e e p a r t s , i d e n t i f i e d by Roman 
n u m e r a l s I t h r o u g h I I I . 
O f f e r o r s s h a l l examine each p a r t and p r o v i d e t h e r e q u e s t e d 
i n f o r m a t i o n i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e C o s t Account ing S t a n d a r d s (CAS) 
r e q u i r e m e n t s a p p l i c a b l e t o any r e s u l t a n t c o n t r a c t . 
I . DISCLOSURE STATEMENT-COST ACCOUNTING PRACTICES AND CERTIFICATION 
( a ) Any c o n t r a c t i n excess o f $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 r e s u l t i n g from t h i s 
s o l i c i t a t i o n , e x c e p t c o n t r a c t s i n w h i c h t h e p r i c e n e g o t i a t e d i s b a s e d 
o n (1 ) e s t a b l i s h e d c a t a l o g or market p r i c e s of commerc ia l i t e m s s o l d 
i n s u b s t a n t i a l q u a n t i t i e s t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c , or (2) p r i c e s s e t by 
l a w o r r e g u l a t i o n , w i l l b e s u b j e c t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f 48 CFR, 
P a r t s 9 9 0 3 and 3 9 0 4 , e x c e p t f o r t h o s e c o n t r a c t s which a r e exempt a s 
s p e c i f i e d i n 48 CFR, Subpart 9 9 0 3 . 2 0 1 - 1 . 
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(b) Any offeror submitting a proposal which, if accepted, will 
r e s u l t in a contract subject to the requirements of 48 CFR, Parts 
S903 and 9304 must, as a condition of contracting, submit a 
Disc losure Statement as required by 48 CFR, Subpart 9903.202. The 
Disc losure Statement must be submitted as a part of the offeror's 
p roposa l under this so l i c i t a t i on unless the offeror has already 
submit ted a Disclosure Statement disclosing the practices used in 
connect ion with the pricing of th is proposal. If an applicable 
Disc losure Statement has already been submitted, the offeror may 
s a t i s f y the requirement for submission by providing the information 
reques ted in paragraph (c) of Part I of this provision. 
CAUTION: In the absence of specific regulations or agreement, a 
p r a c t i c e disclosed in a Disclosure Statement shall not, by virtue of 
such d i sc losure , be deemed to be a proper, approved, or agreed-to 
p r a c t i c e for pricing proposals or accumulating and reporting contract 
performance cost data. 
(c) Check the appropriate box below: 
[ ] (1) Certif icate of Concurrent Submission of Disclosure 
Sta tement . 
The offeror hereby c e r t i f i e s that, as a part of the offer, copies 
of t he Disclosure Statement have been submitted as follows: (i) 
Or ig ina l and one copy to the cognizant Administrative Contracting 
Off icer (ACO) , and (ii} one copy to the cognizant contract auditor. 
(Disclosure must be on Form No. CASB DS-1. Forms may be obtained 
from the cognizant ACO or from the looseleaf version of the Federal 
Acqu i s i t i on Regulation.) 
Date of Disclosure Statement: 
Name ajnd Address of Cognizant ACO where f i led: 
The offeror further c e r t i f i e s that practices used in estimating 
c o s t s i n pr icing this proposal are consistent with the cost 
account ing practices disclosed in the Disclosure Statement. 
[
 x] (2) Cert i f icate of Previously Submitted Disclosure Statement. 
The offeror hereby ce r t i f i e s that Disclosure Statement was filed 
a s f o l l o w s : See attached pa*e 25a 
Date of Disclosure Statement: . 
Name and Address of Cognizant ACO where f i led: , 
The offeror further c e r t i f i e s that the practices used in 
e s t i m a t i n g costs in pricing th i s proposal are consistent with the 
cos t accounting practices disclosed in the applicable disclosure 
s t a t emen t . 
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NSN-7540-01-142^8*5 SUrxlard Form 1411 (FWv 7-87) 
ATTACHMENT TO 
STANDARD FORM 1411 
Reference XX {Government Property, Box 10) 
Explanation mquir&d if checked Yes. 
Reference XX (Same/Similar Items, Box 12) 
Explanation required if checked Yes. 
Reference XX (Proposal Consistent with Estimating System, Box 13} 
Explanation required if checked No. 
Reference XX (CASB Regulation, Box 14A) 
Explanation required if checked No. 
Reference XX (CASB Disclosure Statement. Box 14B) 
The Afiant Teehsystems Inc Aerospace Systems Group Cost Accounting Standards Board Disclosure Statement submittai is comprised 
of the fbtiowmg reporting urate and parts; staftis for each ts provided beiow: 
j Reporting Unit and Disclosure 
I Statement Part 
Bacchus Works 
[ Parts 1-VJi 
[.. j 
Latest Revision/Date 
Amencknent 1 
dated 21 August 1995 
Submitted To: j 
Defense Contract Management Office (DCMO) 
DCMDC-RUA/ACO 
P.O. Box 37, Magna, Utan 34044 
(801)251-1209 I 
Bacchus Plant has submitted to the above ACO office Disclosure Statement Amendment #1, this document reflects the acquisition of 
Hercules Aerospace by AJGant Techsysterns inc. 
Corporate Home Office 
Part VIA 
I 
1 Jan 1991 
Wchanges through 
1 Apr 1992 
Defense Plant Reoresentative Office 
ASiant Techsysterns inc 
Location MN11-2741 
600 Second Street, N.E. 
Hopkms, MN 55343-8384 | 
A revised Part V1H has been submitted to DPRO-Minneapoiis as of 5 April 1995 which reflects the acquisition of Hercules Aerospace by 
Alfiant Techsysterns inc. 
Reference XX (Disclosure Statement/CAS Noncompfiance, Box 14C) 
Explanation required if checked Yes. 
Reference XX (Proposal Consistent with CAS Requirements, Box 14D) 
Explanation required if checked Yes. 
Last Revised 9/5/95 
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[ ] (3) C e r t i f i c a t e of Monetary Exemption. 
^The o f f e r o r hereby c e r t i f i e s t ha t t h e o f f e r o r , t o g e t h e r with a l l 
d i v i s i o n s , s u b s i d i a r i e s , and a f f i l i a t e s unde r common c o n t r o l , d id not 
r e c e i v e n e t awards of n e g o t i a t e d prime c o n t r a c t s and s u b c o n t r a c t s 
s u b j e c t t o CAS t o t a l i n g more t h a n $25 m i l l i o n (of which a t l e a s t one 
award e x c e e d e d $1 m i l l i o n ) in t h e cos t a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d immediate ly 
p r e c e d i n g the p e r i o d in which t h i s p r o p o s a l was s u b m i t t e d . The 
o f f e r o r f u r t h e r c e r t i f i e s t h a t i f such s t a t u s changes b e f o r e an ward 
r e s u l t i n g from t h i s p r o p o s a l , t h e o f f e r o r w i l l adv i se t h e C o n t r a c t i n g 
O f f i c e r i m m e d i a t e l y . 
[ ] (4) C e r t i f i c a t e of I n t e r i m Exemption. 
The o f f e r o r hereby c e r t i f i e s t h a t ( i ) t h e o f f e r o r f i r s t exceeded 
t h e m o n e t a r y exemption fo r d i s c l o s u r e , a s d e f i n e d i n (3) of t h i s 
s u b s e c t i o n , i n t h e cos t a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d immedia te ly p r e c e d i n g t h e 
p e r i o d i n which t h i s o f f e r was submi t t ed and ( i i ) i n acco rdance w i t h 
48 CFR, S u b p a r t 9903 .202 -1 , t h e o f f e r o r i s n o t ye t r e q u i r e d to submit 
a D i s c l o s u r e S t a t e m e n t . The o f f e r o r f u r t h e r c e r t i f i e s t h a t i f an 
award r e s u l t i n g from t h i s p r o p o s a l has n o t been made w i t h i n 90 days 
a f t e r t h e end of t h a t p e r i o d , t h e o f f e r o r w i l l immedia te ly submit a 
r e v i s e d c e r t i f i c a t e t o t h e C o n t r a c t i n g O f f i c e r , in t h e form s p e c i f i e d 
u n d e r s u b p a r a g r a p h (c) (1) o r (c) (2) of P a r t I of t h i s p r o v i s i o n , a s 
a p p r o p r i a t e , t o v e r i f y s u b m i s s i o n of a comple ted D i s c l o s u r e 
S t a t e m e n t « 
CAUTION: O f f e r o r s c u r r e n t l y r e q u i r e d t o d i s c l o s e b e c a u s e t hey 
were a w a r d e d a CAS-covered p r i c e c o n t r a c t o r s u b c o n t r a c t of $25 
m i l l i o n o r more i n t h e c u r r e n t c o s t a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d may n o t c l a im 
t h i s e x e m p t i o n (4) . F u r t h e r , t h e exemption a p p l i e s on ly i n 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h p r o p o s a l s s u b m i t t e d b e f o r e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e 30-day 
p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g t h e c o s t a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d i n which t h e monetary 
e x e m p t i o n was exceeded . 
I I . COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS-ELIGIBILITY FOR MODIFIED CONTRACT 
COVERAGE 
I f t h e o f f e r o r i s e l i g i b l e t o use t h e modif ied p r o v i s i o n s of 48 
CFR S u b p a r t 9903 .201-2 (b) and e l e c t s t o do so , . the o f f e r o r s h a l l 
i n d i c a t e by c h e c k i n g the box be low. Checking the box below s h a l l 
mean t h a t t h e r e s u l t a n t c o n t r a c t i s s u b j e c t t o the D i s c l o s u r e and 
C o n s i s t e n c y of Cost Account ing P r a c t i c e s c l a u s e in l i e u of t h e Cost 
A c c o u n t i n g S t a n d a r d s c l a u s e . 
The o f f e r o r h e r e b y c la ims an exemption from the Cost Account ing 
S t a n d a r d s c l a u s e under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 48 CFR Subpar t 9903 .201-2(b) 
a n d c e r t i f i e s t h a t t h e o f f e r o r i s e l i g i b l e fo r use of t h e D i s c l o s u r e 
a n d C o n s i s t e n c y of Cost Accoun t ing P r a c t i c e s c l a u s e b e c a u s e d u r i n g 
t h e c o s t a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d immedia te ly p r e c e d i n g the p e r i o d i n which 
t h i s p r o p o s a l was s u b m i t t e d , t h e o f f e r o r r e c e i v e d l e s s t h a n $25 
m i l l i o n i n awards of CAS-covered prime c o n t r a c t s and s u b c o n t r a c t s , o r 
t h e o f f e r o r d i d n o t r e c e i v e a s i n g l e CAS-covered award e x c e e d i n g $1 
m i l l i o n . The o f f e r o r f u r t h e r c e r t i f i e s t h a t i f such s t a t u s changes 
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before an award resulting from this proposal, the offeror will advise 
the Contracting Officer immediately. 
CAUTION: An offeror may not claim the above eligibility for 
modified contract coverage if this proposal is expected to result in 
the award of a CAS-covered contract of $25 million or more or if 
during its current cost accounting period, the offeror has been 
awarded a single CAS-covered prime contract or subcontract of $25 
million or more. 
III. ADDITIONAL COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO EXISTING 
CONTRACTS 
The offeror shall indicate below whether award of the 
contemplated contract would, in accordance with subparagraph (a) (3) 
of the Cost Accounting Standards clause, require a change in 
established cost accounting practices affecting existing contracts 
and subcontracts. 
[ ] Yes [JfJ No 
23. INTENT TO FURNISH PRECIOUS METALS AS GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED 
MATERIAL (DEC 1991) 252.208-7000 (Applicable if the item procured 
requires precious metal, as defined in DOD FAR Supp. 208.7301, in its 
manufacture) 
(a) The Government intends to furnish precious metals required 
in the manufacture of items to be .delivered under the 
contract if the Contracting Officer determines it to be in 
the Government's best interest. The use of 
Government-furnished silver is mandatory when the quantity 
required is one hundred troy ounces or more. The precious 
metal (s) will be furnished pursuant to the Government 
Furnished Property clause of the contract. 
(b) The Offeror shall cite the type (silver, gold, platinum, 
palladium, iridium, rhodiuin, and ruthenium) and quantity in 
whole troy ounces of precious metals required in the 
performance of this contract (including precious metals 
required for any first article or production sample), and 
shall specify the national stock number (NSN) and 
nomenclature, if known, of the deliverable item requiring 
precious metals. 
[see next page] 
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Deliverable Item 
Precious Metal* Juanticy (NSN and Nomenclature) 
*If platinum or palladium, specify whether sponge or granules 
are required. 
(c) Offerors shall submit two prices for each deliverable item 
which contains precious metals--one based on the Government 
furnishing precious metals, and one based on the Contractor 
furnishing precious metals. Award will be made on the basis 
which is in the best interest of the Government. 
{d) The Contractor agrees to insert this clause, including this 
paragraph (d), in solicitations for subcontracts and 
purchase orders issued in performance of this contract:, 
unless the Contractor knows that the item being purchased 
contains no precious metals. 
(End of clause) 
SMALL DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS CONCERN REPRESENTATION (DoD 
CONTRACTS) (APR 1994) (DoD FAR Supp. 252.219-7000) 
(a) Definition. 
"Small disadvantaged business concern," as used in this 
provision, means a small business concern, owned and controlled 
by individuals who are both socially and economically^ 
disadvantaged, as defined by the Small Business Administration at 
13 CFR Part 124, the majority of earnings of which directly 
accrue to such individuals. This term also means a small 
business concern owned and controlled by an economically 
disadvantaged Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization which 
meets the requirements of 13 CFR 124.112 or 13 CFR 124.113, 
respectively. In general, 13 CFR Part 124 describes a small 
disadvantaged business concern as a small business concern --
(1) Which is at least 51 percent unconditionally owned by 
one or more socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals; or 
(2) In the case of any publicly owned business, at least 51 
percent of the voting stock is unconditionally owned by 
one or more socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals; and 
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(3) Whose management and daily business operations are 
controlled by one or more such individuals. 
Representations. 
Check the category in which your ownership falls --
Subcontinent Asian (Asian-Indian) American (U.S. 
citizen with origins from India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, or Nepal) 
Asian-Pacific American (U.S. citizen with origins 
from Japan, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Korea, 
Samoa, Guam, U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands Republic of Palau), the Northern Mariana 
Islands, Laos, Kampuchea (Cambodia), Taiwan, Burma, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia; Singapore, Brunei, 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, or the Federated 
States of Micronesia) 
Black American (U.S. citizen) 
Hispanic American (U.S. citizen with origins from 
South America, Central America, Mexico, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Spain, or Portugal) 
Native American. (American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, 
or Native Hawaiians, including Indian tribes or 
Native Hawaiian organizations) 
Individual/concern, other than one of the preceding, 
currently certified for participation in the Minority 
Small Business and Capital Ownership Development 
Program under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act 
Other 
Certifications. 
Complete the following --
(1) The offeror is is not X a small disadvantaged 
business concern. 
(2) The Small Business Administration (SBA) has has 
not made a determination concerning the offeror's 
status as a small disadvantaged business concern. If 
the SBA has made a determination, the date of the 
determination was and the offeror --
Was found by SBA to be socially and economically 
disadvantaged and no circumstances have changed 
to vary that determination. 
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Was found by SBA not to be socially and 
economically disadvantaged but circumstances 
which caused the determination have changed. 
(d) Penalties and Remedies. 
Anyone who misrepresents the status of a concern as a small 
disadvantaged business for the purpose of securing a 
contract or subcontract shall --
(1) Be punished by imposition of a fine, imprisonment, or 
both; 
(2) Be subject to administrative remedies, including 
suspension and debarment; and 
(3) Be ineligible for participation in programs conducted 
under authority of the Small Business Act. 
BUY AMERICAN ACT - BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROGRAM CERTIFICATE (DEC 
1991) (DoD FAR Supp. 252.225-7000) (Applicable to contracts for 
supplies or services which require the furnishing of supplies) 
(a) Definitions. 
"Domestic end product, " "qualifying country, " "qualifying 
country end product, " and "nonqualifying country end 
product" have the meanings given in the Buy American Act 
and Balance of Payments Program clause of this 
solicitation. 
(b) Evaluation. 
Offers wi l l be evaluated by giving preference to domestic 
end products and qualifying country end products over 
nonqualifying country end products. 
(c) Certifications. 
(1) The Offeror certifies that— 
(i) Each end product, except those listed in 
paragraphs (c) (2) or (3) of this clause, is a 
domestic end product; and 
(ii) Components of unknown origin are considered to 
have been mined, produced, or manufactured 
outside the United States or a qualifying 
country. 
(2} The Offeror certifies that the following end products 
are qualifying country end products: 
[see next page] 
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Qualifying Country End Products 
Line Item Number Country of Origin 
(List only qualifying country end products.) 
(3) The Offeror certifies that Che following end products 
are nonqualifying country end products: 
Nonqualifying Country End Products 
Line Item Number Country of Origin (If known) 
(End of provision} 
INFORMATION FOR DUTY-FREE ENTRY EVALUATION (AUG 1992) (DoD FAR 
Supp. 252.225-7003) (Applicable to contracts for supplies or 
services which require the furnishing of supplies) 
(a) Is the offer based on furnishing any supplies (i.e., end 
items, components, or material) of foreign origin other than 
those for which duty-free entry is to be accorded pursuant 
to the Duty-Free Entry--Qualifying Country End Products and 
Supplies clause of this solicitation? 
Yes ( ) No (X ) 
^ j £
 t j l e a n s w e r i n p a r a g r a p h (a) i s y e s , answer the f o l lowing 
q u e s t i o n s : 
(1) Are such f o r e i g n s u p p l i e s now in t he u n i t e d S ta te s? 
;
 Y'es C ) ' Nc I ) 
• (2) Has t he duty on s u c h f o r e i g n s u p p l i e s been p a i d ? 
Yes ( ) N o ( ) 
(3) If the answer to paragraph (b) (2) is no, what a mount i s 
included in the offer to cover such duty? 
(c) If the duty has not been paid, the Government may elect to 
make award on a duty-free, basis. If so the offered price 
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will be reduced in the contract award by the amount 
specified in paragraph (b)(3). The Offeror agrees to 
identify, at the request of the Contracting Officer, the 
foreign supplies which are subject to duty-free entry. 
(d) Offers will be evaluated on a duty included basis except to 
the extent that — 
(1) The supplies are qualifying country end products as 
defined in the Buy American Act and Balance of Payments 
Program clause of this solicitation; or 
(2) The duty-free price is specified for use in the 
evaluation procedure. 
(End of provision) 
REPRESENTATION OF EXTENT OF TRANSPORTATION BY SEA (AUG 1992) 
(DoD FAR Supp. 252.247-7022) 
(a) The Offeror shall indicate by checking the appropriate blank 
in paragraph (b) of this provision whether transportation of 
supplies by sea is anticipated under" the resultant* contract. 
The term "supplies" is defined in the Transportation of 
Supplies by Sea clause of this solicitation. 
(b) Representation. 
The Offeror represents that it— 
Does anticipate that supplies will be transported by 
sea in the performance of any contract or subcontract 
resulting from this solicitation. 
* Does not anticipate that supplies will be transported 
by sea in the performance of any contract or 
subcontract resulting from this solicitation. 
(c) Any contract resulting from this solicitation will include 
the Transportation of Supplies by Sea clause. If the 
Offeror represents that it will not use ocean 
transportation, the resulting contract will also include the 
Defense FAR Supplement clause at 252.247-7024, Notification 
of Transportation of Supplies by Sea. 
(End of provision) 
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2 3 . ACCESS TO VESSELS BY NON-U. S. CITIZENS (ACP
 C E R T I F I C A T I 0 N J (r)rkR$ 
252 . 2 2 2 - 7 0 0 4 ) ( D e v i a t i o n ) (DEAR S t a f f Case 8 6 - 9 0 7 - 24 May 1988) 
( A p p l i c a b l e t o c o n t r a c t s w h i c h i n c l u d e t h e s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n 
e n t i t l e d "Access t o V e s s e l s b y N o n - U . S . c i t i z e n s " ) 
( a ) T h e b i d d e r o r o f f e r o r , i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f a n y c o n t r a c t 
a n d / o r j o b o r d e r r e s u l t i n g from t h i s s o l i c i t a t i o n 
i n t e n d s , d o e s n o t i n t e n d (check a p p l i c a b l e l i n e ) 
t o employ n o n - U . S . c i t i z e n s i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f work, t h a t 
r e q u i r e s access t o n a v a l v e s s e l s , work s i t e s a n d a d j a c e n t 
a r e a s when such v e s s e l s a r e u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n , c o n v e r s i o n , 
o v e r h a u l o r r e p a i r , 
(b) I f t h e b i d d e r o r o f f e r o r , " i n t e n d s " in p a r a g r a p h (a) a b o v e , 
t h e b i d d e r s h a l l i n s e r t i n t h e s p a c e s p r o v i d e d b e l o w , t h e 
r e q u i r e d i n f o r m a t i o n : 
f
~) W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e b i d d e r o r o f f e r o r i n t e n d s t o e m p l o y non-
U. .S . c i t i z e n s , t h e a c t u a l a c c e s s of . n o n - U - S . c i t i z e n s t o 
n a v a l v e s s e l s i s s u b j e c t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e c l a u s e 
e n t i t l e d "ACCESS TO VESSELS BY NON-U. S C I T I Z E N S " . 
ACCESS CONTROL PLAN (ACP) 
A p p r o v e d ACP No. , 
I f n o a p p r o v e d ACP, i n d i c a t e b e l o w , a c t i o n s t a k e n o r 
a n t i c i p a t e d r e l a t i v e t o ACP s u b m i s s i o n t o a p p l i c a b l e 
C o n t r a c t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n O f f i c e (See NAVSEA I n s t r u c t i o n 
5 5 0 0 . 3 ) 
• [ end o f c l a u s e ] 
C o n t r a c t o r A l l l an t Techsystems Inc . f] -
 y, 
J . W. Christensen fjtu^jujj ^v> r^JVu^^Cj^K.4 Q ^ , By; _ _ 
T i t l e ; Contract Administrate 
Date: 7-->f-l£ 
2-96 
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Trr*or«T/-MkTff 
(Non-Compet i t ive] 
T h i s s o l i c i t a t i o n i n c o r p o r a t e s - t h e fo l lowing s o l i c i t a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s 
by r e f e r e n c e , wi th t h e same force and e f f e c t as i f t h e y were g iven in 
f u l l t e x t . Upon r e q u e s t the C o n t r a c t i n g Of f i ce r w i l l make t h e i r 
f u l l t e x t a v a i l a b l e . 
F e d e r a l A c q u i s i t i o n Regula t ion (FAR) (48 CFR Chap te r 1) 
P r o v i s i o n s and POD FAR Supplement (48 CFR Chapte r 2) P r o v i s i o n s 
P r o v i s i o n No. T i t l e and Date P r o v i s i o n Text 
2 
3, 
4, 
**6, 
7, 
8, 
9 
fii. 
12 
13 
Organizational Conflicts of Interest 
Certificate-Marketing Consultants 
(Oct 1995) 
Restrictions on Disclosure 
and Use of Data (Apr 1984) 
Integrity of Unit Prices (Oct 1995) 
Alternate I (Apr 1991) 
Utilization of Small, Small 
Disadvantaged and Women Owned 
Business Concerns (Oct 1995) 
Small Business, Small Disadvantaged 
and Women-Owned Small Business 
Subcontracting Plan (Oct 199 5) 
Liquidated Damages-Subcontracting 
Plan (Oct 1995) 
Preaward On-Site Equal Opportunity 
Compliance Review (Apr 1984) 
Utilization of Indian Organizations 
and Indian-Owned Economic 
Enterprises (Aug 1991) 
Site Visit (Apr 1984) 
Small Business and Small Disadvantaged 
Business Subcontracting Plan 
(DoD Contracts) (Nov 1995) 
Incentive for Subcontracting with 
Small Businesses, Small Disadvantaged 
Businesses, Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities, and 
Minority Institutions (Nov 1995) 
(Insert "IV in paragraph (a)L 
Secondary Arab Boycott of Israel 
(Jun 1992) 
Identification of Uncompensated 
Overtime (Dec 1991) (Applicable 
to level-of-effort contracts) 
52.209-07 
52 .215-12 
52 .215-26 
52.219T-Q8 
52 .219-09 
52 .219-16 
52 .222-24 
5 2 . 2 2 6 - 0 1 
5 2 . 2 3 7 - 0 1 
252.219-7003 
252.219-7005 
252 .225-7031 
252 .237-7019 
* A p p l i c a b l e when the amount of t h i s c o n t r a c t exceeds $200,000 
• • A p p l i c a b l e when t h e amount of t h i s c o n t r a c t exceeds $500,000 
( U n d e r l i n i n g deno te s changes made i n t h i s e d i t i o n ) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, et al . 
Defendant. 
Case No. 030917933 
) 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
October 26, 2009 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
Kelly W. Wright 
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
2001 S. State St. S-3600 
SLC, UT 84190 
Telephone: (801)468-3267 
John C. McCarrey 
Laron Lind 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
160 E. 300 S . 5th Fl . 
SLC, UT 84114 
Telephone: (801)366-0375 
David J. Crapo 
WOOD CRAPO 
60 E. South Temple #900 
SLC, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)366-6060 
Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT 
273 Interlochen Ln. 
Stansbury Park, UT 84074 
Telephone: (435) 590-5575 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
be seated. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on October 26, 2009) 
COURT BAILIFF: This Court is again in session. Pleas 
I
THE COURT: Good afternoon. We're here in the matter 
of Alliant Techsystems, Inc. vs. Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization, Utah State Tax Commission and Granite School 
District. For the parties, we don't have a video anymore, we 
have an audio. So I need you to identify yourselves on the 
record so they can hear your voice and so when they know you 
speak they know who it is. So I need everybody to identify 
themselves separately as we go through. 
MR. MCCARREY: Thank you, your Honor. John McCarrey, 
assistant attorney general here on behalf of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. McCarrey. 
MR. LIND: Laron Lind, assistant attorney general here 
on behalf of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. SLOAN: Mary Ellen Sloan, Salt Lake County Distric 
Attorney on behalf of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalizatio 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, Kelly Wright with the Salt La 
County District Attorney's Office on behalf of the County. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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1 MR. CRAPO: Good afternoon, your Honor. My name is 
2 David Crapo. I'm with the law firm of Wood Crapo here in Salt 
3 Lake City representing Alliant Tech Systems. Observing from our 
4 office is Ms. Pamela Hunsaker. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. Now since we have cross motions 
6 for summary judgment, I thought I would allow Alliant Techsystems 
7 to go first since really the burden of proof of theirs ultimately 
8 in this of proving the inapplicability or exemption from the tax. 
9 So Mr. Crapo, you may proceed. 
10 MR. CRAPO: Thank you, your Honor. There is an 
11 outstanding motion that was filed by the counties on the motion 
12 to strike portions of the affidavit of Mr. Abpanalp. 
13 THE COURT: Do you want to deal with that first? We 
14 can. 
15 MR. WRIGHT: That's fine, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. CRAPO: I believe that's the County's motion, so --
18 THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead. 
19 MR. WRIGHT: If you have any questions, I'm sure the 
20 Court has reviewed that. 
21 THE COURT: I have. 
22 MR. WRIGHT: The essence of our argument is that to 
23 parole evidence we should look to the documents themselves to 
24 establish a relationship. Our concern was that we get carried 
25 away with trying to characterize the documents, the four corners 
-4-
1 and what the relationships are, and those are really contained 
2 within those documents. 
3 We're criticized because we had included evidence 
4 actually of Mr. Foote -- Jeff Foote. The distinguishing point 
5 that I would make is that that testimony was actually -- not only 
6 was it sworn, but it was subject to direct and cross examination, 
7 was actually part of the hearing, where the affidavit that we 
8 have is just unilateral. It hasn't had a chance -- nobody has 
9 had a chance to examine and cross examine the individual. 
10 We believe, your Honor, that basically if the Court were 
11 to stay within the four corners of the documents and that the 
12 facts that we have that are presented there within the documents, 
13 that that's the appropriate inquiry by this Court. So to the 
14 extent that we have representation outside of the four corners 
15 of the documents, we would ask that that be stricken. 
16 THE COURT: What specific representations do you believe 
17 are outside of the four corners of the document? I mean as I 
18 went through -- and we didn't go through -- I didn't go through 
19 every one, but most of them seemed consistent with the -- very 
20 few things seemed inconsistent from his statement --
21 MR. WRIGHT: I think that's correct. 
22 THE COURT: -- that it was just --
23 MR. WRIGHT: I think that's correct, your Honor. We 
24 just wanted to make sure on the record that what we look at is 
25 the documents themselves. 
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1 THE COURT: But are there specific statements that you 
2 believe in there that are outside -- that I specifically need to 
3 address? Again, just going through it generally it appeared that 
4 most of them were consistent with statements either you made or 
5 ATK made in their statement of facts as they went through. There 
6 were --
7 MR. WRIGHT: I understand. 
8 THE COURT: I couldn't really find any that I thought 
9 were just really something that was in opposition or was new or 
10 different. 
11 MR. WRIGHT: I'll tell you really the part that we're 
12 most concerned about is the characterization that the Navy, if 
13 you will, controls ATK. 
14 THE COURT: Well, that characterization is -- yeah. 
15 That's an assumption that this Court is not going to be bound by. 
16 It's what his assumption is. I mean that's findings that I'm 
17 going to have to make. 
18 MR. WRIGHT: And I concur with that, your Honor. That 
19 probably is -- that characterization, we believe it does 
20 ultimately go to an issue that may or may not be an ultimate 
21 issue of fact as to it's relevant, but that's our primary 
22 concern. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. WRIGHT: Otherwise, I concur with your assessment. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
-6-
1 MR. CRAPO: Your Honor, in response on the motion to 
2 strike, we don't believe the counties have identified anything 
3 that is inconsistent with the actual documents themselves. 
4 Mr. Abpanalp did not testify in his affidavit that the Na^ /y 
5 controls. He said the contract controls, and he talked about 
6 specific limitations identified in the contract. I believe 
7 the counties have the burden of coming forth and specifically 
8 identifying where it's contrary and providing evidence where 
9 it's contrary. So I believe the Court should properly deny --
10 THE COURT: How do you pronounce his name again? 
11 MR. CRAPO: He says Abpanalp. 
12 THE COURT: Abpanalp, okay. 
13 MR. CRAPO: The other item that was raised by the 
14 counties is Mr. Foote's testimony. We did not criticize the 
15 counties for inclusion of the testimony. We ]ust criticized the 
16 proper context m which it was being stated and said that they 
17 needed to give the entire statement rather than just selective 
1 8 portions. 
19 Your Honor, I don't believe there's any merit to the 
20 County's motion to strike. They have not come forth with the 
21 requisite evidence to be able to rebut it, and we'd ask that you 
22 deny their motion to strike in toto. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. WRIGHT: May I respond very quickly? 
25 THE COURT: Yes. 
-7-
1 MR. WRIGHT: Do you want me up here where --
2 THE COURT: Either way. You're on the mic either way. 
3 MR. WRIGHT: Just a couple of points. 
4 THE COURT: Yes. 
5 MR. WRIGHT: Our motion to strike does go in detail and 
6 talks about that. It does bring up the issue of law which is 
7 what we're raising. I'm not sure what Counsel expects with 
8 additional evidence, because that's the whole point. We have the 
9 documents themselves. They speak for themselves. So we believe 
10 that we have met the burden, that that is contained within our 
11 motion to strike, and the issue is an issue of law. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. I have reviewed this. I'm going 
13 to deny the motion to strike. However, in saying that, there are 
14 certain statements where I think that he does reach the limit of 
15 trying to interpret the law. Just so that it's clear that those 
16 statements or those conclusions he reached as the application of 
17 law are not binding on the Court, those findings of fact. So 
18 they are not binding. 
19 The factual assertions he makes can stand for 
20 themselves. I don't think they're different than the statements 
21 that are in the findings of fact, but his assertions of what --
22 how that's applied or how to even interpret the contract are 
23 beyond what is appropriate for an affidavit. That's my role 
24 as the Court. 
25 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, your Honor. 
1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. CRAPO: Might I proceed, then? 
3 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
4 MR. CRAPO: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, I'll 
5 try to address just the key points that have been raised in the 
6 briefing because you have significant and substantial briefing, 
7 and I'd be happy to answer any questions you may have. 
8 THE COURT: I probably will as we go through, yes. 
9 MR. CRAPO: We believe that this case is really a 
10 statutory construction case, and it's based on the plain language 
11 of the statute. I have placed on the board in front of me the 
12 applicable statute, and if you'd like, I have a handout that is 
13 that if you can't see that. 
14 THE COURT: I have the statute here. 
15 MR. CRAPO: Very good. Your Honor, the statute at issue 
16 is Title 59-4-101, which is the privilege tax statute in the 
17 State of Utah. We are dealing with the exemption provisions 
18 which are found in subparagraph 3, and then there's (a) through 
19 (g) currently that are exemptions. 
20 We're going to be talking about (e). We believe that 
21 the plain language allows us -- this exemption -- and let me 
22 explain. If you look at the very first sentence of (e), "The use 
23 or possession of any lease, permit or easement, unless the lease, 
24 permit or easement entitles the lessee or permitee to exclusive 
25 possession or the premises to which the lease, permit or easement 
~9 
1 relates." The language that we think we really need to focus 
2 on is any lease or permit or easement, and do we have exclusive 
3 possession. We believe we have a situation where we have a 
4 permit. We do not have exclusive possession; therefore, we're 
5 entitled to the exemption. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Let me stop you right there 
7 because I -- when I was legislative general Counsel, one of my 
8 responsibilities was drafting laws, and one of the laws -- the 
9 areas that I was responsible for was drafting tax laws. So I 
10 spent a number of years drafting some of the statutes we're 
11 talking about, and was involved in drafting them when I was 
12 legislative general Counsel. 
13 One of the things that concerns me about the argument 
14 that you're making and I'd like you to address is the exemption 
15 itself. It says, "The use, possession of any lease." Okay. 
16 So you start out with a lease. With a lease you have certain 
17 property rights, and you've cited cases in which you say lease 
18 rights you have to have exclusive possession, and you cited case 
19 which talk about a leasehold interest. 
20 A permit interest is something less than a leasehold 
21 interest, by law. I mean you look at the cases and there weren' 
22 a lot of cases cited in permitees or licensees, which are 
23 analogous -- some. There were some cases addressed licensees, 
24 but that property (inaudible) by permitee or licensee is less 
25 than a lessee. 
-10-
1 Then on the -- on the far end down there is somebody 
2 that has an easement, which is something less than a permLtee 
3 or a licensee. Then the statute goes on to say that -- and so 
4 you have different classes, but then it says, "The lessee are 
5 permitted to exclusive permission of the premise to which the 
6 lease permit or easement relates." 
7 So you could have an exclusive possession within the 
8 rights of a leasehold. You could have exclusive possession 
9 within the rights of a permitee, and you could have exclusive 
10 possession in the rights of an easement, and they may not be the 
11 same as exclusive possession period. It seems that the statute 
12 makes the distinction. 
13 One other thing that's troubled me about the argument 
14 you've presented, and using lease all the time is you say that 
15 this exclusive possession we have to be granted is exclusive 
16 possession period rather than exclusive possession limited to 
17 which the permit relates. So I'd like you to address that and 
18 talk about that, because there seems to be -- either that or the 
19 words don't mean anything. I mean there's no use to have all 
20 those other words and all those other types of possessory 
21 interests unless they mean something. 
22 MR. CRAPO: Right, thank you. I believe you've raised 
23 the point very well. What you're really focusing then is if you 
24 have a permit and it's exclusive only for the range of the permit 
25 itself, then what is left over for the premises. 
- 1 1 -
1 THE COURT: Yeah. For example, in the history -- the 
2 discussion where you could grant a license or a permit into a 
3 mine or what's later coming with the Great Salt Lake. You can 
4 give somebody the right to mine gold. You can give somebody the 
5 right to mine silver. You can give somebody else -- and so they 
6 all have for purposes of taxation exclusive possession to do what 
7 they're going to do with the same set of property, even if you 
8 have more than one person acting on the property. 
9 That seems to bear out with the later language in 
10 dealing with the Great Salt Lake, that there appears to be an 
11 intent to do that, either that or it appears to me that some of 
12 that language just doesn't need to be there, and that's not the 
13 way statutes are usually interpreted. 
14 MR. CRAPO: Thank you. If I might be able to try to 
15 explain it, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. CRAPO: The way that I believe that you're 
18 interpreting it with a lease, a permit and an easement, you take 
19 the permit and you say it has lesser geographical boundaries or 
20 lesser rights on a particular area. If that is true under the 
21 statute, you're only entitled to tax the beneficial use of the 
22 permit as it applies to those premises, not to the entire land 
23 or not to the entire property at issue. If you allow the tax to 
24 go beyond the restrictions of the permit, then you're going to 
25 impose tax on the United States government who has the remainder 
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1 in this particular case. 
2 If I might explain sentences 1 and 2 as it relates to 
3 the language, you have sentence 1, which I believe is fairly 
4 unambiguous and straight on its face. 
5 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
6 MR. CRAPO: The question then becomes sentence 2f and 
7 we've had discussion back and forth in the briefing what does 
8 that really mean. 
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
10 MR. CRAPO: I believe in looking at the bills and the 
11 language that was drafted, it probably appears -- and I need to 
12 correct myself in the first briefing -- that it appears that the 
13 legislature is trying to tax the mineral rights but not the Great 
14 Salt Lake brines. 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 MR. CRAPO: What becomes interesting is why did 
17 they leave out exclusive because that was in the original bill, 
18 and they struck it on the legislative floor so it only said 
1 9 possession. 
20 Then the question becomes at the end of the sentence 
21 where it talks about having different holders of mineral rights 
22 on the same land, but it talks the value of the premises rather 
23 than in the same lands. According to my understanding, when you 
24 have, for example, a co-lease, you may have -- or even an oil 
25 lease on a 10 acre parcel, you'll give a two to three acre lease 
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1 or mineral lease to extract. The next lease that will be given 
2 on that land won't sit right on top of that, will be adjacent to. 
3 So you'll have three acres of premises, three acres of premises, 
4 three acres of premises for three different lien holders on a 10 
5 acre parcel owned by the owner. 
6 Now if the County's interpretation is correct where you 
7 get to tax the entire parcel for each of those three, you're 
8 going to get 300 percent tax because you're going to get a full 
9 tax from leaseholder or permit holder No. 1, lease or permit 
10 holder No. 2 and No. 3, which is illogical and can't work. 
11 So the restriction, I believe, if it's to be read 
12 congruent with the first sentence is saying the premises is 
13 what that they are allowed to tax, even though there may be 
14 others that have a right to use the same lands with the premises 
15 immediately adjacent thereto. So I think that would be the 
16 interpretation that would keep this consistent for all the 
17 language. 
18 Now you say, "Well, what about a permit," because 
19 you've cited the Keller case and you've cited a few others that 
20 say there's always going to be some sort of a restriction. I 
21 recognize that. I believe there is some sort of a restriction. 
22 So you're then faced with an interpretation to say does it mean 
23 exclusive as to just third persons or third parties or others, 
24 or does exclusive also include the owner. 
25 The counties site the Bullough (phonetic) case, which is 
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1 the 1920 sheep grazing case. In that one you have a person 
2 asking for actually a permit -- grazing permit, and there were 
3 two or three others that had permits as welL on that same 
4 property, I believe 1500 head of sheep to 4300 head of sheep. 
5 So the question is is this exclusive. The County 
6 interprets that to say, "Well, you just look at who the other 
7 parties are and you don't look at the owner. If there's other 
8 parties, then that's how it's exclusive." I don't think that is 
9 a fair interpretation. 
10 What if you had the owner m Bullough who says, "I want 
11 to run my 4300 head of sheep on my own property, but I want to 
12 give you a permit to run your 1500 head on my property as well." 
13 Does that mean that that new person, because he's exclusive as 
14 to anyone else except for the owner who runs his 4300 head that 
15 he says, "Oh, you're exclusive now. Therefore, you pay a full 
16 property tax on my 5,000 acres of property, even though you're 
17 only running 1500 head." I don't believe so. 
18 So the owner's rights retained have to be viewed as to 
19 say do you really have exclusive possession and control of the 
20 property that is being subject to tax. In this particular case 
21 ATK does have certain possession rights under a permit, certain 
22 other rights, but it does not have possession and control of the 
23 entire Nyroit (phonetic) property without intervention from the 
24 United States government. 
25 For the County to come in and say, "We're going to tax 
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1 the entire amount," would impose a tax on the United States 
2 government. That's why we believe you have to look at the 
3 premises that are being subject to tax when you look at the 
4 language on this. 
5 I believe that if you look at the cases that we also 
6 cited you for Exxon Mobil, that if you have the plain language 
7 that is there, you need to interpret it saying any lease and not 
8 exclusive possession, and if for any reason you don't think it 
9 yields a result, you can't try to judicially carve that result, 
10 but you should rule on the plain language, and Exxon says, "Then 
11 the legislature will change it." 
12 That's exactly what happened in County Board of 
13 Equalization vs. Evans and Sutherland, which was exemption (c) 
14 just above. Supreme Court applied the plain language and then 
15 said this is the way it will go, and the legislature can change 
16 it if they need to. 
17 So your Honor, I think that answers the interpretation 
18 and keeps it consistent with the plain language when what we're 
19 looking at is it says any lease, and are we permitted exclusive 
20 possession. You look at Keller, we don't have exclusive 
21 possession. You look at Loyal Order of the Moose where the 
22 Supreme Court said, "We've got to look at the word exclusive," 
23 and it doesn't mean just primary. That means you have the 
24 exclusive control of this land. We don't. We may have limited 
25 rights. So I believe that answers the question. 
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1 The arguments from the counties are basically one, we 
2 don't have a permit is their first attack. I don't believe that 
3 is really with merit. Permit is defined as any rights to use or 
4 occupy, though without a leasehold interest. I think that's 
5 clearly what we have here. Their next attack was the exclusive 
6 possession language, and to say the third party versus the owner, 
7 and they don't want to allow the owner into that definition, 
8 which I already explained. 
9 The next argument that they go to is the adjustum 
10 generis, which is saying you have to take the second sentence 
11 and read it to control the first sentence. 
12 THE COURT: Well, I don't think you even need the second 
13 sentence to control the first. 
14 MR. CRAPO: Well, your Honor, I believe --
15 THE COURT: I mean to me -- and I'm not sure you've 
16 answered my question completely -- that a permit interest or an 
17 easement -- and maybe my understanding with the tax commission 
18 is different. If somebody has an easement going through this 
19 property, are they taxed for the full value of the property or 
20 ]ust the property that's within the easement? 
21 MR. CRAPO: Your Honor, we would --
22 THE COURT: I mean I don't know. I mean how --
23 generally my understanding of easements, m cases I've had 
24 before, they're only taxed on the property within the boundaries 
25 of the easement. They're not taxed on the value of the full 
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1 property. 
2 MR. CRAPO: And that's the way we would look at it. 
3 Your Honor, candidly, if the counties were only taxing a 
4 possessory interest, which ATK holds, we wouldn't have an 
5 argument, but they're taxing us as if we own the entire property. 
6 THE COURT: No, no. They're taxing it on a value as if 
7 you owned the property. I mean -- and that's a big distinction 
8 under tax law. It doesn't have to be the same as an advolarm 
9 property tax. It's a use tax. It's a privilege tax. 
10 You start out with the premise that it's taxed on this 
11 value, and then you can argue valuations. I mean you can argue, 
12 "Well, that's not an appropriate valuation," but that doesn't 
13 affect the constitution or legality of a tax. It's the premise 
14 to start. It's not the -- and it can be something -- a privilege 
15 tax or a use tax doesn't have to be the same as an advolarm 
16 property tax. 
17 MR. CRAPO: Well, I believe that gets right into the 
18 case that we cite you from Colorado on the Nye case. 
19 THE COURT: No, the Nye case is -- well, the Nye case 
20 is the Tenth Circuit -- or the Ninth Circuit. The Nye case --
21 it points out in the Nye case that the Tenth Circuit has a more 
22 restrictive reading than even the Colorado cases. 
23 One thing that concerns me about the cases that you've 
24 cited to me, all of those -- Colorado, New Mexico, Nye case -- in 
25 every one of those cases, the United States government was the 
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1 principle party. The United States government is not a party 
2 here, and under Shelleby vs. Lore (phonetic) they set forth a 
3 three part test for standing to raise constitutional issues as 
4 supremacy clause. 
5 MR. CRAPO: Right. 
6 THE COURT: Under that it appears to me that ATK doesn't 
7 have standing to raise the issue of supremacy as applied to this 
8 statute because the second test is the impossibility of the right 
9 holders asserting their own constitutional rights, and it's clear 
10 from the other cases across the country that if the United States 
11 government wants to assert its rights, it clearly has the ability 
12 to do that. So there's no impossibility of the federal 
13 government asserting that right. 
14 The third is the need to avoid delusion of third party's 
15 constitutional rights, which would result -- and again, if the 
16 United States wanted to do this -- and so it appears to me that 
17 as I have gone through and really looked at this that there 
18 really is a standing issue to raise that argument in this case, 
19 that it's the United States government that has to come in 
20 because every case that you have cited on the supremacy clause, 
21 the United States government is the party in interest and is the 
22 one bringing the claim, and it's exactly the same case as yours. 
23 There are people there that are permitees that are 
24 on the ground doing it, doing everything, but it's the United 
25 States government that's challenging the County in all the cases 
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1 assessing, not the lessees or the person or the permitees or --
2 and they're the primary party bringing the claims, and so that 
3 issue is not raised. So I have a real question about standing 
4 to even raise the argument here. 
5 MR. CRAPO: Your Honor, I'd respectfully disagree with 
6 that interpretation, and the reason being on standing is we are 
7 not bringing a claim asking for the refund for the United States. 
8 We are rather doing an interpretation of the statute to keep it 
9 constitutional. 
10 THE COURT: Right, but that -- in every one of those 
11 cases that's what they were doing, asking for the 
12 constitutionality of the statute. 
13 MR. CRAPO: Right. In those particular cases, though, 
14 your Honor, if you will look at County Board of Equalization, the 
15 Evans Sutherland case that's cited to you. 
16 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
17 MR. CRAPO: In that particular case, the counties 
18 themselves raise constitutional issues on the interpretation of 
19 this very -- not (e), but subsection (c) of this very statute. 
20 The Utah Supreme Court had no hesitation in addressing those 
21 issues that were raised as constitutional questions for the 
22 privilege tax issue, even though the United States government 
23 was not a party in that particular case because they were 
24 interpreting the statute. 
25 In that particular case even Ms. Sloan who is Counsel 
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1 here argued that case before the Utah Supreme Court, and asked 
2 them on discrimination against the United States government for 
3 equal protection, uniform application of la^s. They did not use 
4 supremacy, but they used each of those items and due process, and 
5 the Supreme Court did not hesitate in allowing and interpreting 
6 those constitutional provisions as it applies to this statute. 
7 I believe the standard is different in the State of 
8 Utah in trying to interpret a statute that once it's been raised, 
9 the Supreme Court will address those particular issues in the 
10 interpretive fashion to say would it cause this statute to be 
11 unconstitutional or not. We'd ask you to look at that case in 
12 relationship to Shelby -- Shelleby, excuse me. 
13 The other point, your Honor, that I'd like to cover --
14 a couple of points that were raised by the counties that may have 
15 been issues for these. One is whether Thiokol applies or not. 
16 We do not believe it does apply. I might show you a slide -- a 
17 poster. On this particular poster, your Honor, the question was 
18 does the exemption as it currently read exist in 1959 as was the 
19 1961 date for Thiokol, and we don't believe it did. 
20 If you'll look at the original enacting language, it 
21 said no tax shall be implied, and what did it talk about, mineral 
22 or grazing leases only. I've italicized the language the County 
23 pointed out to you and said well, that's existed ever since day 
24 one, every iteration has existed. But what did it apply to? 
25 The language, "Unless you have exclusive possession," 
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1 only applied to mineral and grazing. In 1975 it was amended. 
2 Minerals were dropped out, and it applied to grazing only, and 
3 then you get that other language for minerals. In 1987 what did 
4 they do? They took grazing and put it at subparagraph (d) and 
5 sub -- which has no requirement of exclusive possession for 
6 grazing leases at that point, and then had subsection (d), which 
7 is our current language, and the only thing is any lease. 
8 So your Honor, that actual provision of looking at any 
9 lease that does not give you exclusive possession was not even 
10 addressed or raised at the time of Thiokol back in 1961. So 
11 we think it's a different statute and a different time period. 
12 Because of that, we don't think that Thiokol is binding or reall 
13 helpful for that matter in this particular case. 
14 I believe the only other case that was cited by the 
15 State that was from Utah was ABCO, and in that particular 
16 case you had a lease. It doesn't really get to the exclusive 
17 possession issue that is raised in this particular matter. So 
18 really subsection (d) as it is in the current was never addresse 
19 or raised. 
20 So your Honor, it really does come down to that first 
21 sentence of subsection (d) on how to interpret it. I see where 
22 you're coming from, but we honestly believe that the plain 
23 language states any lease or permit. We have a permit here to 
24 use. 
25 I believe the facts show that we don't have unrestricte 
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1 rights for this particular property. The government call allow 
2 whoever it wants to come and go. Then you look at exclusLve 
3 possession. We believe the statute should be read exclusive 
4 possession includes rights withheld to the owner. 
5 I guess then it gets to the interpretation that you 
6 raised, your Honor, of how do you value. As we read the statute 
7 we read it the same way that Nye did in saying the value is b e m 
8 determined on the full value of the property, and then restricte 
9 back down. We believe if the statute were read to be only the 
10 possessory benefit that we had, then it would be a constitutiona 
11 statute, and it could be upheld. Once it extends beyond that fo 
12 the full value, we believe it's inappropriate. Thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. You may proceed. 
14 MR. WRIGHT: We have argued -- and I appreciate the 
15 Court's comments that this is not a property tax. This is a 
16 privilege tax. It's a beneficial use. Even the possessory 
17 interest argument that Counsel makes tries to bring it into the 
18 realm of a property tax, and it is not. 
19 Obviously if it was a property tax, because it deals 
20 with exempt property, it would be unconstitutional. So I think 
21 that is absolute key. I think that's recognize in the ABCO case 
22 The ABCO case, you have the plaintiff in that case who 
23 says, "Look, we have leasehold interest. That's all we have. 
24 You're taxing us on a fee simple interest, the whole bundle 
25 price," and the Supreme Court went through the analysis. It was 
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1 certainly under equal protection in federal court, but also 
2 operation of laws which is the equivalent of the Utah 
3 constitution and said no, it is absolutely constitutional. 
4 Let me step back. The interpretation, the legislative 
5 history I think is important. Counsel wants to suggest that 
6 in 1987 we have a brand new statute. That is not the case. 
7 In our reply brief we have cited to -- we pulled the tape from 
8 the Senate from the floor with the comments that were made, and 
9 if I could just quote this again, because the way Counsel is 
10 interpreting this just does not make sense. 
11 Here's what was done in 1987. It's pretty clear. It's 
12 pretty clear by the Senate Bill 69, which is what it is, this 
13 (inaudible) phase II recodification. So as they go through their 
14 renumbering and they're pulling everything apart, the key is this 
15 language. "I would just say this, though" -- this is Dr. Brady 
16 speaking to the legislators -- "it has not been our intent to 
17 change tax policy as we have completed and entered into this 
18 phase II task. When we get into phase III we would probably 
19 be addressing such matters as you've just mentioned." 
20 So it's my understanding the tax law will still be read 
21 and interpreted the same after these tax bills are passed as they 
22 are now. So there's no change anticipated here. There was no 
23 change. 
24 As we've cited in our brief, the language which is key 
25 to this, that is the language of unless -- this language, "unless 
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the permitter easement and so on has been consistent in every 
statute." As you look at the 1959 through the 1975, which are 
the -- that's the analysis that we initially looked at and went 
through, it is clear that the statute hasn't changed from 1959 
That means Thiokol is absolutely on point. 
I have some other arguments that I'd like to get into 
Thiokol on that, your Honor. Just very quickly, and I will be 
very quick because you --
THE COURT: Let me just ask a fundamental question to 
the first argument you raise where you said that they don't have 
a lease permit or easement. You say they have a contract. I 
mean are you -- I mean it's hard for me to understand. I mean 
they have something --
MR. WRIGHT: They do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: -- and it's either a lease or permit or --
MR. WRIGHT: And I recognize --
THE COURT: -- I mean a license or -- I mean however you 
call it, they have an interest in conducting their business on 
the property. 
MR. WRIGHT: They do, and the tax commission found that 
they (inaudible) that. I'll be candid. It's the weaker of our 
arguments, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WRIGHT: So --
THE COURT: That's fine. I don't need you to say 
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1 anymore. 
2 MR. WRIGHT: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 MR. WRIGHT: The comment Counsel made about taxing three 
5 times the value of the land again goes to the issue of it's not a 
6 property tax, it's a beneficial use. The 1975 language I think 
7 is -- can only be read one way. I'd like to suggest to the 
8 Court -- and I do have a copy of -- and perhaps the Court does as 
9 well of the statutory language that's listed here. The language 
10 that was added in 1975 -- let me see if I've got mine right here. 
11 If I may, your Honor? 
12 THE COURT: You may. 
13 MR. WRIGHT: The language in the 1975 -- I have it 
14 highlighted in red. It reads, "Every lessee, permitee, or other 
15 holder of a right to remove or extract mineral covered by the 
16 lease, right or permit or easement, except from brines in the 
17 Great Salt Lake." I think the Court's indicated well that that 
18 is an exception. 
19 This language and the language that follows Great 
20 Salt Lake where it says, "is deemed to be in possession of the 
21 premises," I would submit that what that says is taxable. Is 
22 taxable. That is the language that they used that was understood 
23 because if not, it makes absolute no sense. It becomes an 
24 absurdity. Statutes are read to have meaning. 
25 What's interesting about that section is it says a 
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1 similar right, but it's another mineral, so it's not the same 
2 mineral. It's from the same lands. So we have differing 
3 mineral interests in the same premises. So the language is 
4 deemed to be in possession of the premises, we could substitute, 
5 I believe to say, is taxable, notwithstanding the fact that the 
6 parties have a similar right to remove, in other words not 
7 withstanding that we have parties that operate in the same lands. 
8 So that's the essence of what that section says. I think key to 
9 this legislative intent is that the statute hasn't changed since 
10 1959. 
11 In respect to the issues here at hand, I would just 
12 simply point out that if we look at ATK and how it represents 
13 itself to the world, in the -- I think the annual report or the 
14 10-K report -- does this microphone go off and on? 
15 THE COURT: If you get too close to it, it does. You 
16 just have to stand back. It's --
17 MR. WRIGHT: Okay. 
18 THE COURT: It's a temperamental mic. 
19 MR. WRIGHT: All right. If you take a look at the 
20 annual report and you look at the 10-K report, ATK represents to 
21 the world, if you will, as it's required under the SEC that, "We 
22 have -- we occupy this property." Counsel and ATK has said that 
23 there's nobody else. There's nobody else. Their argument simply 
24 goes to the property owner itself. 
25 What's interesting about the relationship is that this 
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1 is -- there is a business relationship, and as an independent 
2 contractor with its client, the client is going to want to have 
3 the opportunity to make sure its product is there. So what 
4 Counsel suggests is management and control is really the client 
5 wanting to inspect and wanting to understand. As I go through a 
6 series of points with Thiokol, I think you'll see that, because 
7 that's what the Court looked at as well. 
8 Our position, and as Counsel has indicated as the Court 
9 has reviewed under Bullough as we look at permits, permits can be 
10 exclusive or they can be non-exclusive, and that was clearly the 
11 law of the state at the time in 1959 that the statute was put 
12 into place. 
13 It does not make sense that the issue of exclusive 
14 possession would relate to the landowner -- of the exempt 
15 landowner because in every instance, whether it's a lease, 
16 a permit or an easement, it is a fractional interest in the 
17 property, which means that the property owner continues to have 
18 rights in the property, rights to control. They have the right 
19 to sell. They have the right to do any number of things that 
20 they can do. Certainly as was done in this particular case, they 
21 can define rights and burdens with respect to the document, the 
22 contract itself. 
23 Unless the Court has additional questions -- and let me 
24 just interject right here -- it is our position that ATK does not 
25 have standing because it's not an agent or an instrumentality of 
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1 the United States, and it doesn't have the standing to bring the 
2 issues -- the supremacy clause issues. I don't believe that the 
3 evidence in the Sutherland case stands for that proposition, 
4 because United States was not involved in that case at all. 
5 So having said that, I -- and looking at their reply 
6 brief, I think that the -- their challenge -- constitutional 
7 challenge under the supremacy clause has effectively been 
8 withdrawn or abandoned. 
9 So I would conclude with this analysis with the Thiokol 
10 case. In Thiokol the Court determined -- and again, let's go 
11 back. Thiokol was producing a product for the US government 
12 under contract. They were using the federal premises, just 
13 like ATK uses the federal premises. They were an independent 
14 contractor, just like ATK is an independent contractor. There 
15 was federal oversight in the Thiokol case, just as there is 
16 federal oversight by virtue of the nature of the relationship. 
17 I would submit that what we have provided to the Court 
18 in the facilities use contract and the capital maintenance 
19 contract, and then we have supply contracts, including the 
20 Martin -- Lockheed Martin, excuse me, contract for the Tritan II, 
21 which has language in it that specifies what the relationship of 
22 the parties is. 
23 So as I review the Thiokol case, the Court said, "The 
24 above conclusion" -- and this is again that Thiokol has the right 
25 to use the property practically as it chooses, because of 
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1 necessity it has to. It has a contract that it has to perform. 
2 The issue that they've raised about national security -- I hope 
3 it's clear -- our understanding is that that concern is ATK's 
4 concern as well, in a more significant way because not only do we 
5 have the national security concerns, but they are under contract 
6 with the government and producing a product that is very 
7 essential to our national interests. 
8 I'm reading from paragraph 5 -- or excuse me, Section 
9 5 of the Thiokol case. Does your Honor have a copy of that? 
10 THE COURT: I do. 
11 MR. WRIGHT: Okay. "The above conclusion is not changed 
12 by the fact that under the contract the government maintains a 
13 staff of about 60 people to supervise such things as security 
14 safety measurements, labor relations, accounting, procurement, 
15 the company's organizational structure, wages, salary. These 
16 measures are quite understandable because of the desirability of 
17 safeguarding the interests of the government and the expenditure 
18 of such large sums of government money, and more importantly 
19 because of the necessity for maximum security in this field vital 
20 to national defense, but they are not inconsistent with the main 
21 purport of the contract, which is directed towards requiring 
22 Thiokol to pursue its own course, to accomplish the end result." 
23 If you look at the contracts, they specify the 
24 relationships. They actually have -- include language -- these 
25 are the subcontracts or the prime contracts, and ATK subcontract 
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that says there will not be government interference, and it 
specifies that. 
So we look at the statute, and take the position 
that ATK clearly has exclusive possession. If it's a permit the 
have exclusive possession to all the world, and they have the 
relationship with the Navy. Therefore, the exemption does not 
apply, and therefore we'd ask that the Court find in favor of ou 
summary judgment. 
THE COURT: I need to ask both of you a question becaus 
of the way the case was stipulated in Kmgsman. Are there 
questions of fact as to how much the Navy controls or what the 
Navy does that's different than -- because you both seem to say 
the same thing. I mean there didn't seem to be in terms of yes, 
they have the one building there, they have I think what, 14 --
I can't remember the number; I think it's 14 --
MR. WRIGHT: It's 14, yes. 
THE COURT: -- individuals that were there. Their role 
is primarily inspection, maintenance, review of the contracts 
that ATK does for the Navy, and there wasn't any indication that 
they do independent works or independent contracts or other 
contracts. I mean is there -- and I'm just -- I mean from what 
I have read, there does not appear to be a factual dispute as to 
what their role --
MR. WRIGHT: That would prohibit --
THE COURT: -- or what takes place --
-31-
1 MR. WRIGHT: -- a summary judgment? 
2 THE COURT: Yes, for purposes of summary judgment. 
3 Is there -- neither of you seem to raise -- either of you in 
4 your pleadings. I mean you've argued that I should interpret 
5 the law either this way or this way, but there doesn't appear to 
6 be a dispute of fact that either of you are raising, at least as 
7 I've gone through your statements of fact and that you've gone 
8 through. Is that a correct statement on both sides? I mean I --
9 MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, I think it is subject to our 
10 motion to strike and the Court's ruling on that, and reserving 
11 also the ultimate fact as to what is the legal significance of 
12 that. I don't believe there is a question of fact that would 
13 require a further evidentiary hearing. Certainly we take the 
14 position that the contracts specify that, and all of that is in 
15 the record. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
17 MR. WRIGHT: I'll respond (inaudible). 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you very much. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you. 
21 MR. MCCARREY: At what point would you like to hear from 
22 us, your Honor? 
23 THE COURT: Whenever you feel like you'd like to step up 
24 and provide your input. 
25 MR. MCCARREY: It might be appropriate now, and then it 
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1 would give both of the parties an opportunity to reply. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. You may. 
3 MS. SLOAN: Your Honor, I have a few cases that we 
4 (inaudible) in terms of the federal supremacy clause issue, and 
5 have those available for the Court, if the Court would like that 
6 Additionally, we had planned to kind of split the argument, and 
7 would address the federal supremacy clause argument, but if you 
8 do not feel that that is necessary, I (inaudible). 
9 THE COURT: No, I'll allow you to do it, but I'll allow 
10 the attorney general's office to appear at this time. 
11 MR. MCCARREY: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Now you're here on behalf of the State Tax 
13 Commission, I assume, in the brief that was submitted by the --
14 on behalf of the State Tax Commission. 
15 MR. MCCARREY: It was, your Honor, and we are here 
16 on behalf the administering body. Pursuant to Utah Constitution 
17 and statute, the Utah State Tax Commission does have the 
18 responsibility to administer and supervise Utah's tax laws, 
19 and those responsibilities are particularly heightened in the 
20 property tax area, as you are aware. 
21 We ask that as a starting point that your opinion rests 
22 on the construction of tax exemptions that they are strictly 
23 construed against the tax payer with ambiguities resolved in 
24 favor of taxation. That having been said, the case law also 
25 does provide that it shouldn't overcome the plain meaning or the 
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1 purpose of the exemption. So we believe that that is important. 
2 We think that the exemption needs to be put in the 
3 context of the entire statute. We are concerned that the 
4 exemption really is being argued almost as a standalone item 
5 here, although there has been some mention of the statute, but 
6 that when you look at the statute as a whole, really beginning 
7 with the first subsection that talks about the possession or 
8 other beneficial use and exemption, that implicit in the language 
9 is that there is somebody else who does have an ownership 
10 interest, that the statute recognizes that interest in the 
11 property. 
12 The second subsection talks about how the tax is going 
13 to be imposed, the amounts that it will be imposed at, and it 
14 talks about as though the possessor were the owner of the 
15 property. Again, we feel like that that is really critical 
16 language for your Honor to remember as you make your decision 
17 that again, on the face of the statute, it clearly recognizes 
18 that there is somebody else that has interest in the property. 
19 Finally, it talks about ownership by the federal 
20 government. Based on that, we have taken the position that as 
21 you interpret exclusive possession. That needs to be exclusive 
22 of everyone but the owner of the property. We would agree with 
23 the counties and their reading of the ABCO case that while that 
24 did arise under a uniform application of laws challenge, that the 
25 critical issue there is that ABCO did have less than the full 
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1 bundle of rights, the fee interest in the property, and asserted 
2 that it should not be assessed at a value based on its use, but 
3 equated to the entire value of the property, and the Court just 
4 did not agree with ABCO on that particular point. 
5 As far as the other language of the exemption that the 
6 use or possession of any lease, permit or easement, while the tax 
7 commission did make a finding below on that particular point, it 
8 has not taken a position in this particular litigation. It did 
9 rule based on the information and the arguments of the parties 
10 below, but again, we would ask that there just be a clear 
11 framework laid out because we will indeed have to go back and 
12 administer this for many properties. Your ruling will impact 
13 not only ATK, but it will impact other properties throughout the 
14 state. 
15 Finally, in relationship to the supremacy clause 
16 argument, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed this issue, the 
17 Thiokol case. We hope that the privilege tax issue, aside from 
18 the factual issue and the interpretation of the contract and how 
19 that works doesn't get lost here, but the legal incidence test 
20 that was relied on by the Utah Supreme Court in that particular 
21 case is followed. 
22 We believe that the County has properly interpreted and 
23 distinguished the federal cases, but in addition to that, we 
24 would again underscore a point that you had raised earlier in 
25 your questioning of ATK that relates to the 1999 Nye decision out 
1 of Nevada. That is the language of the case. It says, "Much 
2 case law suggests that the tax on the use of federal property 
3 may be measured by the value of the property itself.'' 
4 So we certainly think that it's appropriate that you 
5 distinguish between the use of the property or the possession 
6 the property versus the ownership of the property, but as the 
7 case suggests in that 1999 opinion that it is appropriate to 
8 measure the tax by the value of the property itself, and then 
9 it relies on two US Supreme Court cases and a Ninth Circuit c 
10 and then goes on to say, "However, the Sixth Circuit has held 
11 that the amount of the tax may not exceed the value of the 
12 property's use to the contractor." 
13 So we would urge you when choiced with a decision 
14 between United States Supreme Court's holdings and what has 
15 happened here and that of the Sixth Circuit, that you go with 
16 the United States Supreme Court. We believe that that is the 
17 appropriate response, and that you limit the Tenth Circuit 
18 Colorado opinion ]ust as the -- as the Nye case did that is 
19 interpreted that way. That is to distinguish between a 
20 management contract versus the type of contract where a party 
21 is potentially involved in manufacturing is using that for th~ 
22 business purpose. 
23 The Colorado case relies on the US Supreme Court cas 
24 the United States vs. City of Detroit, and then again the 
25 Muskegon case, which are really clear that you can measure th 
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1 tax by the value of the property. 
2 THE COURT: Can I ask a question on that? 
3 MR. MCCARREY: Yes, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: That has some interest to me. If the 
5 property going through here was an easement with Rocky Mountain 
6 Power, you know, for a line that went across there, they wouldn't 
7 be taxed at the full value, would they, of the property? 
8 Don't -- I mean because you do that, you -- I mean Rocky 
9 Mountain Power may not -- probably wouldn't have fee simple in 
10 federal land, but they probably have easements all over the place 
11 with federal lands, and they're probably taxed under this 
12 provision. So how is Rocky Mountain Power taxed on its easements 
13 under this statute that goes across those lands? 
14 MR. MCCARREY: That most likely, your Honor, probably 
15 becomes a question of fact based on the methodology that you'd 
16 use to determine the value of the property. If you use an income 
17 approach, you're going to capture the cash flow of Utah Power and 
18 Light --
19 THE COURT: I'm just asking how the tax commission -- I 
20 mean you sit in on a lot of those cases, I know. How does the 
21 tax commission assess and -- I mean because we have different 
22 rights here under the statute, and that's what I'm trying to kind 
23 of grapple with. We have, you know, leasehold interest, we have 
24 permit interest and we have easements, and they're all under the 
25 same statute. 
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1 You know, there's been an argument with this all or 
2 nothing, but it appears to me that under that statute it isn't 
3 all or nothing because I don't believe easements are taxed. I 
4 mean it can be a way to do it, but I don't think we do that. We 
5 certainly tax under this statute easements of Rocky Mountain --
6 I mean water companies. There are a whole bunch of entities that 
7 we'd probably tax under this, and I just wonder how -- and I know 
8 they don't tax the full amount. 
9 MR. MCCARREY: What they would generally do, your Honor, 
10 on a -- in an instance like a Pacific Corp is you would split the 
11 two interests, and you would look at, for example, in a lease 
12 situation, you would look at a leasehold and lease fee interest. 
13 You know, the lease fee interest may be exempt. The leasehold 
14 interest is then held by the person who is subject to tax, and 
15 you're really going to capture that through your cash flow stream 
16 back to the holder of the lease fee interest. 
17 The scenario here where you have -- you make the 
18 assumption well, let's assume a property that has a lease, a 
19 permit and an easement on it, and the argument was made that the 
20 County is going to capture all three of those interests at the 
21 full value, you just don't see that type of a case. 
22 THE COURT: No, but it's possible to capture all of 
23 (inaudible) more than if just one person owned it fee simple. I 
24 mean I'm sure that happens, too. 
25 MR. MCCARREY: You could do that, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: And I don't think there's any 
2 unconstitutional about doing that, if they capture them under 
3 different taxes. 
4 MR. MCCARREY: It again, with the methodology that 
5 you employ, at least on the state level, you're going to try to 
6 separate out the interests and apportion it that way. As far as 
7 the --
8 THE COURT: Well, let me tell you why I'm asking the 
9 question. 
10 MR. MCCARREY: Okay. Sure, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: The statement was made that it's either 
12 all or nothing, but if under the statute we don't do it all or 
13 nothing in all the parts that are there, is all or nothing the 
14 only interpretation as far as the tax commission? I mean do you 
15 believe -- I mean you said you wanted me to follow the one case, 
16 but is in fact are they doing all or nothing with all -- I mean 
17 are they treating leases, permits and easements all -- as all or 
18 nothing? 
19 MR. MCCARREY: Our position would be that it really does 
20 end up being an all or nothing, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Even on easements? 
22 MR. MCCARREY: As far as separate easements, those --
23 again, you've got to distinguish the types of taxation that the 
24 state does. It does the --
25 THE COURT: No, I understand the type. I mean --
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1 MR. MCCARREY: The unitary assessments and --
2 THE COURT: No, I understand. I've been to the school 
3 and I served for 12 years on the tax recodification commission, 
4 and so went through and have spent -- I mean gone through and for 
5 12 years I sat as a member of that commission and we went through 
6 and spent a lot of time going through this. 
7 To be honest, that's why I'm asking these questions 
8 because I'm trying to understand -- you're asking me to 
9 interpret how this statute should be applied. Part of that is 
10 understanding how is it applied today. How is it being applied 
11 because we have in the same -- and if I give words -- do I give 
12 words different meanings? You know, do they have the same 
1 3 meanings ? 
14 Is -- and I'm not sure, because I don't -- these are 
15 questions I don't know. That's why I'm legitimately asking how 
16 the tax -- you represent the tax commission. How are they doing 
17 that, because I don't believe from my -- and granted, I have 
18 limited knowledge, and it's been awhile since I have been 
19 involved in that, you know. In fact, quite a few years since 
20 I've been -- but these laws haven't substantially changed since 
21 I've been on the bench because all these amendments and 
22 everything are -- predate me even coming on the bench when I 
23 was on the tax recodification commission. 
24 MR. MCCARREY: Yeah, that --
25 THE COURT: And so I --
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1 MR. MCCARREY: It's not -- I guess it's not a question 
2 that's susceptible to boil down in one simple phrase. It's going 
3 to depend on the property interest, it's going to depend on the 
4 methodologies that are used, whether they're using an income or 
5 cost approach, it's going to depend on how the property is 
6 captured on the books and records of a particular entity. Is it 
7 in some way being amortized. 
8 There certainly is going to be an effort made to look 
9 at the different property interests themselves. However, if you 
10 really get to a -- you know, something more basic like a mining 
11 interest, generally my understanding is that they're going to use 
12 an income approach, and they're going to try to capture the value 
13 of that interest, which candidly, is probably going to be the 
14 full value, at least on a depleting property. With a property 
15 that doesn't deplete, again, that becomes just a much more 
16 difficult question. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. MCCARREY: Other questions, your Honor? 
19 THE COURT: I'm not sure you answered my question, 
20 but --
21 MR. MCCARREY: I'm not sure I have an easy answer for 
22 you, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
24 MR. MCCARREY: Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: Do you want to deal with the supremacy 
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1 issues, then? 
2 MS. SLOAN: Just briefly, your Honor, I'd like to point 
3 out to you that m para -- page 17 of ATK's reply memorandum they 
4 state that, "ATK has not requested relief from this Court based 
5 on an asserted violation of the supremacy clause, nor has it 
6 asserted a claim on behalf of the Navy.'' So I'm not quite sure 
7 where they -- you know, where they actually stand in terms of 
8 their pleadings, but it seems pretty clear that they walked away 
9 from their supremacy clause argument. 
10 I do have cases that have been referred to in the 
11 arguments of Counsel, and I have those for the Court if the 
12 Court would like them in terms of the supremacy clause. 
13 THE COURT: Yeah. I mean I've copied -- I have 
14 (inaudible) so that I may have already read them. Okay. 
15 MS. SLOAN: Just briefly, I think it's very clear under 
16 US Supreme Court precedent in the Muskegon case in US vs. Foyd 
17 that measuring the tax, which is measured on the full value of 
18 the property is constitutional. 
19 Nye County, of course, is not precedent in this 
20 jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit case, that has been 
21 distinguished because it was really based upon a services 
22 contract as opposed to a management contract. Even the Tenth 
23 Circuit alluded to the fact that had it been a management 
24 contract, which is -- or a manufacturing contract, which is what 
25 we have here with ATK supplying solid rocket motors, that the 
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1 Tenth Circuit may have looked at that differently. 
2 Further, two years after US vs. Colorado, the Tenth 
3 Circuit issued US vs. New Mexico. In that case the Tenth Circuit 
4 upheld the constitutionality of New Mexico's taxation of federal 
5 contractors, sales and use taxes, but it adopted the same 
6 standard, which the US Supreme Court ultimately upheld in US vs. 
7 New Mexico. US vs. New Mexico is the clear bright line case that 
8 the Supreme Court was trying to establish in these governmental 
9 lmmumty cases, and it has not deviated from that since US vs. 
I 0 New Mexico. 
II So the Ninth Circuit, I would contend, is an outlier 
12 case, and the Tenth Circuit, US vs. Colorado was very fact 
13 specific because the Tenth Circuit was bothered by the fact 
14 that Rockwell International was subject to a privilege tax that 
15 exceeded the value of its management contract. So --
16 THE COURT: It was about double. 
17 MS. SLOAN: It was about double, and so I think that was 
18 clearly an influence on the -- had an influence. I agree with 
19 the Court, Shelleby vs. Lore is applicable The evidence in the 
20 Sutherland case is not because the County wasn't asserting the 
21 constitutional rights of a third party in that case, which is 
22 contrary to what ATK is doing. Their whole case in terms of 
23 supremacy clause relies on the constitutional rights of the 
24 United States. So that's --
25 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. 
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1 MS. SLOAN: Thank you. 
2 MR. CRAPO: Did the County want to respond to anything 
3 the State Tax Commission stated, your Honor? 
4 THE COURT: (Inaudible)7 
5 MR. WRIGHT: No, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed. 
7 MR. CRAPO: Thank you, your Honor. I'd like to address 
8 a couple of the points that were raised by the County and the 
9 State Tax Commission and answer any remaining questions the Court 
I 0 may have. 
II I'll probably ]ump around a little a bit and try to hit 
12 the points that were raised. First on the legislative intent 
13 that was cited by Mr. Wright on behalf of the counties, that 
14 was a statement made by Mr. Brady in 1987. I don't believe that 
15 Mr. Brady really speaks for the legislative intent. He's not a 
16 member of the legislature, and --
17 THE COURT: No, he spoke for the tax recodification 
18 commission as the chairman. 
19 MR. CRAPO: Yeah. 
20 THE COURT: Coming in and explaining why they had made 
21 these recommendations of this statute, so I'm very familiar, 
22 having served on that with --
23 MR. CRAPO: Right, and there were several phases to that 
24 recodification, as you're aware. 
25 THE COURT: Yes. 
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1 MR. CRAPO: It's really interesting to look at the 
2 statute. The Supreme Court, which addressed the 1987 statute in 
3 the Evans vs. Sutherland case made the statement that apparently 
4 the legislature did intend to change the statute and broaden the 
5 exemptions for the religious one in subparagraph (c) and for non-
6 exclusive leases and permits, which is Exhibit (d). 
7 So despite what maybe Mr. Brady thought or intended, 
8 other phases or whatever, the Supreme Court did decide that there 
9 were changes. The thing that's also sort of interesting is you 
10 look at the language that Mr. Wright pointed out to you, as you 
11 go here, you'll notice in 1959 it talks about mineral and grazing 
12 permits issued by the United States or the State of Utah. In 
13 1975 it stays the same. We have subparagraph (d) here. 
14 There's no restriction to the United States or the State 
15 of Utah. You also look at subparagraph (c), no restrictions to 
16 the United States and State of Utah. They definitely broadened 
17 it on that score. They also broadened -- in fact, they broke out 
18 grazing, put it at (c), then changed it to agricultural, and then 
19 they went to (d) . 
20 So despite that fact, it appears, and the Supreme 
21 Court has stated -- the Utah Supreme Court -- it appears the 
22 legislature did change this in the 1987 recodification to some 
23 degree. We believe that should be interpreted in favor of the 
24 plain language. 
25 Now we get to the question -- a couple of questions that 
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1 were raised on exclusive possession and what does it really mean 
2 in the first sentence, and can the first sentence be interpreted. 
3 While this only points to subsection (e), I want to talk about 
4 (d) as well. 
p. I 
3 As I stated in my opening statement, we take the 
6 position that the language that was added in ^75 to remove the 
7 minerals from the grazing and move them into subsection (2) or 
8 the second sentence, it does appear that the legislature was 
9 attempting to tax minerals at that point, exclusive of the brines 
10 of the Great Salt Lake. 
11 Now the question then becomes why did they then make the 
12 change m 1987 and break it out even further, and did they put 
13 grazing in a separate subsection, and then you have subsection 
14 (d) down below. We believe that you can read it consistently 
15 that the legislature is saying, "Okay, we now have grazing, and 
16 we're not even going to require that it be exclusive possession," 
17 which is what they have in subsection (d). 
18 Now we have minerals in (e) that we're saying, "Okay, 
19 we are going to deem them to have possession." So what does the 
20 first sentence of (e) mean? They're saying, "Well, there are 
21 other leases out there, and there are other permits out there, 
22 and if there isn't exclusive possession of those particular 
23 properties, then they should not be subject to tax," which is 
24 consistent with the same language of the Great Salt Lake brines 
25 because they said they're harvesting the brines, the minerals out 
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1 of the water. No one has possession or a particular amount of 
2 water that they're flooding in that are particular areas. The 
3 legislature states then in (e) there may be other ones where 
4 people do not have exclusive possession, and if there are other 
5 ones, they're not subject to tax. 
6 THE COURT: I need to ask you one question. You 
7 seem to use in your brief interchangeably the words control 
8 and possession, that exclusive possession means the right to 
9 exclusive control. Now with a lot of leases and permits and 
10 particularly that you can have exclusive possession, but it's 
11 subject to certain rules and conditions. 
12 For example, if you're down at BYU in BYU housirg you 
13 can have an exclusive lease to a property, but it's subject to a 
14 whole set of rules that it doesn't give you exclusive control of 
15 your property, it -- that allows you exclusive possession subject 
16 to a number of standards and rules. You seem to use -- do you 
17 think there's a difference where you can have exclusive 
18 possession but not have exclusive control? 
19 MR. CRAPO: It's a fine point, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Well, and it's the fine point that this may 
2 1 turn on. 
22 MR. CRAPO: Right. In Keller --
23 THE COURT: As I have gone through and looked at your 
24 position, because it seems to me that you can have -- but I'd 
25 like to hear your argument. Can you -- because I think there are 
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1 a lot of cases you can have exclusive possession without 
2 exclusive control. 
3 MR. CRAPO: Right. In Keller it talks a little bit 
4 about that control language, and that's where we've cited it into 
5 the brief. 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
7 MR. CRAPO: The point being made in Keller and a couple 
8 of other cases that were cited there, they said that a lease is 
9 going to be deemed to give some exclusive possession to the 
10 actual premises that are at issue for time specific and that will 
11 be sufficient. They talk about that exclusive possession. 
12 Does that mean that the landlord has given up every 
13 single control? Probably not. They still have a control to 
14 sell that property. They still have control to be able on a 
15 reasonable basis to come in and maybe inspect that property, 
16 but the tenant at that point has the expectation that when the 
17 landlord shows up at the door they can say, "You cannot come in 
18 right now. I have my right to enjoy and to use this property 
19 at this particular point. Come back at a reasonable time that 
20 is convenient for me and convenient to what we have in our 
2 1 documents." 
22 That, I believe, is distinguishable here with ATK. ATK, 
23 one, does not pay any rent, as you're aware, on this. It's a 
24 non-interference basis. They're asked to do contracts for the 
25 United States government -- the Navy -- to build missiles, and to 
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1 make them for them. 
2 Part of the agreement is it says the government is not 
3 going to charge them rent. Why? Because they're doing what the 
4 government wants them to do with the government's property. If 
5 they're going to do something different they have to get special 
6 permission through a cross utilization to say may we use this for 
7 some other purpose. Then the Navy will decide whether they'll 
8 allow it or not. 
9 THE COURT: But doesn't give that -- doesn't that give 
10 them, then, exclusive possession for the pioperty for the purpose 
11 of the permit? I mean if the permit is to be in that property to 
12 build the missiles and do these things -- and like you say, well, 
13 if they're going to go back and do something different, they've 
14 got to ask the Navy if we can do something different, but doesn't 
15 that give them exclusive possession as long as they're doing what 
16 the terms of the permit say? 
17 MR. CRAPO: I believe where we would argue that it's 
18 different from the Keller versus this one, your Honor --
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. CRAPO: -- is they don't have a right to use and 
21 enjoy. Any moment the Navy says, "Stop using, Stark is coming in 
22 to inspect," they stop. Any moment the Navy says, "You're not 
23 going to be using this property today," they can't use it. When 
24 the Navy says, "We're allowing someone else in on the property 
25 right now," and we say, "Well, gee, we don't want you in," they 
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1 say, "Too bad. Any time, any place, we're the Navy, it's our 
2 property. We come in, we use and we're there." 
3 We don't have that right of enjoyment or that control 
4 issue. We have a limited right to be able to use it as the Navy 
5 dictates us to use it, and we don't have that enjoyment you get 
6 under a lease. 
7 THE COURT: But does that language allow you to have 
8 that enjoyment to not be taxed, because the language says 
9 exclusive possession of the premise to which the lease, permit 
10 or easement relates. So if you have exclusive possession and it 
11 relates to doing just this --
12 MR. CRAPO: Right. 
13 THE COURT: And as long as you do just this, you have 
14 the right to do that, but if you do this, yeah, they can come in 
15 and say do something different, or if you do this, but it still 
16 seems like you have exclusive possession as it relates to the 
17 terms of the -- either the lease or the permit or the -- it's 
18 when you get outside of that that you don't -- and it's your 
19 argument that the nature of what they have doesn't give them even 
20 exclusive possession within their permit, within the terms of the 
21 contract and the permit? 
22 MR. CRAPO: This is where we get to the definition, your 
23 Honor, of property --
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. CRAPO: -- that's subject to tax and whether it's 
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all or nothing. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CRAPO: That's where we hit here. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CRAPO: Because if you tell me that my permit for 
ATK is exclusive for the use of this particular drill and this 
particular building for drilling down a particular motor, I have 
that at that moment, but I don't have exclusive possession of the 
other 400 acres or the other buildings that we're not even using. 
The County is taxing us not on our exclusive possessory use, but 
they're taxing us on the entire all. So it's all or it's 
nothing. 
When you asked Mr. McCarrey the question what happens at 
the State Tax Commission, remember, we're dealing with a locally 
assessed property here by the counties. They use a cost approach 
and income approach. They do it very different than a unitary 
approach, which is done at the State Tax Commission. So there is 
a difference here. 
What we end up having at the last section which is 
subsection (4), it talks about a tax imposed under this chapter 
is assessed to the possessors or users of the property on the 
same forms and collected and distributed at the same time and in 
the same manner as taxes assessed to owners. 
Now what they're doing is they're saying, '"Okay, we're 
going to tax you as if you're the owner of the entire property." 
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1 We believe that that is inappropriate. It basically reads this 
2 out of any exemption for that first sentence. It isn't needed. 
3 THE COURT: So is your claim instead of a supremacy 
4 claim an equal protection claim? 
5 MR. CRAPO: It would work that way as you look at ATK's 
6 claim would be the equal protection. The United States would be 
7 the supremacy. 
8 THE COURT: That's what I mean, but you can only raise 
9 ATK's claims. 
10 MR. CRAPO: That is correct, your Honor, and that's the 
11 point that was made in Evans and Sutherland. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. CRAPO: Your Honor, I think if -- the only way to 
14 really read this to give this meaning is if you've got a parcel 
15 of land and you have a small 10 or 20 percent use with a permit 
16 that's exclusive to that 10 or 20 percent, you only should be 
17 allowed to tax that portion. It is in essence an all or nothing 
18 That's why you get to ABCO. If you look at ABCO in 
19 paragraph 13 as you read through that, the Supreme Court says, 
20 "We're going to analyze on equal protection and on due process 
21 the privilege tax just like it's a property tax. They've got to 
22 be on equal footing." So you can't say well, just because this 
23 is a beneficial use tax it has a different standard applied to i 
24 and we can levy it based on a 300 percent rule that we talked 
25 about earlier. 
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1 So I think the Supreme Court is directing us how to 
2 interpret this. I think if we read it as applying to any, you've 
3 got grazing above it, you've got any here, and then you've got 
4 the mineral down below. I believe that is consistent with the 
5 interpretation, and would allow the Court to proceed in a 
6 constitutional manner. I'd be happy to answer any questions that 
7 you may have. 
8 THE COURT: No, I think you've covered it. I mean this 
9 has been very thoroughly briefed. I appreciate all --
10 MR. CRAPO: Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: -- parties' arguments 
12 MR. CRAPO: Thank you, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Does the County have anything else that you 
14 wish to -- any of the -- or the attorney general's office? 
15 MR. MCCARREY: Can I ]ust touch on a couple of points, 
16 and then if you want -- if Counsel wants to follow up. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah, just's quickly. 
18 MR. MCCARREY: Okay. 
19 MR. CRAPO: If it's something new I would like to 
20 comment on it. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. I will allow you. I'm not going to 
22 cut anybody off. 
23 MR. MCCARREY: I guess at one point I did miss on 
24 Ms. Sloan's is I just wanted to point out that the Evans and 
25 Sutherland case does come after Shelleby, and I believe E made 
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1 that point clear, but --
2 THE COURT: Yes. 
3 MR. MCCARREY: -- that's the case we would refer you to. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
5 MR. WRIGHT: I would just like to clarify that ATK is 
6 taxed on property that it uses, and we've got that set out in the 
7 facts. If you were to take --
8 THE COURT: Well, the facts say I think, what, there are 
9 181 pieces of property, and they use --
10 MR. WRIGHT: Yes, and some don't have value and --
11 THE COURT: Yeah, I think there's 15 that they don't 
12 use, and then one building that the Navy uses, and so --
13 MR. WRIGHT: Correct. I just wanted to clarify that I 
14 think Counsel misspoke on that issue. Well, your Honor, I think 
15 the Court has addressed the issues and concerns. The Evans and 
16 Sutherland case, the statement in there, you have to read the 
17 language -- it is dicta, first of all, but then the way they read 
18 it, I don't believe that they're reading it to say in 1987 we 
19 have a brand new statute. I don't believe that. 
20 If you take their argument to an extreme, you could 
21 never have a privilege tax on any property. So we -- I 
22 respectfully disagree. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. 
24 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: Anything else? 
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MR. CRAPO: I don't think that opens anything up, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Thank you for all the 
parties and the good work that you have done. I will be issuing 
an opinion. It will probably be closer to the 60 days than 30 
days by the time we finish it, but I will -- because it has to 
be, I think, fairly thorough. 
I need to ask you so I clarify with you, you don't 
believe there are any factual issues that would require a further 
hearing. I asked that of the County and they said no. 
MR. CRAPO: Yes, and I didn't --
THE COURT: And you didn't. Because I mean that's -- I 
just want to clarify that for the record. 
MR. CRAPO: Procedurally I believe you have enough to 
rule on summary judgment based on what you have. However, if the 
interpretation of the Court were to go and say do we not have 
full control of the premises by defining the premises to the 
exclusive, you'd probably need additional factual information 
to say what control do you really have and what parts of the 
property don't you utilize. That's not before you at this point. 
THE COURT: Okay. What is before me is they don't 
utilize all the buildings. 
MR. CRAPO: Correct. 
THE COURT: So what I have before me, I mean factually, 
is that they don't utilize all of the buildings. Out of 181 
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1 buildings there are 14 that they don't utilize. 
2 MR. CRAPO: Correct. 
3 THE COURT: So I have to assume that as fact because 
4 you're both agreed to that as to where we are. 
5 MR. CRAPO: That's correct, your Honor. 
6 MR. WRIGHT: And we have taxed only the property that 
7 ATK uses. 
8 MR. CRAPO: That's not a fact before you, your Honor. 
9 That's not been alleged in any --
10 MR. WRIGHT: It's a fact that we've got -- that we've 
11 put in that I think they've agreed to. I think it's paragraph 
12 12. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Let me look at that. That is a --
14 paragraph 12 of your --
15 MR. CRAPO: Of your brief, Kelly? 
16 MR. WRIGHT: Actually, paragraph 16, your Honor. 
17 MR. CRAPO: Of yours? 
18 MR. WRIGHT: Yes. Yes. This -- if you wanted to go 
19 to the motion for summary -- or the summary judgment, the very 
20 initial brief, it was included in the reply brief as well. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. So it is your motion, and it's 
22 paragraph 12? 
23 MR. WRIGHT: No, I'm sorry, 15 and 16. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. So 15 --
25 MR. CRAPO: Of your memorandum. 
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THE COURT: All right. It says, "The Nyroit property at 
ATK (inaudible) is comprised of six parcels that constitute 
528.48 acres, 181 improvements owned by the US. Alliant uses 161 
improvements at Nyroit in connection with its business to fulfill 
and perform its government contract. The uses and features of 
the structures within Nyroit are similar to the ones at plant 
one. Of the 181 improvements, 15 no longer contribute value, 6 
contribute less than 1,000, 16 contribute less than 5,000. 
Consequently" -- so what you're saying is that the only thing 
that you are taxing is -- the 144 constitute 99.7 percent of the 
value, and that 15 you're putting at no value, 6 less than 1,000 
each and 16 less than 5,000 each. 
MR. WRIGHT: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. So -- okay. So that is a fact that's 
in part of the record. 
MR. WRIGHT: That is a fact, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Okay. Thank you very 
much. 
MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. 
MS. SLOAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court is in recess. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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